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Abstract 
	  
In this project, I pose the question, "why do authoritarian rulers create political parties?" Given 
the recent proliferation of authoritarian regimes that feature pluralistic, if skewed, elections, the 
incentives for dictators to have parties of their own have never been stronger. Yet only about half 
of authoritarian rulers in fact have their own parties. I argue that incumbent rulers create parties 
of power in order to change existing political elites' incentives for cooperation, but that many 
rulers do not to create parties of their own because they risk failing to attract political elites into 
their party. I theorize party creation by incumbent authoritarian rulers as a strategic and 
interdependent process, in which the act of establishing a party serves as a meaningful but 
imperfect signal of a leader’s type. I present a formal model of authoritarian party creation in 
which I define parameters and state assumptions that generate five pure-strategy equilibria. I 
state two hypotheses relating to the role of elite beliefs in leading to different party creation 
outcomes, which I evaluate using paired historical case studies of four Post-Soviet leaders’ 
institutional choices. This project offers a corrective to existing theories of authoritarian party 
creation by focusing on short-term incentives and immediate strategic conditions. It also 
demonstrates why many leaders choose not to create parties despite having incentives to do so. 
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Chapter 1: Authoritarian Leaders and Institutional Choices 
 
Had Tolstoy trained as political scientist, he might have quipped that "all 
democratic countries are democratic in the same way, while each authoritarian regime is 
authoritarian in its own way." In other words, while citizens in democracies elect their 
political representatives, and enjoy a wide range of other civil liberties, authoritarian 
regimes exhibit far greater institutional diversity. Some authoritarian rulers inherit their 
positions by descent or divine right while others hold their positions by virtue of being 
the military's top officer. Some dictators are appointed by their predecessor, while others 
win office through elections. Some rely on praetorian guards to remain in power, while 
others cultivate broad patronage networks, and others establish cults of personality to 
legitimize their power. Some authoritarian regimes feature regular, if skewed, elections 
while in others, legislatures and elections are banned for decades. Most authoritarian 
regimes feature some combination of the attributes listed above, and many rulers shift 
their strategies of rule over time. The diversity among authoritarian regimes is striking. 
Why, then, do authoritarian rulers choose some strategies of rule over others? 
While existing scholarship has succeeded in illustrating the remarkable institutional 
diversity of authoritarian regimes (Huntington 1968, Geddes 1999, Bratton and Van De 
Walle 1997, Chehabi and Linz 1998, Slater 2003, Lust-Okar 2005, Magaloni 2006, 
Gandhi 2008, Svolik 2012a), and while many of these works have elaborated on the 
many benefits that parties provide in authoritarian regimes, these works have reached 
little consensus on what explains this variation. Furthermore, they have barely begun to 
address the specific question of why dictators create political parties of their own. 
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I argue that authoritarian rulers create parties of their own in order to change 
elites' incentives for cooperation. Authoritarian rulers seek the cooperation of elites to 
reduce the transactional costs of running an authoritarian regime,1 which frees resources 
that authoritarian rulers can use for any number of other purposes. Cooperative elites 
contribute more to economic growth are less likely to revolt (Wintrobe 1998). While 
parties of power perform a wide range of functions over time for leaders who create 
them, I argue that these long-term functions should not be conflated with the immediate 
concerns that lead to their creation. Furthermore, while many leaders in authoritarian 
regimes have strong incentives to create parties of their own, these rulers create parties 
only when they expect other elites to join.  
I focus in particular on party creation by authoritarian rulers because of the 
puzzling variation in this institutional outcome; given the benefits that parties provide 
authoritarian rulers, why don't all authoritarian rulers have parties? I argue that while 
authoritarian rulers contemplate creating a party of their own,2 they create parties only 
when they are certain that elites will join. Elites in turn will only join the leader's party 
when they believe that party affiliation will bring rewards greater than the benefits they 
would retain by remaining independent from the leader's party. I argue in this dissertation 
that elites above all wish to remain elites, which is to say that they wish to remain part of 
the "winning coalition" within their regime. This offers a more substantial guarantee of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 While it is possible to win over regime supporters on an ad-hoc basis, recruiting a stable loyal set of elites 
to cooperate with the leader reduces the transaction costs associated with repeated searches for regime 
supporters. 
2 Leaders of authoritarian regimes where elections are not held are unlikely to contemplate creating parties. 
Similarly, leaders in regimes where legislatures function on a non-partisan basis have little incentive to 
create parties. 
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eligibility for the benefits of association with the ruler rather than ad-hoc handouts from 
the leader. 
Building upon the substantial scholarship on parties outside of consolidated 
democracies, (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966, Huntington 1968, Voslensky 1984, Linz 
2000, Smith 2007, Magaloni 2006, Brownlee 2007) this work contributes a novel theory 
of party creation by incumbent authoritarian leaders. Rather than conceptualizing the 
absence of a pro-regime party as the failure to create one, this work treats both the 
creation of parties and the decision not to do so as institutional equilibria in their own 
right. The theory focuses proposed in this work focuses on the strategic nature of party 
creation in authoritarian regimes and considers both the incentives of elites along with 
those of leaders to explain the variation in the emergence of parties of power in 
authoritarian regimes worldwide. This project offers a novel explanation for the puzzling 
variation of institutional configurations within authoritarian regimes and demonstrates the 
leverage of this new theory with historical case studies and a discussion of the theory's 
application to the entire set of parties of power created since 1946. 
 
Confronting the Dictator's Dilemma: Institutional Diversity and Convergence  
Remaining in office is the fundamental goal and paramount challenge for 
politicians in democracies and autocracies alike (Downs 1957, Harmel and Janda 1994, 
Wintrobe 1998, Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003).3 However, most authoritarian leaders 
lack routinized procedures for gaining and passing on power, and furthermore, they face 
a more or less constant threat of coup (Gandhi 2008, Svolik 2012a). Thus, to secure their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Other goals such as maximizing personal wealth or carrying out various ideological programs are 
contingent on the ruler remaining in power or their ability to install a successor who protects their interests. 
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tenure in power, they must maintain a coalition of supporters and repress others. Even 
with a clear base of support, their ability to hold on to power and then leave office 
peacefully is difficult to guarantee. To that end, authoritarian rulers have turned to a wide 
rage of practices and institutions. 
Cross-national datasets of authoritarian regimes reveal wide variation in 
authoritarian leaders' ability to stay in power and call into question the ability of parties to 
lengthen the tenure of authoritarian ruling coalitions. Between 1946-2008, the average 
tenure of ruling coalitions of successive allied leaders was 14.7 years with a standard 
deviation of 16.8 years. Breaking down this set into those coalitions that came to power 
already in control of a party with those that created a party after gaining power reveals an 
notable difference. Coalitions that created parties after gaining power remained in power 
on average for 17.4 years, while coalitions that already had parties remained in power for 
22.4 years. Ruling coalitions that never created parties in regimes where executive and 
legislative elections were held regularly remained in power on average 14.2 years, only 
20% less than coalitions that created parties (Svolik 2012b, Author’s calculation). Given 
the costs and risks associated with creating parties, this seems to be a meager payoff. 
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Figure 1: Authoritarian Paths to Power 1946-2008 
 
Source: Svolik 2012b   
 
While exhibiting remarkable diversity over time in terms of the existence and 
makeup of legislatures as well as executive paths to power, in recent years, authoritarian 
regimes are converging institutionally to the point that the majority holds multiparty 
legislative elections and multicandidate executive elections. Between 1946-2008, 42% of 
authoritarian country-years were spent under unelected rulers, who included but were not 
limited to military dictators and monarchs, while an additional 32% were spent under 
leaders who were the only candidate to compete in their "election." Many of these 
leaders, though not all, presided over Marxist-Leninist states. In the 139 countries that 
endured spells of authoritarian rule, legislatures were banned in 18% of country years; 
unelected legislatures were present in 10%, while 37% of country-years were spent under 
a single-party legislature. For 14% of country-years between 1946-2008, the executive 
was unelected and no legislature existed, meaning that leaders ruled either through some 
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combination of direct cooptation and coercion. Nearly 25% of country years occurred 
under single-party regimes which underscores the prevalence of political parties in 
authoritarian regimes (Svolik 2012b). 
 
Figure 2: Partisan Composition of Authoritarian Legislatures 1946-2008  
 
       Source: Svolik 2012b 
 
However, after 1991, approximately 46% of authoritarian country-years passed in 
regimes where rulers competed in multi-candidate elections whereas 16% of authoritarian 
country years before 1991 occurred under similar conditions. This figure has risen to 55% 
in the 2000s. Since 1991, 52% of authoritarian country-years passed in regimes where 
multiple parties held seats in legislatures, as opposed to 20% of legislatures before 1991. 
Since 2000, this figure has risen to 57%. These gains in multiparty legislatures and 
multicandidate executive elections has occurred largely at the expense of single party 
regimes, which accounted for 43% of country-years before 1991 and 11% of country 
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years since 2000, though approximately 24% of executives, largely monarchs, are still 
unelected (Svolik 2012b). 
As of 2008, 70% of authoritarian regimes permitted multiparty representation in 
legislatures, while parties were banned in only 20% of authoritarian regimes. Over time, 
despite remarkable diversity in the origins of authoritarian regimes, most have converged 
to share these institutional features. Though the independent authority of legislatures in 
authoritarian regimes is lower than those in democracies, the existence of legislatures and 
the operation of multiple parties may pose a threat to dictators who must take steps to 
manage these independent institutions. As elected executives and legislatures become the 
norm in authoritarian regimes, the incentives for leaders to create parties of their own if 
they do not already have them are increasing.  However, approximately half of those 
authoritarian rulers in office at present who did not come to power with parties of their 
own still have not created parties. Why is this the case?  
 
Why Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: Competing Explanations 
 As scholarship on political parties has expanded to non-democratic contexts, 
parties have come to be understood as highly beneficial if not essential to the function of 
some authoritarian regimes. They unify disparate groups within society (Zolberg 1966, 
Huntington 1968), strengthen the ability of authoritarian rulers to distribute patronage to 
allies (Magaloni 2006), establish protected forums for bargaining with rivals (Gandhi 
2008), and buffer leaders from crises and internal challenges (Brownlee 2007, Levitsky 
and Way 2010), thereby prolonging the tenure of authoritarian rulers and their coalitions 
(Svolik 2012a). Given the widely recognized benefits provided by political parties, why 
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is it that so many leaders do not have parties of their own? Phrased differently, why do 
some authoritarian rulers rush to create their own parties once in office, and why do 
others refrain altogether from party politics? In this section, I review theories about the 
role of parties in authoritarian regimes. Given that these works are largely silent about the 
specific conditions that lead to party creation, I draw out the implications of these 
theories for the variation in authoritarian leaders' choices to create parties of their own. 
Early theories about political parties outside of consolidated democracies focus on 
modernization as the driving force behind these parties' formation. Pointing to the 
proliferation of single party regimes in the newly independent states of Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Southeast Asia where parties had come into existence either on the eve of 
independence or shortly afterwards, LaPalombara and Weiner (1966) explain the 
formation of these parties as a "consequence of larger socio-economic changes, and in 
particular the appearance or expansion of entrepreneurial classes and the proliferation of 
specialized professional classes" (20). Additionally, single parties served to unify and 
mobilize ethnically fractious societies, and mitigate the perils of political and social 
change in modernizing countries (Zolberg 1966). In this case, the organic processes of 
interest aggregation and differentiation drive institutional formation. As economies 
developed and differentiated, modernization theorists expected multiple parties to emerge 
in single-party regimes as interests and demands diversified within society (Huntington 
1968, Huntington and Moore 1970).  
However, this turned out not to be the case. If followed to their logical extension, 
these works would predict that regimes featuring a single pro-regime party would 
transform into multiparty democracies as economies and societies modernized. The five 
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decades that have passed after the authoring of the major works of modernization theory 
have shown that multiparty regimes such as India and Bangladesh that rank 
approximately at the 30th percentile for per capita income as well as on the UNDP's 
Human Development Index (HDI), while essentially single-party regimes endure in 
Russia and Singapore under middle and high levels of per capita GDP as well as 
high/very high scores on HDI (UNDP 2014). These works have difficulty explaining the 
trajectories of the many countries that alternate between periods of democracy and 
authoritarianism, and moreover do not account for the mechanisms that lead to the 
establishment of parties.  
Another major explanation for the creation of parties in authoritarian institutions 
holds that rulers who lack resources for patronage or coercion create parties as a way to 
build loyalty among elites and the population. As resource-rich rulers face less pressure 
to tax their populations, they face less pressure to cultivate loyalty among subjects, and 
can simply resort to force or direct material cooptation to secure their rule (Wintrobe 
1998). In a similar line of argument, leaders who gain power and immediately have 
access to resources have less need for organizational infrastructure such as parties and 
legislatures. According to this argument, leaders who lack the resources to coopt rivals 
invest in institutions such as parties in order to bolster their power. Ironically, this means 
that leaders who gained power with fewer resources fare better when crises hit because 
they have invested in institutions rather than winning support simply through material 
transactions with elites (Smith 2007).  
While these resource-based accounts of authoritarian institutional creation may 
help explain individual cases, they fail to map more generally onto the creation of parties 
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of power worldwide. Leaders of a number of resource-rich regimes such as Zaire, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Kazakhstan have created and maintained parties of power, while 
dozens leaders of resource-poor countries including Afghanistan, Guatemala, Cambodia, 
and Haiti have not. Furthermore, resource-based theories of institutional creation are 
unable to account for variation within a single regime type (resource-rich or resource-
poor).  Though resource endowments are a crucial consideration in any explanation of 
politics, there does not seem to be as clear a relationship between resources and 
institutional strategies as the authors above suggest.  
Another line of argument holds that authoritarian rulers create parties when they 
lack civilian bases of support or institutional capacity in legislatures. Dictators who 
originate as military officers use parties of power to establish a civilian power base and 
recruit cadres of politicians for legislative and bureaucratic support, thereby reducing 
their reliance on army officers to remain in office (Geddes 2006). According to a similiar 
logic, rulers in presidential systems who do not already have parties of their own create 
them in order to exert greater influence over legislatures (Smyth 2002). This phenomenon 
is particularly prevalent in mixed parliamentary systems where seats are allocated both in 
single member districts as well as by party list, which creates strong incentives for 
leaders to have a party of their own. While the chief executive might find side payments 
sufficient to win the support of members of parliament from single member districts, 
partisan parliamentarians have loyalties that may be harder to sway and so must 
somehow be induced to support the president’s agenda (Smyth 2002: 559).  
The "institutional bridge" argument offered by Geddes (2006) and Smyth (2002) 
improves on existing literature by linking the creation of parties to institutional 
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challenges for which parties provide an immediate solution rather than explaining the 
creation of parties by pointing to the long-term benefits that parties may or may not 
eventually deliver. Empirically, their arguments do not adequately account for 
institutional outcomes within the post-Soviet space, let alone outside the region. Though 
Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova4 all share the institutional configurations that Smyth 
(2002) indicates as creating incentives for parties of power, a party of power emerged 
only in Russia. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan both have similarly structured legislatures,5 
though leaders in the two countries did not create parties until the mid-2000s. However, 
Smyth's (2002) argument is compelling, and should be applied to a wider set of cases. 
Executives in a variety of institutional contexts could benefit from establishing a "long 
coalition" (Aldrich 1995) with legislators. I believe that this pressure is quite common, 
especially at the inception of an authoritarian leader's tenure, and is the driving force 
behind their decisions to create parties.  
I argue that creating one's own party is most appealing to authoritarian rulers who 
wish to change the incentives of existing elites for cooperating with the ruler. This 
particularly applies to leaders who have just assumed power as well as those who face 
newly competitive conditions, whether in a reconstituted legislature or upcoming 
elections.6 As many previous works have argued, parties can be excellent tools for 
creating long-term incentives for cooperation and loyalty from within the ruling coalition. 
However, an authoritarian ruler may prefer not to create such a binding institution. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Moldova switched to a parliamentary systems in 2009; the president is now indirectly elected, but seats in 
parliament are still filled by mixed party list and single-member districts. 
5 Kyrgyzstan switched to a semi-presidential system in 2010; there is still a directly elected president who 
shares power with a prime minister nominated by the majority bloc in parliament. The parliament is still 
elected by mixed voting. 
6 The majority of parties of power are created within the first two years of an authoritarian spell (Svolik 
2012b). 
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costs of maintaining parties are manifold, a corrupt and unpopular party can significantly 
weaken a leader's reputation, while factional infighting can reduce the efficacy of the 
party and the regime as a whole. This is all to say that creating a party involves both the 
short-term risk of failing to establish the party as well as future risks related to the party's 
performance. Authoritarian rulers who face immediate and credible threats to their 
initiatives will seek to obtain control over the legislative agenda. For leaders, creating a 
party of power is one, though not the only way to do so.7  
 In line with recent actor and choice-oriented theories of institutional formation 
(Levi 1988, North 1990, Jones-Luong 2002, Magaloni 2006, Gandhi 2008, Svolik 
2012a), I treat the creation of institutions as agential and strategic, both for leaders and 
elites. A satisfactory explanation of the creation of parties in authoritarian regimes must 
link the interests, expectations, and beliefs of relevant actors with the actions these actors 
take. Furthermore, focusing on the fact that leaders often initiate the creation of political 
parties sheds light on puzzle that is at odds with traditional assumptions about 
authoritarian institutions. Rather than conceptualizing institutions such as parties and 
legislatures as concessions to regime opponents (Gandhi 2008), leaders may envision 
creating a party as a way to build a durable base of support (Svolik 2012a). Rather than 
serving as a measure intended to ensure a long tenure for the ruler, a party may be 
intended to improve the leader’s chances of surviving in the short-to-medium term. 
Additionally, creating a party is in itself an action that holds meaning as well as the 
power to change elite incentives for cooperation. Once created, the leader may wish to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Rather than engineering a dominant ruling party, leaders may seek to shape the meta-institutions of 
government by conferring "super-" and "hyper-presidential powers" on the executive branch (Ishiyama and 
Kennedy 2001, Fairbanks 2004), by engineering electoral codes that favor non-partisan and regime-
nominated candidates (Jones-Luong 2002), or increase the power of business associations or unions at the 
expense of parties (Hale 2006). 
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use the party for different functions like coordinating the recruitment of candidates for 
election, distributing patronage, and more, but these functions may not be the tasks for 
which the party was initially created. 
 At the end of the day, the question of why should a leader create a party at all, 
when they have the options of repression and dyadic cooptation at their disposal. While 
each individual leader's calculus on this question likely differs, there are a number of 
arguments about what parties offer authoritarian rulers over the other options. Most of 
these explanations address the efficiencies that parties create, especially over time. Svolik 
(2012a) likens the pro-regime party to a pyramid scheme in which leaders and elites buy 
in early on and then reap rewards from later on as more and more politicians and citizens 
are attracted to the party. This offers a clear sense of the selective incentives available to 
those who coordinate early on to establish a party. Early on and especially over time, 
parties reduce leaders' uncertainty about who constitutes the winning coalition within the 
selectorate. Affiliation with a party of power is a visible signal of loyalty that conveys 
symbolically that the leader has support. Less visible forms of cooptation cannot change 
perceptions of the general population as easily, while repression alienates the general 
population and may stoke the desire to revolt.  
 
 
Defining Party of Power	  
 Over the past several decades, a robust industry has developed for classifying 
parties and party systems. At least seven terms remain in current use, many of which are 
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used interchangeably to describe approximately the same kind of party.8 I depart from 
much of the existing literature and primarily use the term "party of power," which I 
define as a party established and led by an incumbent authoritarian ruler.9 This 
definition accounts for the key features that, in my analysis, set authoritarian parties apart 
from those in democracies, and also factors that distinguish authoritarian parties from 
others. First, parties in autocracies should be treated as analytically distinct from parties 
in democratic regimes. Second, parties initiated at the will of rulers serve primarily their 
own interests, while parties in authoritarian regimes formed by other political actors serve 
the interests of those other political actors as well as possibly the ruler’s. Finally, some 
parties are created by incumbent rulers while other parties originate under previous rulers.  
 The most common descriptors currently in use in the literature on authoritarian 
parties, "dominant" and "hegemonic," have at times been used to distinguish institutions 
under authoritarian regimes from democratic ones, while at other times, these same terms 
have been used to compare similar institutions in different regime contexts. Given the 
imprecision that has developed around the terms “dominant” and “hegemonic party,” I 
argue for discarding both and using the term "party of power" to describe the parties at 
the center of this study. Following Brownlee (2007), Gandhi (2008), and Svolik (2012a), 
I also use the minimalist terms “regime party” and "pro-regime party" to describe parties 
that anchor authoritarian regimes, though not necessarily parties of power. I also use 
"pro-presidential party" to describe a party that exists primarily serve the interests of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See "dominant party" (Duverger 1954, Almond and Coleman 1960, Pempel 1990, Greene 2007), "pre-
dominant party" (Sartori 1976), "hegemonic party" (Sartori 1976, Magaloni 2006), "party of power, 
(Golosov and Likhtenshtein 2001), "ruling party" (Brownlee 2007), "regime" and "pro-regime party" 
(Smith 2005, Gandhi 2008, Svolik 2012a).  
9 Russian social scientists have labeled United Russia as a "party of power" on these same grounds, namely 
that it was created "by the authorities, in fact based on the decision of President Putin and under the 
immediate direction of his administration" (Ivanov 2008: 8). 
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chief executive. For the purposes of this study, "party of power" is a subset of "(pro-) 
regime" and "pro-presidential" parties that meet the selection criteria outlined below. 
 Before Sartori's (1976) Parties and Party Systems, "dominant" party system 
served as the leading classification for party systems that featured imbalanced 
competition (Duverger 1954, Almond 1960, Zolberg 1966, Huntington 1968). However, 
in an effort to better capture the nature of competition in different party systems, Sartori 
developed terms that differentiated among parties based on their influence within a party 
system, and which distinguished between competitive (democratic) and non-competitive 
(authoritarian) party systems. For authoritarian regimes, Sartori used the term 
 "hegemonic" to describe the leading party in a party systems where multiple parties exist 
but where alternation by election is unlikely if not impossible (230-1). Sartori further 
breaks hegemonic parties into "ideological" and "pragmatic" types where the former 
signifies something akin to totalitarianism, where political information is highly regulated 
by the party, and the latter which is freer and more pluralistic (231-2). I argue that at 
present, nearly all ruling parties in authoritarian regimes qualify as “pragmatic 
hegemonic,” as they are oriented more towards sustaining the leaders' grip on power 
rather than establishing a complete monopoly on information and total control over 
political activity.10 However, for the purposes of this study, the term "pragmatic 
hegemonic" does not distinguish between parties created before or after a leader gained 
power, and so I do not employ the term. 
 In the decades since Sartori introduced his classificatory scheme, "hegemonic" 
and "dominant" have become the most common descriptors for leading parties in party 
systems with skewed competition. While Magaloni (2006) preserves Sartori's proposed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Notable exceptions include Turkmenistan under Saparmurat Niyazov (1991-2006) and North Korea. 
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distinction between "(pre-)dominant" parties that exist in democracies and "hegemonic" 
parties that exist in autocracies, Reuter (2010a) uses the term "dominant party" to apply 
only to autocracies, while Pempel (1990), Friedman and Wong (2008), and Templeman 
(2012) and others use "dominant party" to refer to both democracies and autocracies. 
Reuter (2010a) bases a party's dominance on a 50% majority seat-share in parliament, 
while Templeman's (2012) primary criterion is the duration of a party's hegemony. 
Adding to the mix, Brownlee (2007) employs the minimalist term "ruling party" for the 
leading party in an authoritarian regime while Gandhi (2008) and Svolik (2012a) tend to 
use "regime" or "pro-regime party.” Neither Brownlee, Gandhi, nor Svolik specify seat-
share or temporal thresholds for classifying parties. Their terms simply denote a pro-ruler 
orientation. 
While holding a majority of seats can be a meaningful indicator of a party's 
legislative influence, parties that hold a mere plurality of seats can often dominate the 
legislative agenda just as effectively. This criterion also creates the problem of a party 
such as the New Azerbaijan Party which held 43% of seats between 1995-2000, and 62% 
of seats in the following term, 49% between 2005-2010, and 57% in the current term of 
Azerbaijan's Milli Meclis (IPU Parline 1995a, 2000a, 2005, 2010). A strict measure of 
seat share would suggest that the party passed in and out of phases of dominance, when 
in reality the party’s monopoly over Azerbaijan’s political system only strengthened over 
the period 1995-2010 (OSCE 2006: 4,11). A temporal definition of dominance is also 
problematic because many parties function as dominant or hegemonic parties but do not 
endure for 20 years for exogenous reasons such as the death of their founder or the ruler 
of the country. Using the term "party of power" avoids both of these pitfalls. 
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 This work employs the term, "party of power," which is used commonly in 
Russian-language scholarship on political parties but which has gained little traction in 
English-language social science.11 Employing the term "party of power" allows this work 
to distinguish between the different institutional origins of parties in authoritarian 
regimes rather than operationalizing distinctions either in longevity or seat-share used by 
prevailing classification systems. In practice, the term “party of power” has been used to 
refer almost exclusively to pro-regime parties created in the former Soviet Union, that 
were created by incumbent leaders.  No existing term in the literature on parties in 
authoritarian regimes that carries the connotations relating to the timing of party creation. 
I believe that this distinction justifies introducing yet another term into a field already 
well-populated with alternatives.   
 
Defining the Set of Authoritarian Regimes 
 Following Sartori (1976), I believe that the distinction between democratic and 
non-democratic regimes should be preserved when analyzing political parties, and in 
particular when developing a theory of executive-led party creation. Party dominance (or 
predominance) in democratic regimes is conceptualized primarily as the exceptional 
duration of a given party in power (Pempel 1990, Greene 2007, Friedman and Wong 
2008), which is a remarkable phenomenon for institutional settings where the electoral 
defeat of the party in question is possible. Though electorally dominant parties are known 
to take measures to shape institutions favorably to maintain their position, (McElwain 
2008, Templeman 2012), the potential for electoral defeat remains a consistent threat for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The Russian term, partiia vlasti, has been in use since at least the late 1990s in English-language social 
science to describe pro-regime and pro-presidential parties in the post-Soviet space. 
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these parties who must compete on relatively equal terms with other parties. This is not 
the case in competitive and consolidated authoritarian regimes where unseating the 
incumbent leader or ruling party is nearly impossible by conventional electoral means.  
 Drawing on existing large-n studies of authoritarian regimes (Cheibub, Gandhi, 
and Vreeland 2010; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2012; Svolik 2012b), I employ both a 
procedural and threshold approach to establishing the universe of cases relevant for this 
project. I define the category "authoritarian" residually to capture all states that do not 
qualify as democracies. Following Przeworski et al., I begin to define autocracies as those 
countries where the executive and legislatures are not elected, where only one party 
exists, and where incumbents do not lose elections (2000: 28-29; emphasis is my own). 
Yet under Przeworski et al.'s coding rules, dozens of autocratic regimes over the past 
decades such as Russia since 2000 and Azerbaijan since 1991 qualify as democracies.12 
In order to capture regimes where fraudulent electoral alternation takes place, I follow 
Svolik's (2012b) coding rules that take into account the nature of individual elections 
(22). To complete my inclusive set of autocratic regimes, I compile the set of countries 
for which Freedom House assigns "political freedom" as 4 or higher, which captures not 
only consolidated authoritarian regimes but semi-consolidated authoritarian as well as 
hybrid regimes (Freedom House 2015). 
 I construct a more inclusive set of authoritarian regimes because the incentives for 
leaders to create their own parties are present in nature in the most consolidated 
autocratic regimes and are arguably strongest in hybrid regimes. In this more competitive 
context, leaders face stronger pressure to represent their interests in parties and also may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The ostensibly electoral transfer of power from Heydar to Ilham Aliyev in 2003 and from Putin to 
Medvedev in 2008 count as democratic transfers of power by Przeworski et al.’s (2000) coding rules.  
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see a pro-regime party as a necessary tool for skewing competition in their own favor. 
Therefore, "hybrid" (Diamond 2002) and "electoral authoritarian" (Schedler 2006) 
regimes, both of which overlap conceptually with Levitsky and Way's (2010) 
"competitive authoritarian regimes," are included in the set of authoritarian regimes 
where leaders might plausibly consider creating a party of power. However, the 
incentives to create parties of power changes fundamentally once regimes are solidly 
democratic. While incumbent leaders have been known to create their own parties in 
democracies,13 elites who refuse to join the leader's party can generally depend on fair 
elections to determine whether they win office in the future. Thus, they are excluded from 
the scope of this project. 
 
Determining Executive Initiative and Affiliation 
 This dissertation departs from existing literature on parties in authoritarian 
regimes by focusing on a given party's link with the chief executive. I do not place 
conditions of minimal seat share or duration in power as markers of a party's prominence 
within the party system. However, I do place the clear affiliation between the party and 
the authoritarian ruler as a condition. 
 I determine whether executive initiative led to the creation of a party on the 
following grounds. For the first round of coding, I take cases where the paramount 
leader14 has publicly expressed support for the creation of a party, and whether the leader 
remained the party's official or ceremonial leader after its creation. The former condition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Konstantinos Karamanlis's founding of New Democracy in 1974 and Ariel Sharon's establishment of 
Kadima in November 2005. 
14 I determine the effective head of government by consulting the "leader" variable in Svolik's (2012) 
database, and "ehead" in Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). 
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is most easily determined by public statements, media appearances, or official speeches. 
However, in the absence of such explicit statements, consensus in secondary sources 
about the leaders' endorsement of the establishment of a party of power is sufficient to 
claim executive initiative.  
 For the second condition, I consider different indicators of executive affiliation 
with the party once already in power. Membership in the party is a sufficient indicator of 
affiliation, though party leaders who remain officially non-partisan also may be coded as 
"affiliated" with a specific party. For instance, Russia's President Vladimir Putin, while 
widely recognized as the leader of United Russia from its inception, has never officially 
become a member of the party, nor did he occupy a formal position of leadership in the 
party until he was voted party chairman in 2008 (Ivanov 2008, Russia Today 2012-04-
25). Leaders who simultaneously serve as party chairman or in an equivalent leadership 
post are easily coded as affiliated with the party. At the next level, official membership in 
the party indicates affiliation. Leaders who hold neither an official leadership position in 
the party nor membership in one may still qualify as being affiliated with a ruling party. 
When a leader consistently supports one party and distributes an outsized share of 
positions in the state administration to that party, the continued collaboration between 
leader and party should be considered evidence of executive support. In these cases, 
affiliation can be determined using media accounts and secondary sources. 
 
Defining Elites 
Following Dogan and Higley (1998), I define elites as “holders of strategic 
positions in powerful organizations and movements, including dissident ones, who are 
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able to affect national political outcomes regularly and significantly” (15). Primarily this 
means individuals who have held elected or appointed public office, or those who could 
potentially do so. This includes leading business and cultural figures, those who have 
competed in elections, formed parties, and led political demonstrations. It does not 
include rank and file citizens such as ordinary voters or occasional participants in 
political demonstrations. 
Obtaining comprehensive and systematic data about elites within a country is 
extremely difficult. While directories such as Who’s Who in Azerbaijan or Who’s Who in 
Georgia provide an impression of who may or may not be a member of the country’s 
elite, there is no way to compare these directories across countries as each directory is 
compiled according to different selection criteria. Thus, while I acknowledge that elites 
within a regime represent a wide range of social and professional profiles, for the purpose 
of this model, elites are those who run for political office. I draw a distinction between 
elected and appointed officials in this case, because elected officials hold a mandate to 
power that is distinct from those who can be replaced by a new executive appointment. 
Furthermore, while business elites, regional administrators, and state bureaucrats often 
join parties of power once created, they most commonly join during the secondary and 
tertiary phases of party development; party activists and current legislators join first 
(Reuter 2010a, Reuter 2010b). As would-be creators of parties of power recruit 
incumbent parliamentarians and candidates for legislative office first, I consider them 
first in my analysis.  
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For the purposes of the formal model presented in the following chapter, I 
conceptualize elites as a unitary actor, but recognize in the case studies that not all elites 
hold the same beliefs nor do they take the same actions. 
 
Temporal Precedence in Authoritarian Party Formation 
 The third factor that distinguishes parties of power from other ruling parties in 
authoritarian regimes is the timing of party creation with respect to the beginning of an 
authoritarian spell. If a given ruler comes to power already in charge of a party or 
movement, he faces a very different set of calculations from leaders who gain power 
without a party of their own and then later decide to create one. In the former situation, 
there is no uncertainty about the leader's ability to establish a party, while in the later, 
leaders must consider the benefits and costs of creating a party along with the likelihood 
that they will in fact succeed in establishing said party. Given the range of choices of 
institutions available to authoritarian leaders, those leaders who choose not to establish a 
party may seek other ways to strengthen their rule, whether through dyadic ad-hoc 
cooptation, coercion, or other strategies of rule. 
 Where institutional origins have entered classifications of parties in authoritarian 
regimes, distinctions have focused on the timing of rulers' access to resources (Smith 
2007) and the revolutionary roots of certain parties (Levitsky and Way 2012). According 
to a recent argument by Levitsky and Way (2012), ruling parties that originated as 
victorious movements in liberation struggles are more cohesive in the face of crisis than 
parties that came into existence as patronage machines. The latter type of party lacks the 
strong partisan identity, legitimacy, and capacity to repress that parties with revolutionary 
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origins have. All of these factors merit some discussion, but I argue that they could be 
replaced with a measure which is simpler to operationalize ex-ante and captures many of 
the theoretical distinctions that these authors are attempting to draw. 
 I would argue that rather than focusing on resources or the nature and intensity of 
conflicts that produced certain parties, taking into account the timing of the creation of a 
party serves as an ex-ante identifiable proxy for some of the same factors that Smith 
(2007) and Levitsky and Way (2012) highlight. If a party was established under a 
previous regime before its leaders gained power, the party would likely have been formed 
on the basis of some kind of movement or ideology or on the initiative of motivated 
individuals. If founded by individuals who were not in power, such a party would have 
grown without the benefit of state resources and would have attracted members based on 
non-material appeal. On the other hand, parties formed by incumbent leaders often gain 
large memberships quickly as political elites, hoping to cash in on regime spoils, flock to 
the party opportunistically. If Levitsky and Way (2012) argue that patronage-based 
parties lack the ideological and personal cohesion of revolutionary parties, I would argue 
that all else being equal, parties formed by incumbent leaders are less cohesive than those 
parties formed by leaders before they gained power.  
 Drawing the distinction between parties that formed before the regime under 
which they became the ruling party and those created after helps to avoid becoming 
mired in the differences between violent and non-violent liberation struggles (Levitsky 
and Way 2012), "activist" versus "opportunistic" rebellions (Weinstein 2006), or 
variation in the resource endowments of nascent parties (Smith 2007). Instead, whether 
the party predated the tenure of the ruler may capture some of the differences that 
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manifest between parties established in the absence of executive power and those parties 
that formed specifically to serve executive interests after the leader has gained power. But 
more importantly, the calculations surrounding parties created after leaders gained power 
differ from those established before their rise to power. Therefore they should be treated 
as analytically distinct when explaining their creation. 
 
Parties of Power Worldwide 
 I have identified 30 parties of power created from 1946-present.15 These parties 
were established on average 3.5 years into their founder's tenure, while two thirds were 
created within the leader's first five years in office. One of these parties was created in the 
1950s, six emerged in the 1960s, three were created in the 1970s, and six were 
established in the 1980s. The remaining 14 parties of power were established after 1991, 
which further underscores the increasing pressures that authoritarian leaders have faced 
in recent decades to create parties of their own if they do not already have them at the 
time they gain power. 
 Of the 30 leaders who created parties of power, 12 held positions in the 
government but outside the legislature before gaining power, while four leaders 
originated in the legislature before creating parties of their own. Fourteen of the rulers 
who created parties of power were military officers before becoming the paramount 
leaders of their countries. This distribution lends partial support to Geddes's (2006) 
theory that military rulers particularly need parties of power as well as Smyth's (2002) 
that rulers who originate outside the legislature have incentives to create parties of power. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Appendix A for a list of parties of power created worldwide 1946-present. 
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In general, however, it underscores the wide appeal that parties of power have to 
authoritarian rulers with different institutional backgrounds. 
 Parties of power emerged on five out of six inhabited continents as well as in 
Oceania.16 
  
Chapter Outline of Dissertation 
 This dissertation proposes a general theory of party creation by incumbent 
authoritarian leaders that applies to the entire set of authoritarian regimes that have 
existed from 1946-present. The main theoretical premise of the dissertation, that leaders 
establish parties only when elite beliefs about the leaders' types convince them to join, is 
expressed in a formal model and then illustrated with case studies from four post-Soviet 
states in the 1990s.  
 The second chapter presents the signaling model of authoritarian party creation, 
which is the main theoretical argument of the dissertation. In this chapter, the need for a 
game theoretic model is justified, the parameters of the model are defined, and all 
assumptions supporting the pure-strategy equilibria are identified. The main hypothesis 
tested in the dissertation is stated, and the choice to evaluate the hypothesis with two 
paired case studies is explained. The selection of Georgia and Azerbaijan as cases of 
party creation and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as cases of party non-creation is 
explained. 
 The third chapter demonstrates the existence of the first pooling equilibrium 
generated by the model in which authoritarian leaders of different types both create 
parties of power. The case studies of Presidents Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Laisenia Qarase created the United Fiji Party in 2006, which represents Oceania's only party of power. 
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Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan’s creation of parties of power focuses on the initial 
conditions of each leader’s presidency, the nature of elite mobilization in the two 
countries, and the development of elite beliefs about the leaders’ types. The narratives 
address the founding of the Citizens’ Union of Georgia and the New Azerbaijan Party, 
and follow the differing political trajectories of Georgia and Azerbaijan after the creation 
of parties of power. 
 The fourth chapter documents the second pooling equilibrium in which leaders of 
different types both choose not to create parties of power. The first years of Kazakhstan's 
Nursultan Nazarbayev and Kyrgyzstan's Askar Akayev's presidencies are compared to 
demonstrate the parallel challenges that each leader faced. Both Nazarbayev and Akayev 
struggled to win the cooperation of political elites during the early 1990s. Elites, 
however, considered Nazarbayev and Akayev to be conciliatory leaders and therefore 
intensified their opposition in hopes of limiting executive authority. Realizing that elites 
would likely not join a potential party of power, Nazarbayev and Akayev pursued other 
strategies of rule including creating bicameral parliaments and strengthening executive 
powers via referendum. The strategies that Nazarbayev and Akayev chose instead of 
parties of power are discussed as are the long-term implications of the leaders' types for 
the democracy and regime stability in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
 The fifth and final chapter of the dissertation summarizes the main questions, 
theoretical approaches, and key findings of this dissertation. It also proposes a number of 
extensions of the project for the future. 
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Chapter 2: A Theory of Authoritarian Party Creation  
 
 In this chapter, I propose a formal model of party creation by incumbent 
authoritarian rulers that accounts for both the creation of parties of power by some 
authoritarian leaders and the decision of other leaders not to create parties. I justify the 
use of a game theoretic model for explaining this phenomenon and then present the 
model itself. I list the parameters of the model, explain how I derive values for the 
parameters, and then present the key assumptions that allow me to solve the game. I 
present five pure-strategy solutions to the game and justify focusing the analysis on two 
of these five equilibria. I discuss the main hypothesis generated by the model, namely 
that rulers' decisions to create parties ultimately depend on elite perceptions about rulers' 
types. Finally, I justify the selection of pairs of post-Soviet states as case studies to 
illustrate how the signaling model of authoritarian party creation manifests empirically. 
 
Why a Model? 
 The institutions that emerge from rulers' and elites' strategies are the product of 
choice. Though historical, cultural, and structural factors affect the forms that political 
institutions take as well as their efficacy, when political institutions are created, there are 
specific actions undertaken intentionally by actors in particular strategic contexts. As the 
previous chapter argued, historical legacies do not account for the variation in 
authoritarian leaders' decisions to create parties of power; neither do the resource 
endowments of given countries, northe personal biographies of individual leaders. 
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 I argue that a theory of authoritarian party creation must treat party creation as an 
interdependent decision for leaders and elites in the sense that leaders consider the future 
behavior of elites when deciding whether to create a party of their own.17 Second, any 
theory of authoritarian party creation should also be able to account for both observed 
equilibria, the creation of parties of power by some leaders and other leaders' decisions 
not create a party.18 In addition to satisfying these conditions, a theory of authoritarian 
party creation should be dynamic. Elites can join a nascent party of power only after it 
has been initiated by the leader. Though the specific timing of the creation of parties 
varies from case to case, the actions play out sequentially rather than simultaneously. 
First the party must be created, and then individuals must join the party in order for the 
party to emerge.19 Finally, a theory of authoritarian party creation must account for the 
informational imbalance that exists between the leaders who initiate parties of power and 
the elites who join them. As I argue in this chapter and demonstrate in the case study 
chapters, elites are at an informational disadvantage when deciding whether to join 
parties of power because they do not know what type of leader they are choosing to 
support. Thus, perceptions about the ruler's type play a key role in determining elite's 
willingness to join parties of power. This imbalance in information is crucial for 
explaining the observed variation in authoritarian party creation as a theory based on the 
assumption full information fails to account for empirically observed equilibria. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 While it is technically possible for incumbent authoritarian rulers to create parties of power with an 
entirely new set of elites should incumbent elites refuse to join, in practical terms this is highly costly. 
18 Belarus's Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Kyrgyzstan's Askar Akayev are among the leaders who have 
remained in power the longest without creating parties of their own despite the continuous operation of 
multiparty legislatures during their presidencies. Other authoritarian rulers with comparably lengthy tenures 
in office who also maintained legislatures either inherited their positions, such as Morocco's King Hassan 
II, or were appointed by their predecessor, such as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 
19 I consider a party to have successfully "emerged" once it has registered and occupied at least one seat in 
a national legislature. This is usually a moot point because the party emerges when incumbent elites join. 
These incumbent elites usually already have seats in the legislature 
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 Following Hug (2001), I argue that the decision to create a new party is a choice 
that depends on strategic interactions between entrant and preexisting political forces. For 
parties of power, this means that authoritarian leaders base their decision to create a party 
on their own incentives, conditional on their expectation of the behavior of elites whom 
they wish to attract to their party. Many leaders who have the resources to create a party 
as well as incentives to do so may not create parties when elites are unwilling to join the 
party. Similarly, elites base their decision on whether to join an authoritarian leader's 
party based on their expectation of the leader's future behavior.  
 I model authoritarian party creation sequentially because failing to do so reduces 
the theory's ability to predict both the creation and non-creation of a party as equilibria. 
Models structured around simultaneous choice, such as coordination games, depend on 
"focal points" to explain the emergence of any single equilibrium when multiple 
equilibria are possible. Given that shared knowledge among players serves as the source 
of potential focal points, historical legacies would be the strongest predictor of 
institutional outcomes if party creation is best modeled as a simultaneous choice between 
leaders and elites. As stated in the previous chapter, historical legacies are poor predictors 
of empirically observed variation in party creation by incumbent authoritarian rulers. A 
dynamic game of authoritarian party creation allows for party creation and no party 
creation to emerge as equilibria without depending on focal points. Rather, leaders and 
elites take action in turn and plan their strategies as best responses to their opponent's 
expected actions. The choice to model the leader as the first mover follows existing 
literature (Gandhi 2008, Svolik 2012a). 
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 Finally, I argue that party creation by incumbent authoritarian leaders involves an 
imbalance of information between leaders and elites. While leaders know their true 
propensity to use coercion to achieve their political goals, elites can only make inferences 
about this aspect of the leader's character. For leaders whom elites have had little time to 
observe, there exists a great deal of uncertainty about the leader's type. As I demonstrate 
later, under conditions of full information, it would only be possible for repressive 
leaders to create parties. Conciliatory leaders could never establish parties of power 
because elites would know their type and refuse to join their party. However, when 
information is incomplete, actors in the game have the opportunity to misrepresent their 
type, which makes equilibria possible that would otherwise would not have been. 
 When a leader creates a party, he signals to elites that he commits to deliver long-
term benefits in exchange for their cooperation. 20 By creating a party, leaders also 
communicate that they have the means to reward their supporters and to exclude and 
punish those outside the party. Thus the visible and costly act of creating a party has the 
power to alter elites' incentives for cooperating with authoritarian rulers, which in turn 
gives rulers the incentive to create parties even if they lack the resources or resolve to 
maintain them.  
 
Formal Model of Authoritarian Party Creation 
 In this section I present an extensive form signaling game of authoritarian party 
creation which models the interdependent and dynamic nature of party creation and 
incorporates uncertainty among elites about leader type. The following section introduces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 I use the male pronoun as every authoritarian leader who has created a party of power has been male. 
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the relevant actors, their ranked preferences for outcomes, the parameters that constitute 
the payoffs that actors receive, as well as the five pure-strategy solutions to the game. 21 
 
Figure 3: Signaling Game of Authoritarian Party Creation 
 
 
Table 1: Ranked Preferences of Actors 
Player Outcomes (Leader, Elites) Payoffs 
Repressive Leader ( P, J ) > ( P, ~J ) ≥ ( ~P, J ; ~P, ~J ) B - CR > -CR ≥ -SNP      
Conciliatory Leader ( P, J ) > ( ~P, J ; ~P, ~J ) > ( P, ~J )  B - CC  > -SNP > -CC      
Elites if Repressive Leader ( P, J ) > ( ~P, J ; ~P, ~J ) > ( P, ~J ) SP  > -SNP + R  > R - XR      
Elites if Conciliatory Leader ( ~P, J ; ~P, ~J ) ≥ ( P, ~J ) > ( P, J ) SNP + R  ≥ R - XC  > SP      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 A systematic justification for signaling model including a discussion of simpler alternative models can be 
found in Appendix B. 
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Table 2: Parameters and Other Notation 
 
Term Meaning Term Meaning 
B benefit of party creation θ type of player 
    
CR cost of party creation for repressive leader P create a party 
CC cost of party creation for conciliatory leader J join the party 
    
SP side payment through party σL strategy profile for leader 
SNP side payment without party σE strategy profile for elite 
    
XR punishment by a repressive leader Z beliefs about leader type 
XC punishment by a conciliatory leader   
  λ probability of type by nature 
 
Nature assigns the types of leaders (θ) with probabilities λ and 1- λ for each type. 
When θ=R, the leader is repressive,22 and when θ=C, the leader is conciliatory. In this 
game, only leaders know their true type; elites only have beliefs about leaders' types. I 
define a repressive type leader as a leader who uses coercion to achieve his political 
goals. As relates to the creation of parties of power, repressive leaders punish elites who 
do not join the party of power by excluding them from office, by cutting them off from 
state patronage, by imprisoning them, forcing them into exile, or by murdering them. 
Repressive leaders maintain a smaller winning coalition within the selectorate and 
enforce its boundaries coercively (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Wintrobe 1998). Of 
course, they must have the means to repress and lack the internal and external constraints 
to do so. Absent the personal will to repress, a leader will not repress even when they 
have the means and lack the constraints. Consequently, this analysis is concerned with 
the revealed will to repress. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Whether a leader is a repressive type depends both on their capacity to repress as well as their 
willingness to do so. In this analysis, I define type based on the leader's willingness to repress. The true 
preference regarding repression is an internal characteristic known only to the leader, however elites can 
form opinions about this willingness, which is essentially their best guess about the leader's type. 
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Conversely, conciliatory leaders are those who seek to build support for their rule 
through cooptation, consensus, and compromise. Conciliatory rulers are authoritarian in 
that they restrict open and fair competition among parties, but tolerate opposition party 
activity. They impose some limitations on public speech and assembly, but do not 
imprison or massacre protesters. Conciliatory leaders generally are unwilling to engage in 
repression. This issue begs the question of whether a leader who represses visibly is in 
fact in a strong or a weak position. In theory, an authoritarian leader who is truly secure 
should not have to repress visibly or repress great numbers of subjects, while a weaker 
one must demonstrate their will to repress in order to intimidate their subjects. While this 
phenomenon is indeed puzzling and begs further study, it seems impossible for an 
authoritarian leader to rule from their outset by threats of coercion alone. Any 
authoritarian ruler who wants to maintain a high degree of control over the populace must 
follow through with repression in order to make their threats credible, and then 
periodically remind the public of their will to repress.23 
Elites24 form their beliefs about leader type by observing acts of repression, such 
as the violent disruption of public protests, the arrest, imprisonment, and murder of 
political rivals, and crackdowns on the independent media. Knowledge of a leader's past 
career informs prior beliefs about their type, particularly if the leader has served as a 
military officer or in the intelligence services. After gaining power, cultivating public ties 
with the security forces can also bolster the sense that a leader is repressive, or at least 
increase uncertainty about the leader's type if the prior assumption is that the leader is 
conciliatory. Instances when the leader publicly consults with members of the opposition, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 In practice, leader type exists on a continuum. However, for the purpose of the model, type is binary.  
24 For the purpose of this model, elites are a unitary actor. In practice, elites form beliefs and act in groups 
as well as individually. 
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offers concessions to them, and accepts defeat in policy battles contribute to elites' belief 
that a leader is conciliatory. The continued existence of opposition parties and the ability 
of government critics to voice their opinions with impunity reinforce the belief that the 
leader is conciliatory. 
Uncertainty about leader type is highest at the beginning of the leader's tenure, as 
elites have had little time to form their beliefs about the leader's type. Uncertainty 
increases when elites observe new information that conflicts with their prior assumptions 
about the leader. As an example, uncertainty about the leader's type increases when a 
leader who has a reputation for moderation and dialogue cracks down violently on 
protesters, whereas when a leader with a reputation for having a strong hand cracks down 
violently on protesters, uncertainty about his type decreases. This model is primarily 
concerned with uncertainty about the leader's type, because this information tends to be 
private while elite actions and preferences tend to be more easily observed. 
 
Sequence of Actions in the Game 
In the first move, leaders decide whether or not to create their own party (P, ~P) 
based on their expectations of elites’ interest in joining the party. As stated in the list of 
ranked preferences, repressive leaders' top preference is to create a party that elites join, 
but that repressive leaders face a more complicated choice if they believe elites will not 
join the party. When repressive leaders know that elites perceive them as conciliatory, 
repressive leaders may choose not to initiate a party at all, or simply not to follow 
through with creating a party of their own if they already made some efforts towards 
establishing one. Such leaders know that they can employ measures other than creating a 
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pro-regime party in order to achieve their political objectives, and so failing to create a 
party does not entail the same risks for repressive leaders as it does for conciliatory 
ones.25 Repressive leaders do not hesitate to repress uncooperative elites who choose not 
to join their parties, which in some cases makes elite cooperation easier to secure in the 
future.  
In the first move of the game, conciliatory leaders initiate parties of power when 
they expect that elites will join. Conciliatory leaders stand to benefit greatly from 
institutions such as parties of power because their willingness to coerce in order to remain 
in power is limited; rather, they must cultivate loyalty and offer greater concessions to 
elites than repressive leaders. The expectation of elite cooperation defines the actions of 
conciliatory leaders who strongly prefer party creation to not creating one at all, but who 
also strongly prefer not to create a party if they believe that elites believe them to be 
conciliatory. The latter may find other ways to coopt key elites through ad-hoc side 
payments.  
In the second move of the game, elites choose whether or not to join (J, ~J) a pro-
regime party once they see that a leader is establishing one.26 When they believe that 
leader is repressive, they join the party, reasoning that they will face severe punishment 
and exclusion from future benefits should they refuse to join. However, when elites 
believe that the leader is conciliatory and therefore incapable of excluding them from the 
benefits of party affiliation, elites prefer not to join a party of power. Elites know that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Because of the weak preference for not creating a party, it is possible that repressive leaders will create a 
party even without elite cooperation. Even if they face no immediate threat, having such a party may 
provide rulers with an insurance policy against future opponents.  
26 Public statements calling for the creation of a party of power like Shevardnadze's from August 1993 are 
an unequivocal evidence of a leader's intent to create a party. Giving the keynote speech at an existing party 
conference or strong statements of support for an existing proto-party such as Nazarbayev's in early 1993 
also signal interest in establishing a party of power. 
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leaders know their preferences, which also means that elites know that their beliefs have 
the power to alter leaders' strategies. Elite opposition always dissuades conciliatory 
leaders from initiating a party, and may also give repressive leaders pause. In the latter 
case, leaders may not create a party and instead punish uncooperative elites. 
 
Solving the Signaling Game of Authoritarian Party Creation 
 In this section, I present five pure strategy solutions to the signaling game of 
authoritarian party creation. I identify the necessary parameters from the model and state 
the assumptions necessary to support these equilibria. 
 
Assumption 1: The Benefits of Party Creation: B > 0 
 Authoritarian rulers draw a wide range of benefits from maintaining a pro-regime 
party, some of which go into effect as soon as the parties are created and others that are 
realized over time. Because this paper focuses on authoritarian party creation as opposed 
to maintenance, I devote more attention to the benefits that leaders receive from parties 
early on. First and foremost, creating a party of power changes the incentives that elites 
have for cooperating with the leader. The act of creating a party serves as a stimulus to 
elites who must reveal their preferences for cooperation by either joining the leader's 
party or by remaining independent. In this way, the formation of parties clarifies the 
boundaries of the winning coalition within the selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003, 
Haber 2006) and immediately raises the cost of independent political activity (Greene 
2007). In authoritarian regimes where legislatures operate, parties of power secure 
support for the ruler's agenda (Magaloni 2006, Greene 2007), and in many cases approve 
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constitutional changes that award greater power to the executive branch. In line with a 
common assumption in the literature on parties in authoritarian regimes, I assume that 
benefit of creating a party of power holds a positive value: B > 0.27 
 
 
Assumption 2: Costs of Creating a Party: 0 < CR < CC 
 
 The costs of creating a party are made up of fixed costs, which are invested in 
party infrastructure, as well as variable costs that take the form of side payments to party-
affiliated elites. While the fixed costs of party creation do not vary with leader type, 
because parties all need offices, staff, and other concrete amenities regardless of who is in 
charge. However, compared to conciliatory leaders, repressive leaders pay lower side 
payments to elites since the credible threat of coercion limits elites' demands for the 
benefits of party affiliation. Conciliatory leaders offer higher side payments in order to 
secure broader elite cooperation, effectively creating a larger selectorate within the 
regime because they cannot credibly threaten to exclude uncooperative elites. Repressive 
leaders credibly threaten punishments to limit the demands of elites whom they recruit 
into their parties. Therefore, regarding costs, I assume:  0 < CR < CC. 
 
Assumption 3: Punishments: XR > XC ≥ 0 
 Both repressive and conciliatory leaders seek to punish elites who refuse to join 
their party. However, the nature of this punishment varies by the type of leader.28 Elites 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 I define the benefits of creating a party as a constant (B) for all leaders, as the benefit term always 
appears in conjunction with the cost term (Ci), which does vary based on leader type. 
28 This analysis operates under the assumption that the leader sets the tone of the entire regime, and has a 
hand in repression even if they do not explicitly order each act. I assume that opposition figures are not 
imprisoned, exiled, or murdered in authoritarian regimes without the knowledge of the leader nor without 
his tacit or explicit consent.  
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who do not join repressive leaders' parties face complete exclusion from the side 
payments that derive from party affiliation. Repressive leaders also punish uncooperative 
elites by threatening divestment, imprisonment, or death. However, elites who do not join 
parties established by conciliatory leaders face less severe punishments. Opposition and 
independent parties are permitted to compete, though often at a disadvantage to affiliates 
of the party of power. Donors face pressure not to contribute to opposition parties, while 
leaders affiliated with them may experience legal harassment. Conciliatory leaders rarely 
cross the line to imprisonment, exile, and murder of opposition candidates, and do not 
categorically ban opposition media or demonstrations. Since conciliatory leaders do not 
punish uncooperative elites as harshly as repressive ones, I assume regarding 
punishments:29  XR > XC ≥ 0 
 
Assumption 4: Side Payments: SNP ≥ SP ≥ SO ≥ 0 
 After an authoritarian ruler creates a party, elites affiliated with the party receive 
side payments of various forms. These include appointments to positions in the state 
bureaucracy, clientelistic benefits for constituents, insider deals in state-run enterprises, 
and more. When a party of power exists, access to these side payments depends on 
continued cooperation with the leader (Svolik 2012a). Under various forms of coercive 
threats, repressive leaders are able to reserve party benefits exclusively for party-affiliates 
while conciliatory leaders cannot.  
 While I include SP and SNP as terms that represent the different levels of side 
payments that elites receive from within a party and when no party exists, there is also a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Because the level punishments that leaders mete out is a function of their type, they do not pay "costs" 
when punishing uncooperative elites. The differences between repressive and conciliatory leaders are 
palpable only to elites who receive their punishments. 
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third value, SO, which represents the side payments to elites outside the newly created 
party of power. SO = 0 when the leader is repressive, as such leaders exclude 
uncooperative elites from side payments completely, but under conciliatory leaders, side 
payments for elites outside the party are greater than or equal to zero, but less than or 
equal to the side payments that elites receive when no party at all exists:30 
SNP ≥ SP ≥ SO ≥ 0  
 
Assumption 5: Elite Reputation: R ≥ 0 
 Elites have reputations (R) that reflect the value that they derive from remaining 
politically independent. This term encapsulates both the recognition that individual 
politicians have cultivated among the electorate, their commitment to certain ideological 
positions, and the resources they command independently from state patronage or 
business connections. Reputation is a measure of elites' political prominence independent 
of their affiliation with the leader. Electoral victories, personal popularity, mobilizational 
potential, and patronage that elites control all contribute to the value of (R) as do elites' 
attachments to their ideological convictions. When elites join a party of power, they 
forfeit the independent component of their reputations and tie their future political 
fortunes to those of the leader and the leader's party; in exchange, they receive the 
benefits of affiliating with the ruling party in the form of side-payments (SP), but lose 
their independent reputation (R). When leaders do not create parties at all, elites retain 
their independent reputations and also bargain for side payments with leaders (SNP). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 SO collapses into the punishment term that comprises part of elites' payoffs when they do not join pro-
regime parties. Thus out of the three levels of side payments that exist, only two appear as separate terms. 
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When elites refuse to join parties, they retain their independent reputations but face 
punishments, depending on the leader's type (XR or XC). 
 Given that this value represents elites' estimation of themselves and not the 
general public's estimation of elites, this model operates on the assumption that elites' 
independent reputations are greater than or equal to zero: R ≥ 0. 
 
Discussion of Equilibria 
 
The following sections present five equilibria that emerge from this game: four 
pooling equilibria and one separating equilibrium. These equilibria represent the full set 
of pure-strategy equilibria generated by the signaling game of authoritarian party 
creation. 
 
Equilibrium 1 (EQ1): Suppose the following payoff inequalities hold: 
 
 
 
Conditions 
 
- SNP < B - CR    (1a) 
- SNP < B - CC    (1b) 
 
SP > R - XC - p(XR - XC) (2a)   
 
If these conditions are met, then both types of leaders create a party, and elites believe 
that all leaders who create a party are repressive. Formally, the strategy and belief 
profiles are as follows: 
 
σL   =  P if θ = R 
 P if θ = C 
 
σE  = J 
 
Z    = p(R|P) = p 
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Conditions 1a and 1b state the uncontroversial assertion that both repressive and 
conciliatory leaders have clear incentives to create a party of power. These expressions 
state simply that leaders receive higher payoffs when they create a party that elites join    
( P , J ) than they do when they do not create a party at all ( ~P , J; ~P, ~J). However, 
elites will only join the party when Condition 2 holds, which expresses the probability 
that elites assign for the leader being repressive.31 Here, the payoffs that elites expect 
from joining a party created by a repressive leader ( P, J, b = p) and joining a party 
created by a conciliatory leader ( P, J , b = (1 - p)) are compared. This inequality 
establishes that elites value the side payments they would receive as part of a party (SP) 
more than they value their independent reputations (R) minus the probability of receiving 
a punishment from a repressive leader (p(XR)). 32 Thus, elites prefer to join a party when 
they observe the leader creating one, despite knowing that there is still a possibility that 
the leader is in fact conciliatory. When conditions 1a, 1b, and hold, neither leaders nor 
elites have the incentive to defect from their initial strategy and so a pooling equilibrium 
emerges. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Despite the fact that the probability of the leader being repressive (Z) is the central parameter of interest 
in this condition, it is more intuitive to express the condition without isolating the belief term (Z) on the left 
side of the inequality. Punishments from conciliatory leaders (XC) are negligible and can be assigned a 
value of 0 in order to simplify this expression. See Appendix C for the derivation and alternate expressions 
of this condition.	  
32 Similarly to Condition 2, see Appendix C for the derivation and alternate expressions of the various 
conditions  
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Equilibrium 2 (EQ2): Suppose the following payoff inequalities hold: 
 
Conditions 
 
SP < R - XC - p(XR - XC) (3) 
 
-CR < -SNP   (4a) 
-CC < -SNP   (4b) 
 
SNP + R ≥ SP   (5) 
 
If these conditions are met, then both types of leaders do create a party, and elites believe 
that all leaders who do not create parties are conciliatory. Formally, the strategy and 
belief profiles are as follows: 
 
 
σL   =  ~P if θ = R 
 ~P if θ = C 
 
σE  = (~J) 
 
Conditions 3, 4a, 4b, and 5 jointly establish the conditions under which not 
creating a party dominates creating a party for both types of leaders. Condition 3 
compares the payoffs that elites expect from refusing to join a party created by a 
repressive leader ( P, J, b = p) and not joining a party created by a conciliatory leader (P, 
~J, b = (1 - p)). This inequality establishes that elites value the side payments they would 
receive as part of a party (SP) less than they value their independent reputations (R) minus 
the probability of receiving a punishment from a repressive leader (p(XR)). Thus elites 
prefer not to join a party even if they observe the leader creating one, in essence calling 
the leader's bluff. Conditions 4a and 4b establish that leaders strongly prefer not to 
establish a party that elites refuse to join. These conditions are derived from establishing 
inequalities between the payoffs of not creating a party (-SNP) and the payoffs of creating 
a party that elites do not join (-Ci). Leaders' payoffs from not creating a party are 
   
43 
	  
compared with the payoffs of a failed party (-Ci) rather than a successful party (B - Ci), 
because in this equilibrium elites believe leaders to be conciliatory and therefore have a 
dominant strategy not to join the party (~J), even if they see that one has been initiated. 
Therefore, if both types of leaders expect to pay less in side payments in the absence of a 
party (-SNP) than they would by initiating a party that ultimately fails (-Ci), both types do 
not to create a party of their own. Finally, Condition 5 must hold in order for elites not to 
have an incentive to defect from their choice not to join a party. Thus, the payoffs that 
elites receive when leaders do not create a party (SNP + R) must dominate the payoffs that 
they might receive from joining a party (SP). When all of the conditions listed above hold, 
a second pooling equilibrium emerges in which leaders, anticipating that elites will not 
cooperate in the future, have a clear incentive not to create a party, while elites have no 
incentive to defect from their uncooperative stance. 
 
Equilibrium 3 (EQ3): Suppose the following inequalities hold: 
 
Conditions 
 
CR < SNP  (6a) 
CC < SNP    (6b) 
If these conditions are met, then both types of leaders create parties of power because the 
costs of attempting but failing to create a party are less than non-party side-payments. 
Formally, the strategy and belief profiles are as follows: 
 
σL   =  ~P if θ = R 
 ~P if θ = C 
 
σE  = (~J or J) 
 
Z    = N/A 
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Conditions 6a and 6b present a situation in which creating a party dominates non-
party creation on the basis that the costs of creating a party, even one that elites do not 
join, are always less than the costs of paying non-party side payments. In this case, 
leaders always have an incentive to create a party and will never defect to not create a 
party based on their expectation of elite cooperation. Elite beliefs (Z) in this case are 
irrelevant because leaders have a dominant strategy to create a party regardless of 
whether elites join or not. While I include this equilibrium because as a logical 
possibility, it is not sustained empirically as many authoritarian leaders choose not to 
create parties; this strategy is impossible in this equilibrium.  
 
Equilibrium 4 (EQ4): Suppose the following inequalities hold: 
 
Conditions 
 
-SNP > B - CR  (7a) 
-SNP > B - CC  (7b) 
 
If these conditions are met, neither type of leader creates a party of power because the 
value of the outlay of non-party side-payments is higher than the benefits minus the costs 
of creating a party. Formally, the strategy and belief profiles are as follows: 
 
σL   =  ~P if θ = R 
 ~P if θ = C 
 
σE  = (J or ~J) 
 
Z    = N/A 
 
Under Conditions 7a and 7b, both types of leaders have a dominant strategy not to 
create a party. I derive these conditions by establishing an inequality where the value of 
side payments that leaders pay out if they do not create a party (-SNP) are less than the net 
benefits (B - CR) or (B - CC) that leaders receive from successfully creating a party. Elite 
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beliefs (Z) do not play a role in this equilibrium because leaders have a dominant strategy 
not to create a party regardless of elites' actions. Similarly to Equilibrium 4, I include this 
equilibrium because it is a logical possibility, but it is not sustained empirically as it 
predicts that there are never circumstances under which parties of power are created. 
Furthermore, condition 7a is especially difficult to sustain because it implies that creating 
a party is extremely costly, while existing literature suggests that for certain leaders, 
creating a party need not be especially expensive given the lower costs that repressive 
leaders pay. 
 
Equilibrium 5 (EQ5): Suppose the following inequalities hold: 
Conditions 
 
CR < SNP  (8) 
 
CC > SNP      (9) 
 
R + SNP > SP      (10) 
 
If these conditions are met, repressive leaders always create parties while conciliatory 
ones never do. Formally, the strategy and belief profiles are as follows: 
 
σL   =  P if θ = R 
 ~P if θ = C 
 
σE  = J|P, ~J|~P 
 
b    = p(R|P)=1 
 
Under condition 8, repressive leaders have a dominant strategy to create a party 
even if elites refuse to join, as the cost term for party creation (CR) is less than the outlay 
of side payments that repressive leaders must pay if they don't create a party (SNP). If 
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condition 9 holds concurrently, conciliatory leaders have a dominant strategy not to 
create a party, as the costs of creating a party that elites do not join exceeds the amount 
that leaders would pay out as side payments should they not create a party. Additionally, 
when Condition 10 pertains, a separating equilibrium emerges. This condition establishes 
that elites value their independent reputation (R) plus non-party side-payments (SNP) 
higher than the side payments that they expect to receive through party affiliation (SP). 
Satisfying this condition means that elites have no incentive to defect to joining a party 
created by a conciliatory ruler. 
 
Hypotheses 
 Of the five pure-strategy equilibria that this model generates, equilibria 1 and 2 
are of greatest interest because they offer the greatest leverage for understanding the 
variation in party creation by incumbent authoritarian leaders. As a pair, they specify 
conditions under which empirically observed institutional outcomes (party creation, and 
no party creation) emerge as stable equilibria. However, unlike in equilibria 3 and 4 
which predict different choices as dominant strategies for leaders regardless of elite 
beliefs, equilibria 1 and 2 take elite beliefs into account as playing a crucial causal factor 
in informing leaders' strategies.  
 Equilibria 3-5 hold far lesser theoretical and empirical interest. Equilibrium 3 
represents conditions that lead both types of leaders always to create parties of power, 
while equilibrium 4 establishes the conditions under which not creating a party of power 
is the dominant strategy for all leaders. As variation in party creation by authoritarian 
leaders is an empirical fact, any equilibrium that categorically predicts a single outcome 
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for all rulers offers little leverage for understanding variation in party creation. 
Equilibrium 5, a separating equilibrium in which repressive leaders create parties while 
conciliatory ones do not, coincides with a plausible explanation that leaders who have the 
means, whether coercive, material, ideological, or otherwise, create parties, while leaders 
who lack the means do not. This explanation, however, would struggle to account for the 
wide variation in durability and regime dynamics among leaders who choose the same 
institutional strategy. Given the difficulty recognizing empirical validity for equilibria 3-
5, I do not use them to derive hypotheses, nor do I address them in the case studies. 
However, I discuss the possibility of a semi-separating equilibrium involving equilibria 
1,2, and 5 in the concluding chapter. 
 Equilibria 1 and 2 generate the following set of hypotheses, namely that 
when elites believe leaders to be repressive, leaders succeed in creating parties (H1) 
and when elites believe leaders to be conciliatory, leaders do not create parties of 
power (H2). As existing literature on parties in authoritarian regimes indicates, and as 
the conditions specified above establish in formal terms, I operate under the assumption 
that authoritarian leaders of all types have a constant interest in creating parties of power 
in regimes where executive and legislative elections are held.33 These hypotheses relate 
to the conditions under which elites will join a party that a leader creates.  
 
Testing the Model of Authoritarian Party Creation  
 I offer a preliminary test of the signaling model of authoritarian party creation in 
the form of "analytic narratives" that allow a thorough and nuanced exploration of actor-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Authoritarian leaders in other institutional contexts, such as where elections are not held regularly, where 
legislatures are appointed, or where they are non-partisan have weaker incentives to create parties. 
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centered and context-dependent processes that lead to party creation by incumbent 
authoritarian rulers. These narratives combine "'thick' accounts" of events "with 'thin 
forms of reasoning'," that "highlight and focus on the logical processes that generate the 
phenomena" of interest (Bates et al. 1998: 14). The narratives proceed according to the 
sequence of actions in the game and are structured around the parameters of the model.  
 The case studies trace the relationship between leaders' incentives, elite beliefs 
about leader type, and the emergence of parties of power, and demonstrate the existence 
of two pooling equilibria from the signaling game of authoritarian party creation. In 
equilibrium 1, elites believe that their leader is repressive and so they join parties of 
power initiated in their countries, despite the fact that the leader may not truly be 
repressive. In equilibrium 2, the inverse situation plays out. Believing the leader to be 
conciliatory and therefore subject to manipulation for greater concessions in the future, 
elites hold out against joining a possible party of power and instead increase their 
opposition to the leader. 
 In selecting cases for this study, I follow the three main recommendations in 
Collier (1993) for employing the comparative method, namely increasing the number of 
cases, matching cases in order to control for rival explanations, and decreasing the 
number of variables (111-112). This study employs aspects of Mill's most different 
systems design in that each empirical chapter pairs cases with the same party creation 
outcome in order to isolate the operative variable of elite beliefs about leader type.  
 The case studies in this work focus on party creation in the successor states of the 
Soviet Union. These countries make a natural set for comparative historical analysis as 
their shared political pasts, homogenous institutional endowments inherited from the 
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Soviet Union, and comparable levels of socio-economic development at the time of 
independence allow researchers to eliminate these factors as rival explanators for the 
outcome of interest. The successor states of the Soviet Union (re-)gained their 
independence in the same international context in which linkage with and leverage from 
established democracies34 put pressure to hold regular elections for legislative and 
executive offices, to guarantee basic civil liberties, and to adopt neo-liberal economic 
reforms (Levistky and Way 2010: 38-45). A number of social scientists have recognized 
the value of post-Soviet Eurasia as "a laboratory" for studying institutional creation (Frye 
1997, Jones-Luong 2003).35 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Four Case-Study Countries 
Basis of Comparison Georgia Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan 
Population in 1989 5.4M 7.0M 16.5M 4.2M 
Percentage Titular Nationality in 1989 70% 82% 39% 51% 
Per Capita GDP in 1990 $1614 $1237 $1647 $608 
Perestroika-Era Mobilization High High Low  Low 
Communist Party Influence Low Low High High 
Armed Conflict 1990-1995 Yes Yes No No 
Leader's Path to Power Coup Coup Continuity Continuity 
Political Rights Average 1991-1995 5.0 5.5 5.5 4.5 
 
Sources: Anderson and Silver 1990, World Bank 2015, Bessinger 2002b, Dawisha and Parrott 1997,  
 Freedom House 2015 
 
  
Among the post-Soviet states, I compare Georgia and Azerbaijan where 
incumbent leaders created parties of power in the 1990s, and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Though Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that linkage and leverage with the West, were generally low in 
the post-Soviet states, there was important variation among the post-Soviet states.  
35 See Appendix C for a full list of Post-Soviet leaders and their institutional choices, 1990-2010. 
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where incumbent leaders did not create parties of their own in the 1990s.36 As the table 
below indicates, the countries are paired based on their institutional outcomes (party and 
no party) and matched on key social and economic indicators. Azerbaijan and Georgia 
are both roughly the same size; data from the final Soviet census also show that the titular 
nationality was a majority in both republics, but that there were also sizeable minority 
populations. Though Kazakhstan's population was more than three times larger than 
Kyrgyzstan's in 1990, the two share other important demographic features, namely the 
fact that the titular nation was not a majority in the republic (Anderson and Silver 1990), 
with large concentrations of Russians and other Slavs in the northern areas of each 
republic (Dawisha and Parrott 1997). Economically, Georgia and Azerbaijan had similar 
profiles; the republics were ranked 6th and 7th within the USSR for per capita GDP in 
1990; both were largely agricultural republics. While Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan's 
income levels and economic endowments differed significantly in 1990, both republics 
experienced similar drops in economic output during the period, which created similar 
uncertainty about the future. 
 The pairs of countries share other historical commonalities. Levels of protest 
mobilization during perestroika in Georgia and Azerbaijan were among the highest in the 
entire Soviet Union, and popular front-led governments replaced the Communist 
leadership immediately after independence in both countries. In Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, the opposite was true. During perestroika, levels of popular mobilization 
were among the lowest in the Soviet Union, while during the first years of independence, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Other instances of party creation such as the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (1991), 
Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (1991), and the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (1994) were 
considered along with leaders' decisions not to create parties in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova in 
the 1990s. However, the pairs selected above matched best on the indicators of interest for this project. 
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the Communists remained the strongest and best organized political force in the two 
republics (Beissinger 2002b, Dawisha and Parrott 1997). Both Georgia and Azerbaijan 
were seized by separatist and interstate conflict during their first years of independence, 
while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remained at peace and territorially intact. The leaders 
who created parties in Georgia and Azerbaijan returned to power in 1992 and 1993 after 
coups deposed popularly elected leaders in, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan's first 
post-independence presidents came to power in 1989 and 1990, respectively (Dawisha 
and Parrott 1997). Finally, Freedom House political rights scores from all four countries 
hold roughly the same average for the years 1991-1995 when leaders were in the process 
of making the institutional choices that are at the center of this study. At the time, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan all qualified as "semi-consolidated 
authoritarian regimes" in which leaders had strong incentives to create parties of their 
own.  
 
Conclusion  
 The formal model in this chapter uses assumptions about a small set of variables 
and the preferences of actors to determine when certain institutional outcomes emerge. It 
has demonstrated that both party creation and not party creation can be stable equilibria. 
In some individual cases, it is impossible to determine at an abstract level which of the 
above equilbria a given leader is in, e.g. a conciliatory leader who does not create a party 
could be in a pooling equilibrium or a separating equilibrium that leads to the same 
outcome. However, by delving into the cases and evaluating the model parameter by 
parameter, it is possible to distinguish between the equilibria presented above. The 
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following two chapters do this in the form of historical case studies of two pooling 
equilibria: party creation in Georgia and Azerbaijan, and no party creation in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan. 
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Chapter 3: Party Creation in Georgia and Azerbaijan 
 
 In this chapter, I demonstrate the existence of pooling equilibrium 1 (EQ1) from 
the signaling model of authoritarian party creation with case studies of party creation by 
Georgia and Azerbaijan's presidents in the early 1990s. In this equilibrium, repressive 
and conciliatory leaders both establish parties of power based on two crucial factors: the 
benefits they expect to receive by creating a party and their expectation that political 
elites will join their party. As the previous chapter makes clear, incentives to create a 
party of power for a given leader is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
establishing a party.37 Leaders commit to creating a party once they know that elites 
within the regime will join their party. Despite being different types of leaders, elites 
perceived Eduard Shevardnadze and Heydar Aliyev to be repressive for a period of time, 
which made it possible for both leaders to establish parties of power. However, the fact 
that Shevardnadze and Aliyev were different types of leaders had implications for regime 
dynamics that manifested in Georgia and Azerbaijan later in the 1990s and in the early 
2000s.  
 In this chapter, I demonstrate that Georgia and Azerbaijan held comparable values 
for the parameters of interest in the signaling model of authoritarian party creation, 
namely the sizeable benefit (B) that leaders foresaw from creating parties of their own, 
the high levels of side payments (S) necessary for attracting elites into their party, as well 
as the relatively high value that elites in the two countries placed on their independent 
reputations (R). I highlight the instrumental role that elite beliefs (Z) about leader type 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This condition is also generally assumed to be constant in authoritarian regimes where legislatures 
operate and elections are held regularly. 
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play in leading to the establishment of a party of power. Had elites in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan not feared exclusion from power in the future as a punishment for not joining 
the leader's party, I argue that they would have remained independent, thereby preventing 
the emergence of parties of power in those countries. As the narratives that follow 
demonstrate, the parties that Shevardnadze and Aliyev created were not simply rebranded 
versions of the Communist parties of their respective republics. Rather, they were new 
institutions that the leaders used to change incumbent legislators' incentives for 
supporting their agenda.  
 The story of Eduard Shevardnadze's creation of the Citizens Union of Georgia 
(CUG)38 begins in March 1992 with his return to power. Invited back to Georgia from 
Moscow by the Military Council, a triumvirate of militia commanders who had 
overthrown Georgia's first elected president, Shevardnadze spent the next three years 
working to end the country's civil war and to bring order to the political system. He did 
so primarily by moving conflict among domestic factions from the streets into the 
parliament,39 and by seeking a pragmatic solution to the country's separatist conflicts. Yet 
Shevardnadze faced existential threats to his rule, and indeed his life, from highly 
mobilized opposition groups, as well as criminal elements within his own government 
(Slider 1997, Wheatley 2005). Shevardnadze owed his early legislative victories to the 
CUG, which culminated in the ratification of a new constitution in August 1995. He and 
his party also had a strong showing in the presidential and parliamentary elections that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 In Georgian, Sak'art'velos Mok'alak'et'a Kavshiri (SMK). The Georgian name and abbreviation are rare 
in English-language scholarship. 
39 Until 1992, Georgia's legislative body was the Supreme Soviet (Uzenaesi Sabcho), the same name as the 
legislature of the Georgian SSR. I use the term "parliament" synonymously with Supreme Soviet until 1992 
after which I refer to the Georgian legislature, Sak'art'velos Parlamenti as Parliament. 
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followed the passage of the constitution.40 By capitalizing on an early show of strength 
and an increasing sense of his repressive capacity, Shevardnadze secured the commitment 
of diverse factions of elites to join his party, which created a stable base of support, at 
least for a few years, within Georgia's antagonistic, contentious, and fractionalized 
parliament. 
 Heydar Aliyev's formation of the New Azerbaijan Party (YAP)41 between 1992-
1995 provides a meaningful foil to Eduard Shevardnadze's creation of the Citizens' Union 
of Georgia. Like Shevardnadze, Aliyev left a semi-retired life in Moscow in the early 
1990s to return to his home republic, Azerbaijan, where he had served as First Secretary 
of the Communist Party from 1969-1982. Like his Georgian counterpart, Aliyev took 
power in the midst of a war with Armenia over the separatist region, Nagorno-Karabagh, 
as well as under heightened tensions between different Azerbaijani political factions. At 
the time he regained power, he had long been considered by many inside the republic to 
be Azerbaijan's best hope for restoring order and rebuilding the economy. Creating YAP 
helped Aliyev consolidate power in the executive branch, which effectively, though 
brutally, brought an end to Azerbaijan's unruly domestic politics. 
 This chapter addresses each stage of the process of party creation comparatively 
and demonstrates how the parameters from the signaling model of authoritarian party 
creation manifested empirically. The narratives in this chapter emphasize the 
commonalities in Shevardnadze and Aliyev’s backgrounds, their parallel returns to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 CUG members won 40% seats in the 1995-1999 parliament from the proportional list and could count on 
an additional 15-20% of seats from sympathetic independent candidates and other supportive parties. CUG 
party list seats grew to 45% in the 1999-2003 parliament, but towards the end of the parliamentary term, 
defections from the party and a lack of support from other parties impacted the CUG's ability to pass 
legislation. 
41 In Azeri, Yeni Azəәrbaycan Partiyası (YAP). The party is referred to commonly in English-language 
scholarship as YAP and so is used along with New Azerbaijan Party. I refrain from using the abbreviation 
YAP to avoid confusion. 
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power, and the similarly competitive conditions that existed within the legislatures of 
Georgia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. These narratives highlight the crucial role that 
elite beliefs in each country played in leading incumbent leaders to create parties of 
power. While elites' perception of Aliyev's type was correct in Azerbaijan, elites did not 
correctly perceive Shevardnadze's type. The closing sections of the chapter address the 
aftermath of the creation of parties of power in both countries and the implications of 
leader type for the functioning of the party of power after its creation. 
 
Shevardnadze and Aliyev Return to Power 
 In Georgia and Azerbaijan, former Communist Party First Secretaries returned to 
their respective republics and displaced popular front governments that had gained power 
immediately after independence. Both leaders had valuable “usable pasts” (Grzymala-
Busse 2002), which they derived from their careers, however a great deal of uncertainty 
prevailed about how they would be able to use their Soviet pasts after independence. 
Both leaders returned to republics in the midst of social and economic chaos, and both 
replaced popularly elected anti-Communist governments, which intensified opposition to 
leaders who were expected to enjoy high levels of approval. 
 At the time of Shevardnadze's return to power, Georgia was engulfed in civil war. 
A triumvirate of warlords ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in December 1991, 
triggering an open war between supporters of the deposed president and forces loyal to 
those who had led the coup.42 This conflict manifested in Georgia's capital, Tbilisi, in the 
form of assassinations, gang activity, protests, and other forms of unrest while rival 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Jaba Ioseliani, leader of the Mkhedrioni militia, Tengiz Kitovani, leader of the National Salvation Front 
militia, and Tengiz Sigua, the Prime Minister, led the 1991 coup against Zviad Gamsakhurdia. 
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militias did battle for control of Western Georgia (Wheatley 2005). After three months in 
power, Georgia's self-styled Military Council, consisting of three militia leaders who had 
deposed Gamsakhurdia, invited Eduard Shevardnadze to serve as the head of state. Given 
the international prestige and goodwill Shevardnadze had won as the reformist Foreign 
Minister of the Soviet Union (1985-1991) as well as the deep knowledge of the inner 
workings of Georgia he had gained as First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party 
(1972-1985), he was one of very few individuals who could credibly begin the process of 
ending the country's simultaneous political and economic crises.  However, it came as a 
surprise to many inside Georgia that Shevardnadze accepted the Military Council's offer. 
At the time, political observers believed that Shevardnadze had his sights set on 
becoming Secretary General of the United Nations (Rondeli, Alekandre. Interview. 2010-
03-11), or at the very least, that he would continue his work in Moscow with the 
Movement for Democratic Reforms, which he had recently founded (Kommersant 1991-
07-08).  
 Though Shevardnadze had served as First Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the Georgian SSR between 1972-1985, he was not remembered particularly fondly at the 
time he regained power. Leadership of the Georgian Communist Party passed initially to 
Jumber Patiashvili in 1985 and then to Givi Gumbaridze in 1989, which meant that 
Shevardnadze’s patronage networks in the state administration had been largely disrupted 
prior to his return in 1992. Given that Patiashvili and Gumbaridze remained active in 
Georgian politics during the early 1990s, the support of the Communist elites was not 
guaranteed for Shevardnadze (Jones 2013). Shevardnadze was even less popular among 
the newly-elected elites who had won sizeable followings by leading anti-regime protests 
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during Perestroika. Though riven by their own internal divisions, the Zviadists,43 
supporters of Gia Chanturia's National Democratic Party, and Irakli Tsereteli's National 
Independence Party were united in their belief that Shevardnadze's return to power at the 
behest of the Military Council was illegitimate (Wheatley 2005). Nonetheless, 
Shevardnadze accepted the Military Council's invitation and took what he called the 
"riskiest step of [his] life" by returning to Tbilisi in March 1992 (Literaturnaya Gazeta 
1992-03-11).  
 The tone of Heydar Aliyev's return to Azerbaijan in the summer of 1990 differed 
markedly from Eduard Shevardnadze's. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the First 
Secretary of Azerbaijan's Communist Party, Ayaz Mutalibov, as well as the leaders of the 
Azerbaijani National Front all considered Aliyev a persona non grata in the republic. 
Gorbachev prevented the former First Secretary from boarding a flight to Baku in July 
1990, but in the end, Aliyev returned by direct flight to his home region, the Nakhchivan 
Autonomous Republic (NAR).44 At the time, Aliyev had been living in Moscow and had 
kept a low profile after his dismissal from the Politburo in 1987. Despite having served as 
First Secretary of the Azerbaijani SSR’s Communist Party from 1969-1982 and the 
Politburo from 1982-1987, he publicly resigned from the Communist Party in July 1991, 
and used his statement to criticize the Mutalibov for his mishandling of the escalating 
crisis in Karabagh as well as for suppressing the nationalist movements in Azerbaijan 
(Interfax 1991-07-19). With this formal link to the party now severed and without a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 "Zviadist" is a general term for a supporter of deposed president Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Supporters were 
affiliated with a number of different political parties, including "Charter 91" and "Round Table."  
44 An exclave of Azerbaijan, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is bordered by Armenia, Turkey, and 
Iran and so was cut off by road and rail from Azerbaijan proper during the Karabagh conflict. The spelling 
"Nakhchivan" reflects the Azeri Naxçıvan, rather than the commonly used Russian Nakhichevan. 
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formally organized group of supporters, Aliyev found himself with a usable past, but 
without a concrete institution or formal position from which to use his past. 
 Soon after returning to Nakhchivan, Aliyev won a seat as a deputy in the 
Autonomous Republic's Supreme Soviet45, and then was chosen by internal vote as 
chairman of the body in September 1991 (Komosmolskaya Pravda 1991-09-06). Once 
back in office, Aliyev behaved for all intents and purposes as the head of an independent 
state, refusing on numerous occasions to take orders from Baku (Cornell 2011). Aliyev 
sanctioned the opening of Nakhchivan's borders with Iran and Turkey without the 
permission of the republic-level officials in Baku or of Union-level officials in July 1991. 
In September 1991, the Nakhchivan Supreme Soviet under Aliyev's control resolved not 
to participate in the Azerbaijani presidential elections scheduled for that month (Baku 
Radio 1991-09-04).  
As the Karabagh conflict escalated and trade with the rest of Azerbaijan became 
impossible, Heydar Aliyev negotiated trade agreements with Turkey and Iran 
independently of Baku and in May 1993 reached a cease fire agreement with Armenia 
while the government in Baku was still at war with the country. This brought greater 
stability and security to his home region, Nakhchivan, but seriously angered the Poplar 
Front-led government in Baku (Assa Irada, 1993-05-19). At the time, Aliyev assumed the 
role of a full-fledged statesman from his provincial position of Chairman of the 
Nakhchivan Republic Supreme Soviet. In an interview with Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, 
the interviewer remarked to Aliyev, "you are behaving in your fiefdom as though you 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Until 1992, both the Azerbaijani and Nakhchivani legislatures were called Supreme Soviet (Ali Soveti), 
the same names as the pre-independence legislatures. In 1992, the Popular Front-led government changed 
the name of Azerbaijan's legislature to Milli Meclis (National Assembly). Accordingly, I refer to the body 
as Milli Meclis, parliament, or the National Assembly. 
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were the head of an independent state," to which he responded, "…this is what it is. I 
really am the head of a small state" (1992-04-09). Such statements reflect the recognition 
of Aliyev as one of the republic's paramount leaders despite his isolation in Nakhchivan. 
 Heydar Aliyev's return to political office sparked speculation about his intentions 
for the future; in numerous interviews from the period, journalists posed pointed 
questions about his plans for future office (Krasnaya Zvezda 1992-04-09, Izvestiya 1992-
06-29). But Aliyev remained cagey about his ambitions in public statements. In April 
1992, he swore on the Quran on live television that he would not return to Baku to a 
"republic-level leadership post" (Komsomolskaya Pravda 1992-04-04), but a few months 
later offered an ambiguous response of "whatever happens, happens" when asked about 
his political future (Izvestiya 1992-06-29). Aliyev made frequent mention of the wide 
support he had in Baku, and the many telegrams he received from all over Azerbaijan 
demanding that he head the republic (Krasnaya Zvezda 1992-04-09). Over time, he 
changed his tone to admit that he would serve the people in whatever way they demanded 
and that he would not "turn a deaf ear to [the nation's] call" (Moscow News 1993-04-30) 
should they demand his return to power.  
 Whether this shift represents the evolution of Aliyev's sincere plans or the 
dissembling of a savvy political operator is impossible to determine. If one takes Aliyev's 
statements about his ambitions at face value, one would have to accept that he did not 
return to Nakhchivan from Moscow in 1990 with the clear intention of becoming 
president of Azerbaijan. Rather, his path to the presidency in 1993 presented itself as time 
passed, due to a number of historically contingent events. By all accounts an ambitious 
hard-knuckled politico, it is hard to believe that the prospect of returning to power was 
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entirely absent from Aliyev's mind when he returned to the republic in 1990. But the 
twists and turns of high politics in Azerbaijan during that era make it difficult to accept 
that Aliyev had a master plan for his path to the presidency. Rather, he seems to have 
navigated the complicated cross-currents of the Azerbaijani political scene with the skills 
he had honed over a lengthy career as a Communist party insider. Though the 
complexities of the time may have hindered Aliyev's ability to plan his political future, it 
is still likely that the major steps on his path to power were calculated, strategic ones.  
 Both Eduard Shevardnadze and Heydar Aliyev returned to power by 
unconventional means. While both leaders had extensive experience as the chief 
executives of their respective republics from the Brezhnev era, their returns to power took 
place under the conditions of armed domestic conflict, plummeting economies, and as the 
next section shows, highly mobilized populations. These new circumstances posed 
serious challenges to the leaders who faced the immediate problem of securing their hold 
on power and establishing a measure of political order in order to begin to solve their 
republics' twin crises. Despite similar institutional choices, these leaders differed in at 
least one crucial way. As I demonstrate later in this chapter, Eduard Shevardnadze was a 
conciliatory leader while Aliyev was at his core repressive. However, because of 
prevailing uncertainty about the leaders’ types, elites in Azerbaijan and Georgia believed 
Aliyev and Shevardnadze both to be repressive and therefore joined both leaders’ parties 
of power. 
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Elite Mobilization in Georgia and Azerbaijan 
 An examination of the contentious politics of Georgia and Azerbaijan in the early 
1990s provides estimates of the value that elites at the time placed on their independent 
reputations (R) and relatedly, the value of side payments (S) that leaders would have to 
offer elites in order to attract them into a potential party of power. The high levels of 
popular mobilization in Georgia at the time meant that incumbent political elites had real 
claims to popular appeal and could expect to win votes independent of their affiliation 
with the president. This meant that many incumbent elites placed high values on their 
independent reputations (R) at the time Shevardnadze and Aliyev came to power. The 
fractionalized nature of Georgian politics in particular raised the value of side payments 
(S) that Shevardnadze would have to offer elites because of the sheer number of different 
groups he would have to coopt into a party of power. In Azerbaijan, elites in the early 
1990s were highly mobilized in the Azerbaijani Popular Front, which replaced the 
republic’s Communist holdover leadership in June 1992. Similarly to Georgia, this turn 
of events raised the value that Azerbaijani elites placed on their independence, as the 
primary anti-Communist force in Azerbaijani politics achieved its paramount goal of 
taking control of the republic's government (Todua 2001: 20). Despite the elevated values 
on parameters that would make party creation less likely, both Aliyev and Shevardnadze 
managed to establish parties of power. 
 By the time that Eduard Shevardnadze returned to Georgia, Georgian political 
elites had extensive experience mobilizing public demonstrations and also had developed 
nascent but distinct party allegiances. These conditions raised the costs of creating a party 
for Shevardnadze in two important ways. First, the number of different groups 
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Shevardnadze would need to coopt in order to form a sizeable parliamentary faction was 
great because of the fractionalized nature of Georgian political elites. Second, the side 
payments (S) that Shevardnadze would have to offer potential recruits to his own party 
would have to exceed the relatively high value (R) that Georgian elites placed on their 
independent reputations. For many elites at the time, supporting a former Communist 
leader meant alienating constituents who supported nationalist-democratic politicians 
during Perestroika and during the first years of independence.  
 In terms of popular mobilization, from 1987-1992, at least 689 protests with more 
than 100 participants took place in Georgia, which represents the largest absolute number 
of protests as well as the largest number of protests per capita that occurred in any Soviet 
republic during Perestroika. The aggregate number of protest participants for this time 
period divided by the total population of Georgia in 1989 is 1.14, which would imply that 
every Georgian man, woman, and child protested at least once during that time period, 
under the unlikely assumption that each protest drew an entirely new crowd of 
participants.  It is far likelier that an active mobilized core group of protesters went out 
onto the streets repeatedly between 1987-1992. This suggests that if the same individual 
protested multiple times that affinities for particular movements and individual leaders 
were developing in Georgia. Additionally, two protests in the republic drew over 500,000 
participants, or 10% of Georgia's population, indicating the extent to which protest 
mobilization extended beyond activists to include ordinary citizens on a number of 
occasions. Unlike in other former republics of the Soviet Union, the wave of protests did 
not subside in Georgia after it gained independence, or even after the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union; in the two months leading up to Shevardnadze's return, 23 protests took 
place in Tbilisi, drawing an average of over 4000 demonstrators (Beissinger 2002b). 
Protest activity in Georgia was fractionalized among many different 
organizations. Though public opinion data from the era is scant, a rough comparison of 
the organizations responsible for staging protests in Georgia at the time offers a sense of 
the relative levels of activity and support that different groups enjoyed. In Georgia, 
between 1987-1991, 11% of demonstrations were organized by the Round Table, the 
leading political group of the late 1980s, 11% by the National Democratic Party of 
Georgia, 7% by the National Independence Party of Georgia, and 4% by the Ilia 
Chavchavadze Society.  25% of the protests listed in Beissinger’s (2002b) dataset were 
organized by an assortment of smaller groups, while 36% have no organizer indicated. 
These groups, along with many others, competed for seats in the 1990 Supreme Soviet 
elections in Georgia, which were held on a true multiparty, and not merely multi-
candidate basis. Five parties won seats through proportional and single-member district 
votes, with 50% of all seats won by the Round Table, which itself was a coalition of 
smaller Perestroika-era protest groups.46 By October 1990, the Round Table had 
incorporated the Ilia Chavchavadze Society, the Georgian Helsinki Union, the Merab 
Kostava Society, the Georgian Monarchist Party, and the Georgian Traditionalist Union 
(Central Election Commission of Georgia 2010).   
 Besides the fractionalized nature of Georgia's nascent party politics, the 
breakdown of the republic’s legislature posed further impediments for restoring order in 
government. After the December 1991 coup, the Supreme Soviet elected in 1990 was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The two other largest Perestroika-era protest organizations, Giorgi Chanturia's National Democratic Party 
and Irakli Tsereteli's National Independence Party, boycotted the October 1990 Supreme Soviet elections, 
which inflated the seat share for their rival group, Zviad Gamsakhurdia's Round Table. 
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paralyzed. One contingent of pro-Gamsakhurdia deputies followed the deposed president 
into exile in Grozny, while those who remained were unable to meet the quorum required 
to hold a session, and were further stymied when the Supreme Soviet Chairman Akaki 
Asatiani resigned (ITAR-TASS 1992-01-13).47 Parliamentary opponents of 
Gamsakhurdia's Round Table revived a legislature they had formed in 1990 to rival the 
official Supreme Soviet (Programma Radio Odin 1992-01-14), but this body had few 
supporters and no legal standing. 
 Despite this institutional disarray, a consensus existed among party elites as well 
as the Military Council that reconvening the parliament was a necessary step for 
normalizing the political crisis unfolding in Georgia. Thus, the Council agreed to call 
new elections for October 1992 and decided to make the chairmanship of the body a 
directly elected position, rather than a position won by the internal vote of deputies 
(ITAR-TASS 1992-08-31). As the only candidate registered for the position, 
Shevardnadze won handily (Interfax 1992-10-12). The electoral threshold for the interim 
body was set at 1%, which meant that 24 parties won representation in the 1992 
parliament (Wheatley 2005). Among this fractionalized parliament, only 35 out of 234 
deputies elected in 1992 had served in the previous legislature, and only one deputy out 
of these 234 had held a seat in the 1985-1990 Supreme Soviet (Zaria Vostoka 1985-02-
28, Komunisti 1990-11-07, Sakartvelos Respublika 1992-10-28, Author’s calculation). 
This suggests that the modal parliamentary deputy in 1992 lacked legislative experience, 
and also that Shevardnadze likely had few if any allies left in the legislature from his 
tenure as First Secretary. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 By December 1991, the number of deputies with mandates in Georgia's Supreme Soviet was reduced to 
137 out of an original 280 because of purges instigated by Zviad Gamsakhurdia (Radio Rossii 1992-07-31). 
   
66 
	  
 The Azerbaijani populace was also among the most highly mobilized in any 
Soviet republic during Perestroika. At least 234 protests larger than 100 participants took 
place in Azerbaijan between Jan 1, 1987 and December 31, 1992,48 but of these, 50 
protests numbered over 100,000 participants, meaning that on as many occasions, 1.4% 
of Azerbaijan's total population participated in a single protest. The median size of the 
Perestroika-era protests in Azerbaijan was 5000 which almost four times larger than the 
median protest in neighboring Georgia as a percentage of each republic's total population. 
Geographically, protest activity in Azerbaijan was confined almost entirely to the capital, 
Baku, and to the Nagorno-Karabagh Autonomous Oblast where the local Armenian and 
Azerbaijani population staged mass protests over the region's secession from the 
Azerbaijani SSR. Of the 134 protests with an indicated organizer, 75%, were led by the 
Azerbaijani Popular Front. This indicates that a single organization dominated the field of 
"neformaly"49 in the republic at the time (Beissinger 2002b). 
 This unified national front was the only alternative political force that entered 
Azerbaijan's Supreme Soviet during the 1990 elections. Unlike in Georgia where multiple 
parties competed in the 1990 Supreme Soviet elections and reformists won a plurality of 
seats, the 1990 elections in Azerbaijan permitted only the registration of Communist and 
"non-partisan" candidates. Though the Azerbaijani Popular Front registered a number of 
its members as "non-partisan," only 25 Popular Front-affiliated candidates won office out 
of 350 deputies. Thus, the Communists retained their dominant position both in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This figure excludes the 90 protests staged by Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. For 
all intents and purposes, during this period, this population functioned separately from the rest of 
Azerbaijan. 
49 In the parlance of the time, protest-oriented groups were termed "neformaly" or "informal" organizations, 
as opposed to the formally registered Communist Party.	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Azerbaijan's legislature as well as the state administration well into 1992 (Bakinskii 
Rabochii 1990-10-09, Cornell 2011: 57).  
 The Communists, however, did not have unified allegiances or preferences for the 
future. A 1990 article published in Komsomolskaya Pravda laid out the issue this way, 
stating that "... there are Communists and there are Communists," and that despite the 
deteriorating reputation of Communists in Azerbaijan, "quite a few" middle managers in 
the republic still owed their jobs to Aliyev, which could lead to a split within the 
Communist party between supporters of the last Communist-era First Secretary, Ayaz 
Mutalibov, and Aliyev's supporters (1990-10-07). This suggests that while some 
Communists were loyal to Aliyev, this was not uniformly the case in the republic at the 
beginning of the 1990s.   
 In terms of the signaling model of authoritarian party creation, the high levels of 
mobilization in Georgia and Azerbaijan raised both the costs of creating a party (C) as 
well as the value of independent reputation for elites (R). The costs for Shevardnadze 
were high because he would need to secure the allegiance of several factions within the 
parliament if he wanted to form a majority, but the largest contingent of deputies in 1992 
only held about 10% of the seats (Central Election Commission 2010: 37). For Aliyev, 
the costs of creating a party were high as well, because the coup that brought him to 
power unseated a National Front government that had significant popular support. The 
fact that the isolated Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic served as Aliyev's power base 
meant that he faced an uphill battle building support elsewhere in the republic. 
Furthermore, the independent political capital that elites in Georgia and Azerbaijan held 
meant they did not necessarily depend on an alliance with Shevardnadze or Aliyev to 
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hold office in the future. Facing elites who placed a high value on their independent 
reputations, Aliyev and Shevardnadze needed to convince them to abandon their previous 
political identities and join a new party of power. 
 
The Need for Parties of Power in Georgia and Azerbaijan 
 As the signaling model of authoritarian party creation from the previous chapter 
indicates, creating a party of power yields benefits (B) to leaders. Though parties of 
power serve a number of important functions over time, I conceptualize the payoff that 
leaders receive from establishing a party of power as the ones that they derive soon after 
creating the party, such as changing elites' incentives to cooperate with the leader, 
creating a reliable base of support within legislatures, and establishing a formal 
institution to define the winning coalition within the selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et al 
2003). As this section illustrates, both Shevardnadze and Aliyev lacked stable coalitions 
of supporters within the legislatures of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and so both leaders faced 
difficulties in forming majorities to pass legislation. Though both leaders assumed power 
by extraconstitutional means, they portrayed themselves as democrats domestically and 
internationally. In this way, they committed themselves to working through institutions 
that took democratic forms, despite not always operating according to democratic 
principles. 
 Soon after gaining power, Eduard Shevardnadze made clear that he intended to 
hold elections during the fall of 1992. 36 parties and blocs registered for the October 
parliamentary elections, out of which 24 won at least one seat (Central Election 
Commission 2010: 37). After the elections, political analysts forecast a relatively 
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cooperative legislature for Shevardnadze despite its fractionalization. Among MPs 
elected on the proportional list, 88 out of 150 were expected to be either "obedient" or 
"pragmatic," supporters, while the remaining 62 were expected to be either "potential," 
"realistic," or "radical" opponents of Shevardnadze's agenda. Out of 84 SMD mandates, 
analysts identified about 10 clear opponents, which left Shevardnadze approximately 2/3 
of MPs whose support he might capture. (Iveria Ekspresi 1992-10-22). In the absence of 
roll-call data from the period, this breakdown of parliamentarians' leanings gives a sense 
of the competitive environment that Shevardnadze faced after his first parliamentary 
elections.  
 Shevardnadze's need for a party of power grew over the next several months as a 
large contingent of legislators opposed Shevardnadze's legislative agenda and his 
attempts to secure greater executive authority. The new parliament soon divided palpably 
between supporters of Gamsakhurdia and their opponents, the National Democratic Party 
under the leadership of Giorgi Chanturia; additionally, both of these factions considered 
Shevardnadze's return to power an unconstitutional affront to Georgian democracy and 
mobilized both inside the Supreme Soviet and on the street to block his initiatives. 
Shevardnadze's parliamentary opponents called for his and his government's resignation 
repeatedly, while rumors of another armed takeover of the government filled the streets in 
early 1993 (Interfax 1993-01-13, Radio Tbilisi 1993-04-22, ITAR-TASS 1993-06-03). 
Critics blamed Shevardnadze for failing to consolidate a parliamentary majority, despite 
initial expectations that he could (Iveria Ekspresi 1992-10-22, 7 Dghe 1993-06-18).  
Members of Georgia's 1992-1995 parliament acknowledged the many difficulties that 
Eduard Shevardnadze faced in passing his own legislative projects. Each vote required 
   
70 
	  
forming a new coalition of support, and required ceaseless politicking as well as the 
distribution of many favors to deputies (Sakvarelidze, Ramaz. Interview. 2015-03-24; 
Asatiani, Akaki. Interview. 2015-03-27). 
 Tensions in government rose in the summer of 1993 as security and the economy 
deteriorated. Parliament refused to vote on the state's budget, while Prime Minister 
Tengiz Kitovani threatened to publish proof of parties' embezzlement of state funds 
(ITAR-TASS 1993-07-23). Shevardnadze defused the crisis by agreeing to form a new 
cabinet, but parliament continued to put pressure on Shevardnadze by rejecting an initial 
list of nominees for cabinet positions (Radio Tbilisi 1993-08-17). Later, the National 
Democratic faction led by Giorgi Chanturia threatened to leave Parliament in protest 
(Radio Tbilisi 1993-09-02). Throughout the summer, Shevardnadze repeatedly 
reproached the parliament for their intransigence while holding fast to his demand to 
broaden his powers to impose a state of emergency (Radio Tbilisi 1993-06-21, Ostankino 
Television First Channel 1993-06-30, Tbilisi First Program Television 1993-08-05).  
 As pressure and criticism escalated, Shevardnadze began speaking publicly about 
his intention to create a party of his own. In an interview on Radio Tbilisi, Shevardnadze 
said that while he initially had not planned to head any party "in order to avoid a split in 
society and Parliament," he now believed that Georgia needed a unified political force 
that could "act to prevent the onset of chaos or totalitarianism in Georgia" (ITAR-TASS 
1993-08-30). Tensions came to a head two weeks later when Shevardnadze took the 
dramatic step of offering the Supreme Soviet his resignation as Chairman, and effectively 
as head of state, on 14 September 1993 (ITAR-TASS 1993-09-14). Likely realizing the 
utter chaos that would result from Shevardnadze's resignation, a chorus of voices from 
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across Georgian society called on Shevardnadze to stay in power, from Jaba Ioseliani, the 
leader of the Mkhedrioni militia, to Ilia II, the patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church 
(Tbilisi Radio 1993-09-14a, Tbilisi Radio 1993-09-14b, Snark 1993-09-14). At the 
September 13 rally where Ilia II spoke, Shevardnadze agreed to return to power on the 
conditions that Parliament declare a state of emergency and suspend its work for three 
months. The following day, Georgia's Parliament rejected Shevardnadze’s resignation 
with a near unanimous vote of the 150 deputies who attended the session, and granted 
him the right to declare a State of Emergency in the country, which suspended the 
parliament as well as the freedom of assembly for two months (ITAR-TASS 1993-09-14).  
 This showdown paved the way for Shevardnadze to begin the process of 
consolidating his support among incumbent legislators. His maneuver forced members of 
Parliament to confirm their support for his leadership publicly. If one is to take 
Shevardnadze's public statements about not initially intending to create a party at face 
value, it appears that Shevardnadze saw the parliamentary crisis in September 1993 as a 
turning point. Forcing members of parliament to reveal their preference for his continued 
rule in a public manner served as a symbolic victory, which Shevardnadze then tried to 
translate into a more enduring form of support.  
 Heydar Aliyev, similarly, founded the New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) in 1992 
while still in Nakhchivan in order to solidify support for his leadership in his home 
region. In an environment in which several prominent political elites had already created 
their own parties, Aliyev's formation of YAP can be understood as a measure for 
strengthening his own position as a competitor in Azerbaijan's new political order. With 
the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) loyal to Abulfez Elchibey, the president of 
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Azerbaijan since 1992, Musavat loyal to Isa Qambar, the Speaker of Parliament, and the 
remnants of Communist Party loyal to Mutalibov, Azerbaijan's party-space was crowded 
with parties loyal to the most powerful politicians in the country.  
 In this sense, Aliyev's need for a party of power can be understood to be less 
immediate than that of Shevardadze who faced significant pressure to hold new elections. 
However, the necessity of building a reliable base of legislative support in Nakhchivan in 
1992 was clear; additionally, the benefit of creating a formal institution to reinforce his 
informal influence in the face of potential threats from rival parties was high. Later, the 
pressure to replace Milli Meclis members loyal to previous presidents and to crowd out 
alternative political parties provided the final impetus for instituting the New Azerbaijan 
Party as a party of power in the entire country (Todua 2001: 46-28). For both leaders who 
rose up through the ranks of the respective Communist parties of their home republics, in 
a sense, it seems natural that Shevardnadze and Aliyev would seek to create parties of 
power. While creating a party of power was evident as an institutional choice to leaders 
across the post-Soviet space, not all leaders succeeded in establishing such parties. 
Moreover, for leaders like Aliyev and Shevardnadze who returned to power after periods 
of significant elite turnover, the parties of power that they created were not institutional 
successors to the Communist Parties of their respective Soviet Socialist Republics.50 
Establishing the CUG and YAP demanded savvy politicking and improvisation in 
contentious political contexts. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 On the other hand, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan and the People’s Democratic 
Party of Uzbekistan, both created by incumbent leaders in 1991, were in fact direct 
institutional successors of the Communist Parties of these two republics. 
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Elite Perceptions of Leader Type in Georgia and Azerbaijan 
 As the theory presented in Chapter 2 proposes, the mere intention of creating a 
party is a necessary but not sufficient condition for creating a party of power. Elites must 
also join the party that a leader initiates in order for a party to emerge. This condition is 
most simply satisfied when the value of side-payments (S) that the leader offers exceeds 
the value that elites place on their independent reputations. However, as the case studies 
of Georgia and Azerbaijan indicate, leaders did not have great resources at their disposal 
to offer side payments, while elites at the time placed a high value on their independent 
reputations (R). Thus, a second condition must be considered in order to explain elite 
behavior here. As the discussion of assumptions in the model argues, elites strongly 
prefer to join parties established by repressive leaders because failing to do so jeopardizes 
their own future status as elites, while elites strongly prefer to remain independent if the 
leader creating a party of power is conciliatory. I argue that Heydar Aliyev and Eduard 
Shevardnadze’s creation of parties of power depended on the prevailing perception in 
Azerbaijan and Georgia that these leaders were repressive. For elites, the threat of 
punishment and exclusion for those who would not join parties of power was credible, 
and so significant numbers of incumbent elites from the Supreme Soviet pledged their 
support to Shevardnadze and Aliyev's despite having prior partisan identities. This 
section illustrates how these beliefs about leader type formed in Georgia and Azerbaijan 
during the first years of Shevardnadze and Aliyev’s presidencies and addresses how 
uncertainty about leader type can lead to misperceptions on the part of elites. 
 Eduard Shevardnadze had a reputation as a liberal and a reformer from his tenure 
as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia and Foreign Minister of the Soviet 
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Union. After his return to Georgia in 1992, there was increasing uncertainty about his 
type as a leader. Shevardnadze’s collaboration with the Military Council, a triumvirate of 
warlords who had recently deposed Georgia’s elected president and showed the leader in 
a new light (Jones 2013: 76-77). Though the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia remained outside of the authority of the central government for the entirety of 
Shevardnadze's presidency, in 1992-3, Shevardnadze and the Military Council leaders 
showed both the willingness and capacity to use coercion in order to regain control over 
Western Georgia (Sakartvelos Respublika 1992-06-06; Mayak Radio 1992-06-17). 
Meanwhile, Shevardnadze ordered police action against the criminal gangs that had 
seized control of large parts of Tbilisi and also began the process of deescalating street 
protests by cracking down on pro-Gamsakhurdia demonstrations (Mayak Radio 1992-05-
11, Sakartvelos Respublika 1992-06-06, Izvestiya 1992-07-03). Though the road to 
stability extended well into the 1990s, Shevardnadze made eminently clear statements 
that reestablishing security in the country was his paramount goal. To this end, 
Shevardnadze began paying salaries regularly to the police and began a process of 
incorporating the numerous private militias present in the country into the national armed 
forces (Moscow News 1992-03-29, Sakartvelos Respublika 1992-06-06).  
 While stressing the primacy of a political solution through new elections and the 
passage of a constitution, Shevardnadze secured the support of militias such as Tengiz 
Kitovani's National Guard and Jaba Ioseliani's Mkhedrioni (Nezavisimaya Gazeta 1992-
06-18). Crucially, the Mkhedrioni and National Guard began to lend a hand in 
Shevardnadze's suppression of pro-Gamsakhurdia protests in Tbilisi in 1992 and 1993, 
signaling a consolidation of repressive capacity in his camp (Agence France Presse 1992-
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08-12, Nezavisimaya Gazeta 1992-09-04, Radio Tbilisi 1993-05-28, Contact 1993-05-
31). Finally, in September 1993, Shevardnadze reshuffled the cabinet and took the bold 
step of assuming control of the Ministry of the Interior himself (Radio Tbilisi 1993-09-
12). This move meant that Georgia's police force would answer to Shevardnadze directly 
so long as he held this position. Though the state of emergency that began in September 
1993 did not lead to a wholesale crackdown on of the regime's opponents, 
Shevardnadze's control of coercive resources increased the sense of his ability to do so 
(Wheatley 2005). Members of parliament at the time also noted the symbolic meaning 
that Shevardnadze's assumption of control of the Interior Ministry held at the time 
(Sakvarelidze, Ramaz. Interview. 2015-03-24, Asatiani, Akaki. Interview. 2015-03-27). 
The situation that unfolded in Georgia in 1992-1993 illustrates how a discrepancy can 
arise between elite perceptions of leader type and the leader's true type.  
 Finally, during the fall of 1993, Eduard Shevardnadze secured Russia's 
commitment to deploy its Black Sea Fleet to support pro-government forces in Western 
Georgia in exchange for Georgia joining the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
According to Shevardnadze's spokesman from the time, Ramaz Sakvarelidze, the 
Zviadists in Western Georgia were mere days from taking Georgia's second largest city, 
Kutaisi (Interview. 2015-03-24). Thus, while Russian forces informally supported the 
Abkhaz separatists against the Georgian government forces, they also intervened on 
behalf of Shevardnadze's government in its conflict with the Zviadists. Russian Admiral 
Baltin's fleet reinforced Poti, the only Georgian under government control at the time in 
early November 1993, and moved quickly to free the main railway line in Western 
Georgia from the central government's opponents (ITAR-TASS 1993-11-10). Soon after, 
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the Russian Black Sea Fleet assisted the Georgian government’s forces in battle against 
the Zviadists, thereby ending the open hostilities of the Georgian civil war. These actions 
represent a marked shift in Shevardnadze's regime's revealed coercive capacity. By 
forging alliances with domestic militia leaders as well as the Russian military, 
Shevardnadze shored up his own government's position. These moves increased 
uncertainty about Shevardnadze's type, as visible changes in his coercive capacity 
conflicted with prior beliefs about his inclination for reform. As Shevardnadze's actions 
helped to end Georgia's civil war, perceptions about his leadership changed. 
 Unlike Shevardnadze, who had developed a reputation during Soviet times as a 
reformer and somewhat of a liberal, Heydar Aliyev's reputation as a strongman remained 
prevalent from the time he returned to Azerbaijan in the summer of 1990 until he became 
president three years later. Media accounts from the time covered Aliyev's return to 
Azerbaijan and his political activities in Nakhchivan with frequent speculation about 
Aliyev's political future. Some wondered  "whether the only 'yesterday's man'" capable of 
staging a return to politics "will be satisfied with provincial politics or will decide to 
climb higher" (Komsomolskaya Pravda 1991-09-06), while another analyst just after the 
Azerbaijani Popular Front took power, identified Aliyev as a "strong" political opponent 
whose fortunes would rise as Elchibey's fell (Izvestiya 1992-06-29). In retrospect, the fact 
that these sentiments surfaced in numerous interviews with Aliyev during his first years 
back in Azerbaijan contributes a sense of inevitability to his rise to power. 
 The perception of Aliyev as a repressive leader had roots in his long tenure as a 
Soviet statesman. Appointed as First Secretary of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist 
Republic by Leonid Brezhnev in 1969, Aliyev was promoted by to the Politburo in 1982 
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but then dismissed by Gorbachev in 1987 on suspicions of corruption and opposition to 
Perestroika (Graham 2015: 122). Aliyev remained in Moscow through the end of the 
1980s, as First Secretaries loyal to Gorbachev remained in power in Azerbaijan. Aliyev's 
tenure as the Chief of Azerbaijan's KGB contributed his image as a figure capable of 
wielding coercive power. However, the overall image of Aliyev was one of an elite 
Soviet statesman cut from Brezhnevite rather than reformist cloth. Therefore, when 
Aliyev returned to Azerbaijan in 1990, the media responded immediately with 
speculation about his intentions for returning to power. This undoubtedly reflected the 
genuine interest of many who believed that he had the capacity restore order in the 
republic, whether by force or by other means.  
 The belief that Aliyev would repress opponents grew increasingly clear during his 
tenure as Chairman of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic Supreme Soviet, and 
crystallized after Aliyev's return to Baku in June 1993. As Aliyev staked out 
Nakhchivan's independent course from the rest of the republic during the last days of the 
Soviet Union, he threatened that Interior Ministry troops in Baku who were planning to 
occupy Nakhchivan would be met with force like those who attacked the Russian 
Parliament during the August 1991 putsch (Moscow Central Network 1991-09-25). 
Aliyev had his chance to reveal more of his coercive capacity.  
 Though Heydar Aliyev's activities as Chairman of Nakhchivan's Supreme Soviet 
reestablished him as a prominent statesman, it was his participation in the June 1993 coup 
against President Abufez Elchibey that solidified his reputation as a repressive leader. 
Though the details of the coup are still hotly debated in Azerbaijan, the continuing 
economic decline of the republic and the army's poor performance on the Karabagh front 
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intensified calls for the Popular Front-led government to resign in mid-1993. In an effort 
to consolidate power, the government convinced the National Assembly to impose a two-
month state of emergency in in early April 1993 (Turan 1993-05-27). In June, in a move 
aimed at preempting government action against the Ganja troop garrison, General Suret 
Huseynov led an attack against the Popular Front leadership in Baku, demanding both the 
resignation of Prime Minister Panah Huseynov and the appointment of Aliyev as Speaker 
of the Milli Meclis on June 17, 1993 (TRT Television 1993-06-11, Baku Radio 1993-06-
20). The following week, the Milli Meclis quickly stripped Elcibey of his powers as 
president, installed Aliyev as acting president, and approved the formation of a new 
government. While Elcibey never formally resigned, a referendum in August 1993 
confirmed the people's support for Aliyev's presidency (Altstadt 1997).51  
 Almost immediately after Aliyev became the Chairman of the Milli Meclis, the 
atmosphere changed. Deputies claimed at the time that he sought to impose his version of 
the coup events into an official parliamentary report and threatened the parliamentarians 
who did not support his position (Turan 1993-07-17). By August, opposition parties cited 
attacks on their offices, restrictions on their publications, and arrests of opposition 
politicians without warrants (Russian Television 1993-08-11). As repression intensified in 
Azerbaijan, the message became clear to political elites that they should either cooperate 
with Aliyev or face punishment themselves. 
 That elites guessed Aliyev’s type correctly but were wrong about Shevardnadze 
derives from a few factors. In Azerbaijan, Aliyev’s actions, especially after 1993, 
confirmed prevailing perceptions about his type that persisted in the country from his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Expert opinions differ on whether the June 1993 was intended to bring Aliyev or Mutalibov to power. 
However, these sources agree that Aliyev maneuvered skillfully once back in power to consolidate it in his 
own hands (Altstadt 1997, Cornell 2011, Todua 2001). 
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tenure as First Secretary. In Shevardnadze’s case, his increasingly repressive image 
during 1992-1995 was at odds with previous notions about his leadership style, and 
thereby created more uncertainty about his type. Furthermore, elites in Georgia 
misperceived Shevardnadze’s type, beliefs about which derived primarily from 
individuals and groups allied with the president rather than acts of repression that he 
directed. The period during which Shevardnadze created the CUG coincided with the 
period when he was most closely allied with these other figures. In later years, relations 
soured between Shevardnadze and these figures and subsequently his image as a leader 
reverted towards his true conciliatory type. In Heydar Aliyev's case, public 
denouncements coupled with the swift and harsh repression the individuals and political 
parties who lost power during the 1993 coup made Aliyev's position and his type as a 
leader clear to elites in Azerbaijan. 
 
Forming Parties of Power in Georgia and Azerbaijan  
 In Georgia and Azerbaijan, the period of interest for explaining the creation of the 
CUG and YAP began when Shevardnadze and Aliyev assumed power and lasted until the 
first parliamentary elections in which the new parties competed. The earlier portions of 
these periods is covered in section IV of this chapter, which addresses the need that 
Shevardnadze and Aliyev had for parties of their own. The active process of party 
creation began in Georgia and Azerbaijan during states of emergency, which leaders used 
to suspend the activities of standing legislatures. It was during these periods of no 
legislative activity that leaders secured the membership of different factions of elites in 
order to ensure compliant legislatures once they reopened. In Georgia, this process took 
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place relatively quickly, while it was more drawn out in Azerbaijan. In both countries, the 
period of party creation ended with the electoral victories of Georgia and Azerbaijan's 
new parties of power in each country's 1995 parliamentary elections.  
 After voting to reject Shevardnadze's resignation in September 1993, Georgia's 
Parliament agreed to grant Shevardnadze's request of a two-month state of emergency. 
Shevardnadze, who had already worked for a year with the current Parliament, had 
developed a sense of whom he might wish to invite into a party, and formalized these ties 
with elites from three preexisting groups: the Green Party of Georgia, the Unity and 
Prosperity Bloc, as well as from a number of independent members of parliament 
affiliated with the Tbiliseli society. Though at other times, Shevardnadze had relied on 
the support of the National Democratic Party and the Party of Georgian Traditionalists, 
these groups were not incorporated into the CUG because elites in those parties held out 
against incorporation into the party of power. Here, the perspectives of different elites 
who represent the primary factions within Georgia and Azerbaijan's parties of power 
demonstrate how individually held values and beliefs led different actors to join the party. 
 The official founding of the Citizens Union of Georgia took place in November 
1993 at a conference organized by several civic organizations in Tbilisi. Key figures 
among these organizations were Zurab Zhvania, leader of Georgia’s Green Party, Vazha 
Lortkipanidze, a former First Secretary of the Komsomol and former Deputy First 
Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party who was a leading representative of the 
country’s administrative elite, and Gia Zhorzholiani, a charismatic historian who had led 
a number of nationalist-intellectual organizations. Interviews with some of these 
prominent members of the Citizens’ Union of Georgia shed light on the strategic 
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calculations that political elites in Georgia made when deciding whether or not to commit 
to Shevardnadze's project. 
 According to Vazha Lortkipanidze, the Chief of the Presidential Administration 
of Georgia (1992-1995), Prime Minister (1998-2000), and a leader of the Tbiliseli 
Society,52 Shevardnadze created the Citizens' Union because "parliament was isolated 
from the people." Lortkipanidze agreed that there was a need for a "big party" that 
represented the majority of Georgians, and not just the party activists who had won 
mandates and dominated the parliament at the time. Mr. Lortkipanidze referred to vague 
goals like restoring peace and order and promoting Christian-Democratic values when 
asked what drew him in particular into the CUG, though the latter had little to do with the 
party's ideology (Author's note). He also spoke of how the extended networks of Tbiliseli 
members would be able to represent the interests of the restive provinces better than 
members of the parties in parliament, who were influential only in Tbilisi (Lortkipanidze, 
Vazha. Interview. 2010-04-08). Unlike the nascent parties that existed inside and outside 
of Georgia's parliament which at the time were actively seeking to attract voters and win 
office through popular support, the Tbiliseli Society was not formally registered as a 
party or a parliamentary fraction. Rather, it was an informal association of members of 
the former nomenklatura with “usable pasts” but no formal structure in which to use 
them. 
 For elites like Lortkipanidze, joining the Citizens Union of Georgia offered the 
promise of a constant flow of side payments (S) and other benefits of membership in 
government but did not involve a major sacrifice of their independent partisan reputations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Wheatley (2005) refers to this group as the "Tbiliseli Society;" Vazha Lortkipanidze in interviews 
referred to the group as Kalakelebi, meaning "city dwellers." 
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(R) since Tbiliseli affiliates lacked partisan identities. To preserve their status as elites, 
members of the former nomenklatura would either need to develop mass constituencies 
or be coopted from above. Therefore, when the opportunity for the latter presented itself, 
the Tbiliseli affiliates accepted cooptation and incorporation into the CUG. In order to 
rule Georgia outside of Tbilisi and outside of Parliament, Shevardnadze needed the 
cooperation of the old nomenklatura who retained influence at the local level outside the 
capital. Joining the Citizens' Union, therefore, was a dominant strategy for Shevardnadze 
who needed to secure the support of incumbent legislators in order to pursue his policy 
goals and also to neutralize the Parliament as a site of opposition to his rule. For these 
elites, joining the party was their best response at the time, given their expectation of the 
consequences of remaining independent. 
 For Khatuna Gogorishvili, a member of Georgia's Green Party, participating in 
politics depended largely on her personal association with Green Party Chairman and 
future Speaker of Parliament, Zurab Zhvania.53 Ms. Gogorishvili and Mr. Zhvania were 
both biologists working at the same lab in Tbilisi in the late 1980s when protesters began 
to mobilize around different issues. The Green Party organized a few public protests 
during Perestroika that drew up to 1000 participants (Beissinger 2002b), but was more 
focused on winning office through alliances with more influential parties in electoral 
blocs and by obtaining financial support from Green parties in Europe (Gogorishvili, 
Khatuna. Interview. 2010-04-30). By 1992, the party's organizing efforts paid off as the 
party won 11 seats in Parliament - almost as many as the National Democratic Party, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Zurab Zhvania died under mysterious circumstances in February 2005. In order to understand why he 
and his associates joined the CUG, I spoke with Khatuna Gogorishvili and Revaz Adamia both of whom 
were close to Zhvania and were founding members of his faction, the Green Party of Georgia.  
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of the most influential Perestroika-era protest groups (Central Election Commission 
2010).  
 Between 1992-1993, Shevardnadze came to appreciate Zurab Zhvania's skill as a 
political operator and backroom dealmaker and invited his Green Party into the Citizen's 
Union. By coopting the Greens, Shevardnadze incorporated a group of young ambitious 
politicians who saw association with the President as their best bet for advancing their 
careers and feared exclusion from future benefits should they retain their separate 
partisan identity. For this faction, the increasing sense that Shevardnadze would remain in 
power and be able to exclude them from future benefits convinced them to join the 
Citizens' Union and dissolve as an independent party. This was a choice that other 
similarly positioned groups in Georgia at the time did not make, which led to a very 
different fortunes for the leaders of those parties. Zhvania's meteoric rise to Speaker of 
Parliament from what had been only a faction of 10 deputies, as well as the high offices 
enjoyed by many of his closest associates, demonstrate the rewards reaped by elites who 
joined Shevardnadze's party early on. 
 Conversations with Gia Zhorzholiani and Giga Lortkipanidze, who were both 
affiliated with the Unity and Prosperity Bloc in 1992, revealed some of the motivations of 
prominent intellectuals who joined the Citizens' Union. In his own words, Mr. 
Zhorzholiani, a respected historian and Perestroika-era activist, the Citizens' Union 
offered a chance to be a "constructive force" for reform (Zhorzholiani, Gia. Interview. 
2010-05-16). Dismayed by the dogged opposition of the more radical National 
Democratic Party, the National Independence Party, and the Zviadists, Zhorzholiani was 
attracted to the CUG's centrism and pragmatism. Elected to the 1992 Supreme Soviet 
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under the "Unity Bloc," Zhorzholiani did not have a particularly strong partisan identity 
and therefore placed less value on his independent political reputation (R), though he did 
risk his popularity as a public intellectual by pledging his political capital to a party 
project with an uncertain future. Similarly, for Giga Lortkipanidze, supporting 
Shevadndadze seemed like the best way to contribute to the restoration of political order 
in Georgia and at the same time to represent the interests of artists (Lortkipanidze, Giga. 
Interview. 2010-05-19). Though he claimed to have a "dissident's disposition" towards 
politics, Giga Lortkipanidze supported Eduard Shevardnadze's return to power as well as 
Shevardnadze's party building project.54  
As prominent members of Georgia's intellectual elite, Lortkipanidze and 
Zhorzholiani were valuable assets for the nascent CUG. In an era when political 
campaigns were a novelty, when dozens of new parties with vexingly similar names filled 
ballot papers, and when party platforms had scarcely been formed let alone 
communicated to the public, the personal celebrity of candidates was a strong guide for 
electoral choice. Thus, on its 1995 party list, the Citizens' Union's first 10 spots included 
the renowned Georgian filmmaker Eldar Shengelaia, Lana Ghoghoberidze, a well-known 
film actress, as well as Giga Lortkipanidze (Svobodnaia Gruziia 1995-11-21).55 Crucially 
for Shevardnadze, these figures brought personal popularity to the Citizens' Union 
without having to accommodate strong partisan identities into the new party of power. 
They also lent legitimacy to the party, which risked alienating some of the nationalist 
intellectuals now active in Georgian politics by incorporating members of the old 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Mr. Lortkipanidze's distinguished career as an actor and a theater director as well as his numerous state-
awarded prizes suggest he remained in the good graces of the Soviet authorities.  
55 By the 1995 Parliamentary election, Gia Zhorzholiani grew disaffected with Zurab Zhvania's leadership 
and left the Citizens' Union.  
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nomenklatura. Finally, the party served the ambitions of the artists and academics who 
developed their careers under the patronage of the state and wished to continue to do so 
(Lortkipanidze, Giga. Interview. 2010-05-19). 
 Absent in Shevardnadze's coalition were the hardliner remnants of Georgian 
Communist Party led by Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, Zviadists, and members of a number of 
parties that occupied a more hardline pro-Georgian/anti-Russian position. These included 
the National Democratic Party, the Nation Independence Party, the Party of Georgian 
Traditionalists, and other parties that formed out of Perestroika-era protest movements. 
Though these groups kept their seats in the 1992-1995 Parliament, the representation of 
these parties decreased significantly in the 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections 
because of the high barrier for mandates on the proportional list as well as pressure 
exerted on potential donors to these parties. These parties receded in importance as the 
CUG achieved a dominant, though not monopolistic, position in Georgian party politics.  
 Members of Parliament from the 1992-1995 term who did not join the Citizens' 
Union pointed to ideological differences when explaining their decisions not to join the 
CUG.56 For Akaki Asatiani, leader of the Party of Georgian Traditionalists who served as 
Chairman of Georgia's Supreme Soviet from 1990-1991, Shevardnadze's increasingly 
friendly relations with Russia made it impossible for his party to pledge its support to the 
Citizens' Union. While Shevardnadze coopted a few members of the Traditionalists' 
leadership by offering them attractive posts in the state administration, the party's top 
leadership remained independent (Asatiani, Akaki. Interview. 2015-03-27). Similarly, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 It is likely that not all parties in Georgia had invitations to join the CUG. However, given that the 
Republicans and Traditionalists were among the larger and better coordinated parties at the time suggests 
that they would have been considered for incorporation into the CUG. The fact that individual members of 
the leadership of these two parties joined the CUG and were rewarded handsomely lends credence to the 
notion that these parties were candidates for joining Shevardnadze's party. 
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Republican party's members and their leaders prioritized the party's independence above 
all else and rejected partnership with Shevardnadze because of the compromises they 
presented to the party's ideals. Party leader Dato Berdzenishvili noted that the 
Republicans lost a significant contingent of support after voting for Georgia's 1995 
Constitution, because of the perception that the party was caving to Shevardnadze's 
agenda. Ironically, Berdzenishvili claimed, it was by mistakenly alienating many of their 
dedicated supporters that the Republicans failed to clear the 5% threshold instituted in the 
1995 Constitution (Berdzenishvili, Dato. Interview. 2015-03-25). Despite losing 
parliamentary representation in Georgia’s parliament, both the Traditionalists and the 
Republicans survived Shevardnadze and the CUG’s rule, and returned to participate in 
Parliamentary politics both after the Rose Revolution in 2003 as well as after Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s electoral defeat in 2012. 
 After gaining power, Heydar Aliyev developed the New Azerbaijan Party into a 
monopolistic party of power over the course of several years. Though he had established 
the party in his home region of Nakhchivan in 1992, the party remained dormant for a 
period of time after Aliyev gained power in 1993. He used the first years of his 
presidency to sideline his main rivals by extra-parliamentary means before consolidating 
final control over the party sphere. From 1993-1995, similarly to Eduard Shevardnadze's 
first years in power, Aliyev passed legislation by forging ad-hoc coalitions from the 
provisional Milli Meclis that was in session between 1992-1994. From October 1994-
June 1995, the Milli Meclis was suspended due to a series of states of emergency that 
Aliyev initiated. The last one was lifted in time for the beginning of the campaign for the 
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1995 parliamentary elections. Yet immediately, YAP was recognized as the dominant 
political force in Azerbaijani party politics (NDI 1995). 
 According to official accounts of the New Azerbaijan Party history, the initiative 
to establish the party came externally in the form of a letter signed by 91 prominent 
Azeribaijanis addressed to Aliyev, then the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.57 However, the first stage of party creation saw the 
establishment of an institution that united a group of regional elites behind Aliyev, but 
that did little else as a party. At the time, YAP's activities were confined to the 
Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic Supreme Soviet, a legislative body that had no 
jurisdiction over the rest of the country. However, after Aliyev's return to Baku in June 
1993, YAP became increasingly visible as key elites joined its ranks and as Aliyev began 
to curtail the activities of Azerbaijan's largest parties at the time, the Azerbaijani Popular 
Front and Musavat. 
 The New Azerbaijan Party's development into a party of power took place from 
1993-1995 once Heydar Aliyev gained power. In this period, Aliyev forged alliances with 
existing elites in Baku whose affiliation with the governing party broadened his support 
beyond Nakhchivan (Cornell 2011). While most of the other parties that had formed to 
date in Azerbaijan coalesced around specific personalities, many of those individuals 
were convinced to leave the nascent parties with which they had become affiliated to join 
the leader whom they perceived to be repressive. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Whether the idea to create the New Azerbaijani Party originated with Heydar Aliyev himself or with the 
91 elites who asked him to form the party is impossible to know, and ultimately of secondary theoretical 
import. However, Heydar Aliyev's clear initiative to go forward with creating a party is the crucial action 
that indicates which direction he moves in the model presented in the previous chapter.  
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 Eldar Namazov, a former Chief of Staff to Heydar Aliyev, explained that 
recruitment of prominent figures into the New Azerbaijan Party leadership took place 
through the wide personal connections that Heydar Aliyev developed over his long 
career. Namazov himself was recruited as an early leader of YAP along with Lala 
Shovket-Hajieva, who returned from Moscow in 1994 to serve as State Minister of 
Azerbaijan under Aliyev (Namazov, Eldar. Interview. 2011-04-11). However, according 
to Elgun Taghiev, an Azerbaijani political analyst, it was during this early period between 
the formation in Nakhchivan and the 1995 parliamentary election that the mass 
recruitment into YAP of state employees, residents of Nakhichevan, and the Yeraz 
population began (Taghiyev, Elgun. Interview. 2011-04-15).  
 Despite the cooperation that Aliyev was able to secure in the Milli Meclis, all 
parties expected the 1995 elections to the Milli Meclis to be competitive. The 
Communists, heirs to Mutalibov, claimed they would win 70% of seats; the Popular Front 
and Musavat expected to win in every region of the country, including Aliyev's home 
region of Nakhchivan, while a spokesman for the New Azerbaijan party predicted a 
strong victory for all pro-Presidential forces (Zerkalo 1995-05-13).  
 The first official New Azerbaijan party congress took place in December 1999, 
more than seven years after the establishment of the party. Among the many boilerplate 
accolades that Heydar Aliyev showered on the party during his lengthy speech, he spent 
time discussing why the party had not yet held a congress. He claimed that the party 
didn't want to show arrogance by drawing too much attention to itself. He reiterated 
points from his speech on the fifth anniversary of YAP's founding in stressing that he had 
no intentions to form a party of his own at the time, but that the higher duty of saving 
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Azerbaijan from political crisis forced his hand (Bakinskii Rabochii 1999-12-24). Aliyev 
acknowledged that YAP grew slowly during its first few years, but explained this by 
saying that as the party chairman, his goal was to solve Azerbaijan's problems, not to 
build the party, and so he mobilized "all of his efforts, abilities, time, knowledge, and 
will" for those goals instead of focusing on building his own party. Although it is unclear 
why YAP lagged in holding party congresses, its membership and infrastructure grew 
exponentially beginning in 1994, and by 1995 already fulfilled its main goal, the 
“organization of mass support and defending the course of Heydar Aliyev” (Todua 1995: 
41). He writes that despite the party’s “amorphous organization” in its early years, it grew 
by attracting ambitious careerists (2001: 171). 
 The multi-stage formation of YAP reveals its leader’s ability to play the political 
field to his advantage. Incapable of pulling off a complete conquest of Azerbaijan's party 
space immediately after his return to Baku from Nakhchivan, he set about gradually 
coopting key elites while at the same time exerting pressure on representatives of other 
parties in government office. By 1995 parliamentary elections, Aliyev had punished and 
excluded those who remained in outside of YAP to the extent that opposition parties were 
unable to compete on equal footing with the New Azerbaijan Party. While these other 
parties continued to stand in elections and mobilize intermittent protests for the next ten 
years, the creation of YAP marked the steep decline in their formal representation as well 
as broader influence (US Department of State 1996a). 
 The formation of the Citizens’ Union of Georgia and the New Azerbaijan Party 
demonstrate how incumbent leaders patched together parties out of disparate groups of 
elites. In both cases, party founders incorporated elites who were willing to trade their 
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independent political identities for increased and continuing access to state resources 
available through affiliation with the leaders. In both Georgia and Azerbaijan, groups of 
elites who might have been considered joining the party of power remained independent, 
while other elites were likely never considered as suitable members of the party because 
of their strong opposition to the leaders. Though neither the CUG nor YAP occupied an 
outright majority of seats after the 1995 parliamentary elections, each party won a 
plurality of seats that far eclipsed the seat shares of opposition parties (Nohlen et al. 
2001). Joined for votes by large contingents of independents, both the CUG and YAP 
easily dominated the legislatures of Georgia and Azerbaijan's parliaments. These parties' 
preeminent positions neutralized opposition to the leaders' agendas and facilitated the 
passage of super-presidential constitutions that strengthened the executive branch at the 
expense of the legislative for the duration of Heydar Aliyev and Eduard Shevardnadze's 
presidencies and beyond. 
 
Revelation of Types 
 As time passed, uncertainty about the leaders' types diminished. Based on actions 
that they observed leaders taking, elites came to understand whether they had guessed 
their leader's type correctly. In Georgia, the first years under the Citizens' Union was a 
period of institutional stabilization through concessions and cooptation. Though the CUG 
remained the preeminent party in Georgia, the party coexisted in parliament with a 
number of other parties that varied in their level of cooperation and opposition. At the 
same time, factions within the CUG fought openly over appointments and other 
resources, which undermined its internal cohesion (Wheatley 2005, Jones 2013). 
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Shevardnadze himself largely delegated control over the CUG to Party Chairman Zurab 
Zhvania, which further reflected Shevardnadze's tendency to rule by concession rather 
than direct intervention. For elites in Azerbaijan, the period after the creation of the New 
Azerbaijan Party was one of increasing restrictions on opposition media, protests, and 
other party activity. Though only suggestive of the implications of leader type for the 
functioning of a party of power, this case comparison suggests that there are meaningful 
differences in how parties of power run when lead by conciliatory rather than repressive 
leaders. This is a distinction that could be tested on a broader set of cases, but is treated 
preliminarily in this chapter.  
 Shevardnadze's creation of the Citizens' Union marked a turning point from the 
institutional chaos that had gripped Georgia since 1991, though it did not fully resolve the 
political and economic difficulties in the country. After establishing a measure of control 
over the party system, and the passage of the 1995 constitution which granted the 
executive branch significant powers, his party's deep internal divisions undermined its 
ability to develop a clear hierarchy and other institutional infrastructure, while 
Shevardnadze's inattention to internal controls enabled rampant corruption by party 
representatives at all levels As a strategy of rule, Shevardnadze granted significant 
concessions to party and regional elites in exchange for keeping the peace. In a kind of 
division-of-labor arrangement, party-elites assured the nominal loyalty of the parliament, 
though they enjoyed broad powers to engage in corruption as they saw fit (Sakvarelidze, 
Ramaz. Interview. 2010-03-01). According to Gia Arsenishvili, who served as the 
governor of Kakheti from 1995-2000, regime-affiliated regional power brokers ensured 
the nominal integrity of the Georgian state while enjoying a great deal of autonomy in 
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their home region (Interview. 2010-06-04). Throughout his presidency, Shevardnadze 
seemed more concentrated on strengthening Georgia's external ties than building its 
domestic institutions (Wheatley 2005).  
 Despite attempts on Shevardnadze's life just before the 1995 parliamentary 
elections and in 1998, Shevardnadze did not crack down on his political rivals nor did he 
carry out purges within the CUG to enforce party discipline.58 During the 1990s, political 
parties across the political spectrum were able to register and compete in elections. While 
electoral fraud was widespread in the 1995 elections, international observers did not 
determine that they were directed against any parties in particular (OSCE/PA 1995). 
Leaders of parties that did not join the CUG reported informal pressure on their party 
activists at the local level, especially outside Tbilisi, but according to them, this pressure 
was not directed at party leaders (Asatiani, Akaki. Interview. 2015-03-27; Khmaladze, 
Vakhtang. Interview. 2015-03-24). Restrictions on printed media remained minimal in 
Georgia under Shevardnadze; broadcast media, however, reflected a pro-government bias 
despite the fact that opposition-owned channels operated through the 1990s. The 
viewership of government and opposition-owned television channels alike suffered from 
a severe shortage of electricity during the 1990s. Where human rights abuses were 
reported in Georgia, they pertained mostly to excesses committed by local police, 
corruption in the courts, and the poor conditions inside prisons. By 1994, there were no 
officially recognized political prisoners in Georgia (US Department of State 1995a).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Whether Shevardnadze was unwilling or simply unable to punish rivals is difficult to determine. I argue 
that he was likely unwilling to use coercive force against rival parties because at the same time period, he 
was engaged in a systematic campaign using the courts and the police to rein in Georgia's civil war-era 
militias (Wheatley 2005). 
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 During the 1990s, Shevardnadze excluded parties outside of the CUG from the 
main spoils of office through informal pressure on opposition activists, potential donors 
to opposition parties, and by the institutional barriers he devised for keeping smaller 
parties out of the Parliament. However, he refrained from harsher forms of repression. 
The continued existence of a regional party of power in the autonomous Black Sea region 
of Ajara gave small rivals to the CUG in Georgia proper a bloc partner in parliamentary 
elections in 1999 and 2003. According to Republican Party leader Dato Berdzenishvili, 
Shevardnadze was himself not truly "bloodthirsty," and was committed to maintaining his 
reputation as a democrat among allies in Europe and the United States. Rather, as time 
showed, the repressive capacity that Shevardnadze amassed in 1992-1995 was never fully 
deployed. 
 On the other hand, under the control of Heydar Aliyev, the Azerbaijani state made 
liberal use of coercion to crack down on protesters, shut down opposition parties, and 
restrict the media. Political imprisonments and exile became the norm in Azerbaijan soon 
after Aliyev's rise to power as did violent dispersal of public demonstrations, and the 
harsh persecution of supporters and leaders of Azerbaijan's opposition parties.  
 A single opposition newspaper was subjected to 105 censorship reviews in 1996 
while an entire edition was banned for printing a satirical article about the president. 
Journalists themselves came under physical attack by the authorities for covering 
unsanctioned protests and while pursuing stories in the Nakhchivan Autonomous 
Republic in 1996; physical attacks on journalists in 1997 were not investigated by the 
Azerbaijani government (US Department of State 1997a, 1998a). In 1997, the majority of 
newspapers continued to be printed in a central printing house in which they were 
   
94 
	  
subjected to regular censorship on approximately 80 of their editions (US Department of 
State 1998a). In 1998, 34 journalists were attacked by the police while covering an 
opposition rally, while four were injured while themselves protesting an ongoing trial 
against the Yeni Musavat newspaper (US Department of State 1999a). In 1999, 
journalists affiliated with a publication supported by Rasul Guliyev were subjected to 
violence, while a journalist and editor with the Yeni Musavat opposition newspaper were 
kidnapped and beaten, purportedly for writing an article about President Aliyev's health 
(US Department of State 2000). 
 As time passed, Aliyev's regime increasingly repressed public political 
demonstrations. In response to perceived ballot fraud during the November 1998 
presidential elections, the opposition staged an unsanctioned but peaceful protest that 
police forcibly dispersed. The next day, unknown attackers targeted the leaders of a 
sanctioned protest that gathered in the same spot. Following these events, Azerbaijan's 
parliament authorized a new law that gave broader powers to the government to deny 
protest permits on the vague grounds that they might "threaten public order." Fourteen 
participants in this rally were convicted the following year for their participation in the 
sanctioned protest on November 8, 1998 (US Department of State 1999a).  
 According to the US Department of State Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy, 
and Labor reports on Azerbaijan, 20-40 members of the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party 
were arrested annually by the government between 1996-2000, including a number of 
figures from the previous Azerbaijan Popular Front-led government. While most of these 
figures were released, the government kept an estimated 100-150 political prisoners over 
the same time period (US Department of State 1997a, 1998a, 1999a, 2000, 2001a). Police 
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invaded the local headquarters of the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party in Nakhchivan in 
1996 and disrupted events lead by APF leaders. The government maintained travel bans 
on travel outside of Baku for "some prominent political leaders" who were under various 
forms of criminal investigation, however Isa Gambar and Ali Kerimli were permitted to 
travel outside of Baku despite being under investigation for various crimes against the 
state (US Department of State 1997a).  
In 1998, after former Speaker of Parliament, Rasul Guliyev, fled Azerbaijan, one 
of Guliyev's close professional associates and one of his nephews were taken into custody 
but by the end of 1998 had still not been charged with a crime. This episode reflects the 
consequences not only for politicians who opposed the regime but for their families and 
colleagues as well. Musavat Party leader and former Prime Minister, Isa Qambar, was 
taken into custody but not charged in 1998, while a close relative of his was convicted of 
failing to notify the government of a crime and then sentenced to three years’ 
imprisonment. Persecution of opposition activists extended in 1998 to the imprisonment 
of Popular Front-affiliated students who authored an unpublished guide to resisting the 
government as well as supporters of Rasul Guliyev whom the government accused of 
plotting against the president (US Department of State, 1999a). In 1999, another nephew 
of Rasul Guliyev was arrested on charges of smuggling upon his return to Azerbaijan 
from abroad (US Department of State 2000). 
 Though he was initially popular, local experts argue that as early as 1995 Aliyev 
relied on differential treatment by the Central Election Commission of opposition parties 
as well as outright electoral fraud to secure a majority of seats in the Milli Meclis 
(Namazov, Eldar. Interview. 2011-04-11). A pre-election report authored in 1995 by NDI 
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notes the "atmosphere of fear that pervades society," that already inhibited citizens from 
participating in campaign activities, signing petitions to register candidates, or to note 
infractions during the electoral campaign. The rejection of over 60% of candidates who 
sought to register has led some Azerbaijanis to consider boycotting the election (NDI 
1995). A joint UN/OSCE election observation mission noted a few major shortcomings 
in the 1995 parliamentary election and constitutional referendum in Azerbaijan. Their 
report claims that 60% of candidates were denied registration and 1/3 of political parties 
were barred from competing due to arbitrary procedures used to validate signatures 
collected by the candidates and parties. The report also found "widespread interference 
by representatives of executive authority, including the police" in the voting process. The 
Communist Party of Azerbaijan and Musavat, two of the most popular opposition parties, 
were among those prevented from appearing on the proportional ballot; the report details 
how despite blatant mishandling of Musavat's signatures, the Azerbaijani Supreme Court 
confirmed the Central Election Commission's decision to bar the party from the election. 
A similar pattern of suppressing opposition participation in the election applied to single 
member districts. Only one out of four Popular Front candidates and less than 15% of 
Musavat's candidates made it onto the ballot, while 65% of YAP's candidates were 
registered (OSCE/UN 1996). 
 In statements from Azerbaijan's political parties compiled by NDI after the 1995 
parliamentary elections, the resounding message from the Azerbaijan Popular Front 
Party, Musavat Party, claimed the elections had been seriously skewed in the president's 
party's favor. The Azerbaijan National Independence Party noted how the executive 
bodies controlled the process of registering candidates for the elections and not the 
   
97 
	  
election commissions. The National Statehood Party, led by Nemat Panahli, declined to 
publish its statement because of its leader's fear of even greater persecution by the Aliyev 
regime.  
 This fear was well-founded because of the harsh repression that the party 
deployed, even against insiders. In 1998, the Political Council of YAP published a 
scathing denouncement of Rasul Guliyev and a justification of banishing him from the 
party (Bakinskii Rabochii 1998-01-28). Accused of protecting the mafia, stealing state 
resources, appointing relatives and friends to high government office, the Political 
Council stated that Guliyev had joined forces with the enemies of Azerbaijan and had 
become a traitor to society. At the end of its statement the YAP Political Council called 
on all party organizations at the regional and city level to discuss Rasul Guliyev's crimes 
and to develop measures to prevent similar violations of the party principles, and urged 
all socio-political forces to denounce Guliyev's actions. (Bakinskii Rabochii 1998-01-28). 
 These are just a few illustrative examples of the practices that Heydar Aliyev 
deployed during the first years of his rule in order to reinforce his party's monopoly on 
Azerbaijan's party space. Aliyev's frequent use of repression silenced alternative 
viewpoints, excluded broad categories of politicians from participating in government in 
favor of his own party stand in contrast to Shevardnadze's more conciliatory rule. Though 
both leaders convinced key elites to join their respective parties initially by building 
images as capacious leaders, the long-term trajectories of the Citizens' Union of Georgia 
and the New Azerbaijan reveal that following through with repression played a 
significant role in maintaining discipline within YAP. Heydar Aliyev's strong hand over 
the ten years of his presidency yielded a consolidated authoritarian regime and a party 
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that ostensibly accepted the dynastic transfer of power in the country to his son, Ilham, in 
2003. Shevardnadze's conciliatory leadership style and distance from the daily affairs of 
running his own party ultimately left space for younger more ambitious politicians to 
rebel against his rule and ultimately depose him. 
 
Conclusion 
 The paired case studies in this chapter demonstrate how two leaders, one 
conciliatory and one repressive, both succeeded in creating parties of power. Though both 
Eduard Shevardnadze and Heydar Aliyev had clear incentives for creating parties, elites 
who had already mobilized under existing parties posted a serious obstacle to the new 
presidents' establishment of parties of power. However, through a series of conflicts and 
crises between presidents and standing legislatures, large contingents of incumbent elites 
traded their previous political affiliations for membership in parties of power. 
 This chapter illustrates how elite beliefs about leader type played the crucial role 
in the emergence of parties of power in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Had Shevardnadze not 
known with a high level of certainty that elites believed him to be a capacious repressive 
leader, he would not have risked creating a party of his own lest elites choose to remain 
independent. In Azerbaijan, elite beliefs about Aliyev's type developed after the 1993 
matched prior impressions of his type, which hastened the New Azerbaijan's rise. 
 A comparison of Georgia under the Citizens' Union and Azerbaijan under YAP 
strengthens the idea that the mere existence of a party of power in a regime says little 
about the regime's underlying dynamics. While Aliyev enforced strict party discipline by 
periodic purges of his party, Shevardnadze did quite the opposite. He tolerated the regular 
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departure of dissatisfied CUG factions and did little to prevent their continued 
competition in Georgia's party space. While the CUG remained a lively, if dysfunctional 
party, YAP developed into a hollow shell with hundreds of thousands of members on 
paper but little visibility or activity outside of party congresses and elections. This 
suggests that the mere creation of a party of power does not necessarily guarantee a 
longer tenure for the authoritarian ruler who created it nor does it necessarily facilitate 
succession. However, as this case study has shown, parties of power can serve the short-
term needs of authoritarian rulers for defining the boundaries of their winning coalition 
and neutralizing opposition activity within a standing legislature. 
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Chapter 4: No Party Creation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan  
 
 In this chapter, I demonstrate the existence of the second pooling equilibrium 
generated in the signaling game of authoritarian party creation with comparative case 
studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the 1990s. In this equilibrium, a conciliatory 
and a repressive leader do not create parties of power despite having strong incentives to 
do so. The underlying theoretical argument of this dissertation as stated in Chapter 2 
holds that incumbent leaders do not create parties of their own unless they also expect 
elite actors to join the party. If elites are not expected to join, leaders do not follow 
through with creating a party and turn to other institutional strategies to pursue their 
goals. As elites strongly prefer not to join a party of power when they believe the leader 
to be conciliatory, this belief is sufficient to prevent the emergence of a party of power. 
As the case studies in this chapter demonstrate, neither a repressive leader, Kazakhstan’s 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, nor a conciliatory leader, Kyrgyzstan’s Askar Akayev, created 
parties of power in the 1990s because elites in the two countries believed them to be 
conciliatory.  
 In the following sections, I show that the parameters of interest in the signaling 
model of authoritarian party creation held similar values in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
between 1990-1995. The potential benefit of party creation (B) was high for both leaders, 
and Nazarbayev and Akayev had to offer low levels of side payments (S) to convince 
existing elites to sacrifice their independent reputations (R) in exchange for affiliation 
with the party of power given the low levels of political mobilization in the republics. 
Uncertainty about leader type (Z) was higher in Kazakhstan, which led elites to 
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misperceive Nursultan Nazarbayev’s type, while they perceived Askar Akayev’s type 
correctly.  
 Nursultan Nazarbayev was appointed First Secretary of the Kazakh Soviet 
Socialist Republic (KazSSR) in June 1989. As the ethnic Kazakh leader of a republic 
with a Russophone majority, Nazarbayev cultivated the image of a conciliatory ruler by 
declaring his highest priority to be maintaining interethnic harmony in the republic. 
Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev charted a middle ground between 
the Kazakh nationalists who called for secession from the Soviet Union and hardline 
Communists who demanded the end to Perestroika and renewed ties with the rest of the 
Soviet Union (Beissinger 2002b). After Kazakhstan's Supreme Soviet59 declared the 
republic's independence in December 1991, Nazarbayev took a firmly centrist position on 
the salient political issues of the day, balancing the interests of Russian and Kazakh-
speakers, in the interest of maintaining stability in the country. The process by which 
Nazarbayev decided not to create a party is particularly interesting because initially, 
Nazarbayev gave some signals that he might establish one as had other incumbent leaders 
in Central Asia. However, a protracted conflict that developed with parliamentarians over 
both executive powers and the electoral code soured Nazarbayev to the idea of 
committing to a party of power at the beginning of the 1990s, and led him instead to 
dismiss parliament, rule by decree, and impose a new constitution on terms much that 
strongly favored the executive over the legislative branch.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Similarly to the other Soviet Socialist Republics, Kazakhstan's Communist-era legislature was called the 
Supreme Soviet (Zhogorku Kengesh). It retained this name until the 1995 when the Republic's Parliament 
replaced Supreme Soviet. Pre-1995, I refer to the body as the Supreme Soviet or parliament, while after 
1995 I refer to the legislature either the Parliament or the Mezhilis, the lower house of Parliament. 
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 Askar Akayev was elected President of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic 
(KyrSSR) in October 1990 by an internal vote of the republic's Supreme Soviet.60 A 
relative newcomer to politics, he positioned himself as a moderate reformer and stressed 
the importance of building consensus during his early years in power. This rhetoric 
coupled with the visible inclusion of a diverse set of political elites as advisers 
strengthened Akayev's reputation as a conciliatory leader. Akayev's first years in power 
were marked by several struggles to define the balance of power between the executive 
and legislative branches of government and to balance power among the regions of the 
country. After the passage of Kyrgyzstan's constitution in May 1993, Akayev urged the 
Supreme Soviet to disband in a move that resembled the self-dissolution of Kazakhstan’s 
Supreme Soviet during the same year. Members of parliaments, however, staged a 
boycott of the legislature which paralyzed legislative activity in the country. Increasingly 
frustrated by the difficulty of marshaling legislators whose opposition only strengthened 
over time, Akayev steered away from creating a party of his own and instead relied on a 
series of referenda and other measures over the following decade to secure his powers as 
president and work around Kyrgyzstan's intransigent legislature.  
 The following sections of this chapter examine the each stage of the signaling 
game of authoritarian party creation and present narratives of the various actions and 
events that demonstrate the values of the game's key parameters. The closing sections of 
the chapter address the revelation of Nursultan Nazarbayev and Askar Akayev's types as 
leaders and as well as the institutional divergence of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the 
2000s. This case comparison demonstrates how different types of leaders, one repressive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Kyrgyzstan's legislature, the Supreme Soviet (Zhogorku Kenesh), has shifted in size and structure 
numerous times over the republic's 24 years of independence. However, its name has remained the same. 
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and the other conciliatory, both chose not to create parties of power despite having strong 
incentives to do so. 
 
Nazarbayev and Akayev’s Rise to Power 
 Nursultan Nazarbayev was appointed First Secretary of the Kazakh Soviet 
Socialist Republic (KazSSR) in June 1989 just as the wave of Perestroika-era nationalist 
protests arrived in the Kazakh SSR.61 As the leader of the republic, Nazarbayev publicly 
committed to strengthening ties to the rest of the Soviet Union, announcing at a 1991 
party congress that 'the only way [the Soviet Union] can leave this dead end is together." 
(Olcott 1997). However, he also took measures to promote the interests and sovereignty 
of Kazakhstan. This balancing act extended to the realm of nationality policy in the 
republic where Kazakhs and Russians each represented about 40% of the population, but 
where the majority of residents spoke Russian as their first language. Born in Southern 
Kazakhstan into a pastoralist Kazakh-speaking family, Nazarbayev studied metallurgy in 
Ukraine and launched his career in Temirtau, a Russian-speaking mining town in 
Northern Kazakhstan. While Nazarbayev's biography neatly reflected Kazakhstan's split 
ethnic and linguistic identities, his leadership also raised concerns among large portions 
of the population. To many Slavs in the republic, the First Secretary represented a threat 
to their continued economic and cultural ties to Russia, while many Kazakh nationalists 
derided Nazarbayev as a "cossack" for his failure to promote the use of the Kazakh 
language more forcefully (Olcott 1997: 206).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The appointment as First Secretary of Gennadi Kolbin, an ethnic Russian with no previous work 
experience in Kazakhstan, sparked massive demonstrations in Almaty in December 1986, which 
foreshadowed the widespread nationalist mobilization that swept the Soviet Union during Perestroika. 
Nursultan Nazarbayev was only the second ethnic Kazakh appointed as First Secretary of Kazakhstan's 
Communist Party. 
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 During his first years in power, Nazarbayev developed a reputation as a 
pragmatist. While he remained dedicated to preserving the Soviet Union in some form, he 
framed this position in economic rather than ideological terms. While acknowledging the 
need for greater self-determination at the republic level, speaking publicly in favor of 
"strong republics and a strong center," as late as 1991 it was unimaginable to him that the 
15 Soviet republics would be better off going their separate ways than working together 
(Nazarbayev 1991: 233-239, 215).  By the time Kazakhstan declared independence in 
December 1991, Nazarbayev had been serving as the republic's manager-in-chief for two-
and-a-half years. However, he was fundamentally untested as a leader, as the political 
crises that seized other parts of the Soviet Union had scarcely touched Kazakhstan. Given 
the few opportunities to see Nazarbayev truly in action, uncertainty about his leadership 
style under the new political order remained high. 
 Rather than adopting the role of manager in chief, Askar Akayev cast himself as 
Kyrgyzstan’s reformer-in-chief. A physicist by training and a distinguished researcher, 
Akayev entered the Communist Party in 1981. His prominence in public affairs began 
after his election to the KyrSSR Supreme Soviet in 1986 and continued after his 
subsequent appointment as Chairman of the Academy of Sciences of the KyrSSR in 
1988. In October 1990, Kyrgyzstan's Supreme Soviet held elections for the newly created 
position of President, in which KyrSSR First Secretary and Chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet Absamat Masaliev competed against Apas Jumagulov, President of the KyrSSR 
Council of Ministers. Neither candidate received a majority of the votes in the first round 
and so both candidates were disqualified from standing for another vote. A third 
candidate, Jumgal Amanbayev, the final First Secretary of the KyrSSR, also failed to win 
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a majority of votes, which testifies to the general unpopularity of Kyrgyzstan's top 
Communist leadership at the time as well as the stark intra-elite divisions present at the 
time (Koichuyev and Ploskikh 1996: 16). In the final round of voting, the relatively 
unknown Askar Akayev was nominated and ultimately elected president of the Kyrgyz 
SSR. The powers associated with the office were still poorly defined, but by virtue of his 
election, Akayev joined the ranks of Kyrgyztan's top leadership (Anderson 1999: 20). 
 At the time Akayev became President of Kyrgyzstan, tensions in Kyrgyzstan were 
high. Intercommunal violence in June 1990 between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations 
of Osh in Southern Kyrgyzstan killed hundreds of local residents, while protests over the 
discriminatory representation of ethnic Kyrgyz in the state administration seized Bishkek 
(Beissinger 2002b). This unrest undermined the legitimacy of Kyrgyzstan's First 
Secretary, Absamat Masaliyev, and his hardliner associates (Anderson 1999: 20), leading 
members of the nomenklatura who disapproved of Masaliyev to voice their opposition 
more openly. Meanwhile, investigations of the Osh events by officials from Moscow put 
further pressure on the republic's leadership (Huskey 1997: 252-3). These tensions 
exacerbated long-standing intra-elite cleavages that divided the republic along linguistic 
lines, by region, and by clan (Jones-Luong 2002: 81-83). 
During 1991, a kind of dual power existed in the Kyrgyz SSR with Akayev as 
President and Masaliyev in the office of First Secretary. Masaliyev had deep connections 
to the party-state apparatus, while Akayev at the time enjoyed support from 
parliamentarians and the newly forming parties in the republic (Huskey 1997: 253). 
Akayev gained the upper hand in the republic during the August 1991 putsch when 
Masaliyev publicly backed the coup leaders, while Akayev voiced his support for 
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Gorbachev and Yeltsin (Izvestiya 1991-08-22). Kyrgyzstan declared independence on 
August 31, 1991, mere days after the coup’s reversal, and gained full recognition after the 
formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.  
Both Nazarbayev and Akayev became leaders of their respective republics during 
the waning years of Soviet rule. Despite winning nationwide presidential elections in the 
final months of 1991, the powers associated with Akayev and Nazarbayev's positions 
were poorly defined. As holdovers from the Communist-era, their political futures were 
highly uncertain. Without constitutions, incumbent legislators and incumbent presidents 
did not know which powers lay where. Furthermore, as the Soviet Union broke apart, no 
one knew what economic measures would be needed to solve the ongoing economic 
crisis. Given the short periods of time that Akayev and Nazarbayev were in power before 
their republics gained independence, few had a sense what type of leaders they would 
turn out to be.  
 
Elites in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 1989-1993 
 A comparison of political elites in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan provides a sense of 
how elites at the time valued their independent reputations (R). This relates directly to the 
level of side payments (S) that leaders would need to offer in order to ensure elite 
cooperation in a party of power. Should elites place high values on their independence, 
leaders would have to offer even higher side payments in order to convince elites to join 
the party. However, should elites place low values on their independent reputations, 
leaders would not need to offer as large amounts of side payments to attract elites into a 
party of their own. Similarly to the previous chapter, I examine levels of popular 
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mobilization and returns from the legislative elections of the early 1990s to estimate the 
extent to which elites valued their independent reputations. Given that elites in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were among the least mobilized in the Soviet Union during 
Perestroika, the parties that they created after independence had weak claims to popular 
support, nor did their parties have experience competing in elections as independent 
organizations. This suggests that incumbent elites held relatively low values for their 
independent reputations, especially when contrasted with the highly mobilized and 
independent party elites in the South Caucasus. In this section, I also assess how 
Communist party networks and clan affiliation affected elites' willingness to join parties 
of power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In both cases, I find that party networks and 
clan identities did not pose serious obstacles to recruiting elites into a potential party of 
power.  
 The wave of protests that swept across the Soviet Union beginning in the late 
1980s passed over Central Asia without mobilizing large numbers of Kazakhstanis and 
Kyrgyzstanis. In Kazakhstan, a total of 78 protests took place between the beginning of 
Perestroika and the declaration of the republic’s independence on December 16, 1991. 
The median protest in Kazakhstan drew 1000 participants out of a total population of 
16.5 million; by comparison, the median protest size in Georgia was also 1000 
participants, but out of a total population of 5 million. In Kazakhstan, the largest protests 
in Kazakhstan drew 50,000 participants, or 0.3% of the population, on two occasions. In 
Georgia, the largest protests drew up to 10% of the population as participants twice. Of 
these protests, approximately half in Kazakhstan had no specified organizer, while one 
third of the protests were organized by nascent nationalist movements such as Alash, 
   
108 
	  
Zheltoksan, and Azat. The remainder of the protests were organized by generic groups 
within society such as "students," "taxi drivers," "miners," and the like (Beissinger 
2002b). This indicates that there was no equivalent in Kazakhstan of the popularly 
supported protest movements and proto-parties that led Georgia’s first post-independence 
government. While a handful of representatives of these movements won seats in 
Kazakhstan's 1990 legislative elections, the movements themselves had few followers 
among the general population. Rather, former members of the Communist Party who 
adopted a number of different new party affiliations or simply declared themselves 
independents dominated Kazakhstan’s first post-independence legislature (Isaacs 2011: 
57). 
 In Kyrgyzstan, a total of 42 protests took place in the republic before the break-up 
of the Soviet Union, though of these only five were organized by nationalist or pro-
democracy groups in the republic.62 Given this small number of protests, the aggregate 
level of protest participation in Kyrgyzstan was the second-lowest in the Soviet Union.63 
Similarly to Kazakhstan, a few representatives of Kyrgyzstan's nationalist and pro-
democracy organizations won seats in the 1990 Supreme Soviet. The fact that the groups 
mobilized low numbers of protesters on a handful of occasions suggests that their appeal 
and recognition was limited. According to Zaslavskaia (1994), the most popular proto-
parties at the time were Nevada-Semipalatinsk, which focused on environmental issues, 
as well as Zheltoksan and Alash which promoted Kazakh nationalism. In Kyrgyzstan, 
similarly ideologically positioned parties such as Erkin Kyrgyzstan and Asaba claimed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 In Georgia over the same time period, protesters staged nearly 600 demonstrations; approximately 2/3 of 
these events were organized by specific groups. 
63 Only Turkmenistan, where one single protest was held between 1987-1991, had a lower aggregate level 
of protest activity than Kyrgyzstan. 
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less than 10,000 members each, while in reality the number was much smaller 
(Anarbekov 1999). With few constituents and little organizational infrastructure, it would 
seem that elites affiliated with these nascent parties would sacrifice little but gain much 
by joining a party of power.  
 The Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPKaz)and Communist Party of 
Kyrgyzstan (CPKyr) had the largest memberships and broadest recognition of any parties 
in their respective countries in the early years of independence. On paper, they held the 
largest seat shares in the legislatures elected in 1990, as only Communists and 
independents were permitted to register for the 1990 elections. Kazakhstan’s Communist 
Party was officially disbanded in August 1991, but reregistered as the Socialist Party of 
Kazakhstan and continued to operate unhindered. The party, however, included members 
from across the ideological spectrum, including both supporters and opponents of the 
president (Svoik, Petr. Interview. 2015-03-18). Thus, affiliation with Kazakhstan's most 
direct Communist successor party neither precluded cooperation nor predetermined 
support for the formerly Communist president. In Kyrgyzstan, however, the continued 
membership in the Supreme Soviet of two former First Secretaries of the CPKyr who lost 
the presidential election to Akayev positioned the party in clear opposition to the 
president (Anderson 1999: 34). While the CPKyr retained had the largest seat share of 
any party in the republic, (Huskey 1995: 827), the number of independents seated in 
Kyrgyzstan's Supreme Soviet outnumbered all other party-affiliated MPs by 1995 
(Nohlen et al. 2001). In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, leaders appointed prominent 
members of the Communist Parties as ministers and advisers, which demonstrates that 
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affiliation with the Communists did not preclude meaningful political cooperation with 
the presidents of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
 Despite the fact that clan politics64 often enters scholarly analysis of Central Asian 
politics (Schatz 2004, Collins 2006) and expert accounts of local politics (Sabitov, 
Zhaksylyk. Interview. 2015-03-11; Svoik, Petr. Interview. 2015-03-18; Zhotabayev, 
Nigmet. Interview. 2015-03-19), it is difficult to identify ways in which clan identity 
directly affected the creation of parties of power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. While 
most ethnic Kyrgyz and Kazakh have a clan identity, these identities may be leveraged 
rationally, instrumentally, and contextually (Schatz 2004, Collins 2006). According to 
Radnitz (2010), clan identity exists in the form of “mythology and memory,” and neither 
“enables nor inhibits” political mobilization in Kyrgyzstan (128). While Kyrgyzstan's Ata 
Zhurt and Ata Zhurt draw their membership primarily from Southern Kyrgyzstan and 
Adilet attracts primarily northerners, other parties such as the Social Democratic Party 
and Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan draw members from the entire country (Kniazev 
2005: 51). Furthermore, migration patterns and the predominance of the ethnically-mixed 
cities in driving politics further complicate the political expression of coterminous clan 
and regional identities (Schatz 2004). For the purposes of this study, clan politics are 
salient insofar as they clearly lead to one party outcome over another. Given that clans 
have not determined parliamentary alliances or party formation in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan at the expense of other political concerns, I argue that clan politics did not 
prevented or somehow removed the need for parties of power these countries in the 
1990s. Furthermore, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s consolidation of Nur Otan in Kazakhstan in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Existing scholarship employs a broad definition of clan politics that describes people connected by "kin 
and fictive kin identities," which extend to relatives by blood and marriage, and can include individuals 
connected by school, neighborhood and regional times (Collins 2006: 17).	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2006 and Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s creation of Ak Zhol Kyrgyzstan in 2007 demonstrates 
that clan and regional identities did not prevent the creation of parties of power in the 
country during later periods. 
In terms of the signaling model of authoritarian party creation, elites in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the early 1990s had little reason to place high values on 
their independent reputations (R), because most elites lacked substantive partisan 
identities or independent political ideologies. Most elites in the two countries were 
elected as Communists but over time drifted from the reconstituted Communist parties of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Heydar Aliyev and Eduard Shevardnadze targeted similarly 
unaffiliated elites for cooptation into parties of power precisely because they lacked the 
ties to society and popular support that nationalist-democrat elites had developed. 
However, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, these independent elites by and large resisted 
efforts by incumbent leaders to coopt them. As the following sections show, elite 
opposition to the leaders of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan persisted not necessarily because 
of the elites placed on their independent reputations but because of their belief that they 
could extract even greater concessions from their leaders in the future. The low values 
they placed on their independent partisan reputations (R) should have made them 
amenable to cooptation, but their beliefs that Nazarbayev and Akayev were conciliatory 
leaders made them ill-disposed to joining parties of power. 
 
Nazarbayev and Akayev's Need for a Party 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 a great deal of 
ambiguity persisted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyztan regarding the division of power 
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between newly elected presidents and the preexisting Supreme Soviets. Though both the 
executive and legislative branches had been popularly elected, the presidents of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were both elected in hastily arranged single-candidate 
elections in the fall of 1991 that simply confirmed their tenure in positions that they 
already held. The Supreme Soviets of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while somewhat 
inclusive of the democratic-nationalist movements that had emerged during Perestroika 
were dominated by formerly-Communist independents. More importantly, the presidents 
of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were engaged in struggles with legislatures to delineate 
each branch's powers. Both sides had a clear interest in negotiating for the greatest 
possible powers in the future constitutions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which often 
pitted presidents against their legislatures.  
 Drafting Kazakhstan's first post-independence constitution dominated the 
Supreme Soviet and Nazarbayev's agendas for the year following the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. While the legislature and the president's apparatus discussed various 
proposals for defining Kazakhstan's state languages as well as the size and structure of its 
future legislature, a deeper struggle took place at the same time over defining the balance 
of power between the legislative and executive branches. Each branch of government 
sought to tip the balance of institutional power in their favor through the process of 
drafting the constitution, understanding the long-term consequences of this early battle. 
At the time, Serikbolsyn Abdildin, Speaker of the Supreme Soviet 1991-1993, saw the 
legislative branch's fundamental duty as providing a counterweight to the executive 
branch (Interview. 2015-03-19) while President Nazarbayev saw himself as personally 
responsible for executing reforms in the republic and viewed the intervention of the 
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Supreme Soviet in the reform process as obstruction. Accusing MPs for being mired in 
the past, he claimed that:  
 "today, some parliamentarians harbor the opinion that they should represent in the 
 parliament as in the old Supreme Soviets the specific interests of their voters, 
 regions, enterprises, or fields. Most deputies do not understand that in these new 
 conditions, parliament must fulfill a different function, a role that has developed 
 under the circumstances of the establishment of the state and the transition 
 period."  
 
In Nazarbayev's mind, the proper role for the Supreme Soviet was to consolidate support 
for his agenda for state reform, rather than propose alternative agenda (Vidova 2014: 
251-252). 
From 1990-1993, Kazakhstan's Supreme Soviet consisted of 350 deputies. By far, 
the most numerous contingent of deputies originated in the Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan, which was renamed the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan in September 1991 
and remained under the leadership of Communist hardliners (Isaacs 2001). Unfortunately 
for Nazarbayev who left the Communist Party and refused to join the Socialists, the left 
wing of the Supreme Soviet was dominated by unreformed members of the old CPKaz. 
According to Svoik, approximately 25% of the Supreme Soviet deputies elected in 1990 
supported reform, while the remaining 75% of deputies were unreformed members of the 
old Communist party apparatus who had little interest in change. He added that only 30 
of the 350 members of the chamber were active in debates within the Supreme Soviet of 
whom only 10-15 deputies were affiliated with the republic's nascent nationalist 
movements (Svoik, Petr. Interview. 2015-03-18). A contingent of 30 or so deputies 
organized by Supreme Soviet deputy Sergey Dyachenko called the Union for National 
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Unity of Kazakhstan (SNEK)65 whose stated goal was to support the Nazarbayev's reform 
agenda. SNEK. However, in a legislature with 350 seats, the bloc of SNEK affiliates 
lacked the requisite seat share to influence the legislative process in any meaningful way 
(Olcott 1997). 
 During negotiations about the constitution, representatives of the executive and 
legislative branches denounced each other for increasing the risk of destabilization in the 
country through their continued intransigence. For Serikbolsyn Abdildin, Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet, the president's encouragement of the self-dissolution of the standing 
Supreme Soviet threatened the country's fragile political order, while for Nazarbayev, the 
failure of legislators to cooperate during this crucial period of reform presented 
existential risks to the fledgling Kazakhstani state (Vidova 2014). Indeed, at the time, the 
Supreme Soviet’s leadership achieved significant policy victories, especially as related to 
the structure of the legislature under the new constitution. Speaker Abdildin succeeded in 
lobbying against a bicameral parliament because he felt that this arrangement 
unnecessarily complicated the legislative process (Abdildin 1993). In his own words, 
Kazakhstan's first constitution was "abdildinovskaia," reflecting his and his allies' 
influence over its drafting (Abdildin, Serikbolsyn. Interview. 2015-03-19). 
Later the same year, the Russian Constitutional Crisis of October 1993 
demonstrated the extent to which struggles between post-Soviet presidents and the 
legislatures could escalate. Though Nazarbayev did not resort to tanks to force his will on 
Kazakhstan's parliament, the parallels of the situation were clear to political actors in the 
republic. This convinced Nazarbayev of the necessity of seeking alternate solutions to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 In Russian, Soiuz Natsional'nogo Edinstva Kazakhstana (SNEK). This party is commonly referred to in 
Russian and English-language scholarship as SNEK and so I follow suit.  
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executive-legislative conflict underway in Kazakhstan, which he alleviated by urging the 
"self-dissolution" of local councils as well as the Supreme Soviet. Nazarbayev secured 
the agreement of the Supreme Soviet in December 1993 to suspended itself for three 
months and set March 7, 1994 as the date for new elections after which Nazarbayev 
hoped to convene a compliant Supreme Soviet (ITAR-TASS 1993-12-15). 
For Nazarbayev, the need to have a party of his own derived from the fact that 
Kazakhstan's Supreme Soviet was dominated by personalities and parties that opposed 
him and posed a threat to his hegemony over the political system. As one of the most 
influential political actors in the country, Supreme Soviet Chairman Serikbolsyn Abdildin 
leveraged his position and the institutional powers of the body he controlled to counter 
Nazarbayev's initiatives and position himself “actively ... for the coming struggle for 
presidential office” (Nezavismaya Gazeta 1993-01-27). As Nazarbayev's public 
statements confirmed that he valued “social stability” above else, this meant he strived to 
“avoid open confrontation with the speaker,” which led Nazarbayev to offer meaningful 
policy concessions (ibid). In the short term, this strengthened elites' sense that 
Nazarbayev could be pressed for even greater concessions in the future and at the same 
time intensified Nazarbayev's need for a cooperative legislature. 
 Askar Akayev's need for a party grew out of his isolation as a moderate in an 
increasingly polarized legislature. When Akayev was elected president in October 1990, 
he was a Supreme Soviet backbencher. Unlike the leaders of the Communist Party of 
Kyrgyzstan, he lacked a patronage networks inside and outside the legislature, and unlike 
the nationalist leaders recently elected, he lacked recognition among the republic's 
nascent protest movements and proto-parties. Rather, he occupied the lonely middle 
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ground within a polarized political sphere. For the time being, he lacked connections 
among the regional elites represented in the Supreme Soviet, who in other republics 
served as a core of cooperative MPs. Many of these independent deputies preferred other 
moderate Communist leaders of the republic whom they knew better than the newly 
elected president (Anderson 1999: 20-21). Thus, from day one, Akayev faced the 
challenge of defining his winning coalition from among Kyrgyzstan’s amorphous 
selectorate. 
 The membership of the Supreme Soviet elected in 1990 in Kyrgyzstan drew 
heavily from the republic's nomenklatura. The nomination of large numbers of factory 
directors meant that conservative economic elites were well represented in among 
candidates for the 1990 Supreme Soviet. Election rules also permitted party elites to run 
from remote rural constituencies where they faced little competition, rather than register 
in the urban districts where they resided where popular opposition figures’ candidacies 
were registered. In the final tally, 81 out of 350 seats (23%) in the Supreme Soviet went 
to party officials including all 40 rayon first secretaries as well as high ranking republic-
level officials. In the first months of its term, hardliner Communists dominated the 
agenda of the Supreme Soviet, easily voting First Secretary of the Communist Party 
Absamat Masaliyev to the chairmanship of the body (Huskey 1997 823-826). 
 During Kyrgyzstan's first year of independence, the conflict between Akayev and 
Kyrgyzstan's Supreme Soviet intensified. According to observers at the time, "the 
opposition among the nomenklatura and bureaucracy is gathering forces to wage a 
determined battle against the president and his view of Kyrgyzstan's future state system," 
and that "the conflict between the executive and the legislature is at a peak height" 
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(Moskovskie Novosti 1992-11-15). This battle dealt primarily with the balance of power 
between the executive and legislative branches as enshrined by the constitution. Claiming 
that the Supreme Soviet wished to reduce the presidency to a figurehead akin to the 
Queen of England, Akayev blamed the conflict on Supreme Soviet’s domination by the 
old nomenklatura (Moskovskie Novosti 1992-11-15). This and other conflicts turned his 
attention to ways to reduce the Supreme Soviet's control over policymaking in 
Kyrgyzstan.  
 Both Nazarbayev and Akayev found themselves pitted against entrenched 
regional elites, ex-Communists independents and members of newly-formed nationalist 
parties during negotiations over Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan's first constitutions and in 
discussions about land reform, language laws, and other policies. Each of these battles 
required significant outlays of political and material capital from Nazarbayev and 
Akayev, which ultimately weakened their positions. It remains a puzzle, therefore, that 
neither leader took clear steps to establish parties of their own during this period. This 
suggests that the emergence of a party of power depends on more than simply having the 
incentives to create them.66 As the following section argues, while Akayev and 
Nazarbayev had strong incentives to create parties of their own, prevailing beliefs among 
political elites in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan reduced their incentives to join a potential 
party of power. Believing Nazarbayev and Akayev to be conciliatory leaders, elites in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan doubled down on their opposition to their presidents after the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Creating a party of power also depends on having resources to do so. However, the wide range of 
resource endowments of leaders who succeeded in creating parties of power suggests that there is no 
absolute threshold for the resources needed. Thus, this analysis focuses on leaders' willingness to create 
parties of power. 
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passage of each country's constitution, which forced executive-legislative conflict to a 
breaking point in both countries over the following years. 
 
Perceptions about Leader Type 
 Nursultan Nazarbayev was appointed First Secretary of Kazakhstan's Communist 
Party in June 1990, a mere 18 months before the republic declared its independence, 
while Askar Akayev was elected president of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic only 
11 months before Kyrgyzstan broke off from the Soviet Union. Both leaders positioned 
themselves as moderate reformers, which represented a break for Nazarbayev from his 
long career in the Communist nomenklatura. Because elites in Kazakhstan and especially 
Kyrgyzstan had little prior knowledge of their leaders before they gained power, I argue 
that a great deal of uncertainty prevailed about what kind of leaders Nazarbayev and 
Akayev would be in the future. In this section, I argue that elites in both Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, after hearing public statements and witnessing public actions by the leaders 
formed the belief that their leaders were conciliatory, which meant that they would 
pursue compromise, offer concessions, and include political elites in policymaking. Here, 
I present evidence from speeches and concrete actions taken by these leaders that 
reinforce the claim that the leaders could both be perceived as conciliatory. I also 
demonstrate that the leaders refrained from repression during their first years in power, 
which reinforced elites' assumptions of the leaders' types. I argue that the low levels of 
political repression prevalent in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as compared to neighboring 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan reinforced the perception that Akayev and Nazarbayev 
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were in fact conciliatory. In the case of Kazakhstan, however, this belief was incorrect, 
which became evident as time passed.  
 As president, Nursultan Nazarbayev stressed the importance of ruling through 
consensus and maintaining interethnic harmony in the republic. In describing the 
“Nazarbayev phenomenon” in Kazakhstan, the leader’s “pragmatic approach” and 
“ability to put himself in other people’s place [sic]” were cited as some of the qualities 
that made him stand out among the new leaders of the successor states of the Soviet 
Union. According to analysis from the early 1990s, Nazarbayev chose an “evolutionary 
path of reform,” and that this moderate path and “more or less calm development of 
events” in Kazakhstan will keep Nazarbayev in power (Izvestiya 1991-12-04). He was 
said to “avoid confrontational stances,” and give “reasoned and calm” speeches (ibid). 
 During debates in the country over the language policy, Nazarbayev called on 
groups on both sides of the debate to “build a national state… in which everyone can live 
happily,” urged both sides to recognize the positive contributions of Russians and 
Kazakhs to society, and pledged to monitor the respect of both groups’ rights on this 
issue personally (Nezavisimaya Gazeta 1992-06-04). Later in 1992, Nazarbayev proposed 
the establishment of “an assembly of accord and unification of the peoples of 
Kazakhstan” that would act in a “non-political” way to strengthen interethnic unity 
(ITAR-TASS 1992-12-14). These statements and actions underscored Nazarbayev's 
commitment to interethnic harmony, and reinforced the sense that he would act in a 
conciliatory way towards political elites in the country.  
 Regarding many of his policy decisions, Nazarbayev stated that he “could not 
enter a sharp confrontation with the Supreme Soviet,” because of the danger of upsetting 
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the fragile order and stability in the country (Vidova 2014: 247). For Nazarbayev, 
however, the Supreme Soviet represented the retrograde interests of Communist party 
functionaries, and not the “progressive” elements in society (Vidova 2014: 248). Thus, 
Nazarbayev needed either to find a way to transform the Supreme Soviet into an 
institution that supported his agenda, or he needed to find a way to sideline it completely.  
 Askar Akayev too developed a reputation for compromise and inclusion during 
the early years of his presidency. In a statement in the first days after being elected 
president, Akayev stressed the importance of the “consolidation of all the social and 
political forces in the republic," and "achieving civilian harmony” (Moscow Television 
1990-10-30).  He added that he would “start with consultations” since his election to the 
post of President came as a “complete surprise” (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1990-10-30). 
He called for the creation of a presidential council in which there would be 
“representatives of all political parties and various nationalities, regions, and social strata 
of the population” (Komsomolskaya Pravda 1990-10-30) and stated that despite these 
groups’ different views of “current realities, it is this diversity of approaches that will 
facilitate the correct action strategy and tactics” (Pravda 1990-11-02). Journalists in the 
early 1990s confirmed this, writing that Akayev's “speeches and manners have exuded 
democratism" (Literaturnaya Gazeta 1992-05-20), and in his own memoirs, Akayev 
described himself as being “predisposed to accord and consensus” (Akayev 2001: 160). 
These public statements and external assessments of Akayev's character build the sense 
that he was a conciliatory ruler and a consensus-builder.  
 The fact that neither Nazarbayev nor Akayev engaged in widespread repression in 
their first years in office further distinguished their conciliatory approaches from their 
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more harshly repressive neighbors in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. According 
to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor annual country reports, in 1992, 
1993, 1994, and 1995 there were no reports of extrajudicial killings or torture in 
Kyrgyzstan attributed to the central government (US Department of State 1993b, 1994b, 
1995c, 1996b). While the judicial system is in need of reform, analysts at the time did not 
identify ways in which the court system was used to suppress opponents of the 
government. Regarding free speech, a law was proposed in the Supreme Soviet that 
would have prohibited insulting the president. However under opposition from the 
president, the law did not pass.  Similarly, Akayev opposed restrictions proposed in the 
Justice Ministry to submit print media for “screening” for classified information before 
publication, thereby underscoring the wide freedoms that Kyrgyzstani journalists had to 
discuss and criticize government policy (US Department of State 1994b). 
 Actions that Nursultan Nazarbayev took early in his presidency reflect a more 
repressive leadership style than Askar Akayev's but less so than Islam Karimov's in 
Uzbekistan and Saparmurat Niyazov's in Turkmenistan. The 1992 Bureau of Democracy 
Human Rights and Labor country report for Kazakhstan described the human rights 
situation in the country as “mixed,” citing the detention of members of the Alash and 
Zheltoksan nationalist movements for participating in an unauthorized demonstration and 
for insulting the president (1993a: 814-5). However, enforcement of laws requiring 
permits for public demonstrations was sporadic as were regulations requiring the official 
registration of parties and other public organizations. In nearly all cases, unauthorized 
protesters and unregistered groups were permitted to operate unhindered the first years of 
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Nazarbayev’s presidency (US Department of State 1994a, 1995b). As he appeared to be a 
conciliatory ruler, he gave elites little reason to update their beliefs about his type. 
 
Nazarbayev and Akayev Do Not Create Parties 
 Despite the strong incentives that Nursultan Narbayev and Askar Akayev had to 
create parties, both leaders chose not to do so. For Nazarbayev, as opposition intensified 
in the Supreme Soviet, the potential cost of coopting incumbent elites into a pro-
presidential party outgrew the benefits of creating one. Moreover, elites' beliefs that he 
was a conciliatory leader strengthened their willingness to remain independent even when 
a small but overtly pro-presidential bloc formed in the Supreme Soviet. For Askar 
Akayev, increasing intransigence from members of Kyrgyzstan's Supreme Soviet, 
stymied the president's efforts to call for early elections. Realizing that existing elites 
would hardly be willing to join a party of power, Akayev decided not to create one. As a 
result, both Nazarbayev and Akayev took actions that reduced the influence and 
independent power of the legislature of government by external means rather than by 
coopting the existing legislatures. As elites increasingly valued their independent 
reputations (R), Akayev and Nazarbayev found ways to avoid working with these elites 
altogether rather than coopting them on unfavorable terms.  
 The 13 months between the election of Kazakhstan’s 13th Supreme Soviet in 
March 1994 and its dissolution by order of the Constitutional Court in April 1995 reveal 
the strategic conditions that led Nursultan Nazarbayev not to create a party of power. The 
March 1994 elections brought into office a smaller-than-expected contingent of pro-
Nazarbayev deputies, which complicated Nazarbayev's hopes to dominate the 177- 
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member legislature from within. SNEK, a pro-presidential proto-party that had formed in 
1992 and for which Nazarbayev voiced support, won only 30 seats. Despite the fact that 
Nazarbayev had great influence over the nominating of deputies who were elected on the 
“state list,” this did not translate into a stable contingent of support for Nazarbayev in the 
new Supreme Soviet. Journalists at the time noted this phenomenon with surprise, writing 
that Nazarbayev had intended this smaller professional parliament to work in a unified 
manner to support his reforms. While 90% of the deputies were reportedly from the 
former nomenklatura, many in the body acted as a “hidden opposition, if not to the 
president himself then at least to the reforms he [was] pursuing.” (Izvestiya 1994-05-12). 
Furthermore, a large contingent of deputies who simultaneously held regional 
administrative positions frequently missed votes, thus tipping the balance more favorably 
for the vocal deputies. Many of these individuals united into the 15-party Republic Bloc 
under the leadership of the former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Serikbolsyn Abdildin 
(Izvestiya, 1994-05-12), who coordinated the initiatives of Nazarbayev's opponents. 
 Soon after its formation, the Republic Bloc passed a statement expressing a lack 
of confidence in the president's economic and legal reforms and calling him to increase 
dialogue with the legislature, its parties, and other social associations (Kazakh Radio 
1994-05-30). Later that year, deputies called for the resignation of Nazarbayev's cabinet 
(Kaztag 1994-06-24), denied the president's efforts to prosecute a former Supreme Soviet 
deputy who fell out of favor (Interfax 1994-09-22), refused to discuss constitutional 
amendments about land ownership and language policy proposed by Nazarbayev 
(Interfax, 1994-12-15), and used whatever powers they could muster to assert control 
over the budget (Sovety Kazakhstana 1994-12-28). Despite the uncooperative parliament, 
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the president's spokesman in the Supreme Soviet, Murat Rabayev, expressed in 
unequivocal terms in an interview early in 1995 that Nazarbayev had no intention of 
dispersing the new parliament (Karavan 1995-01-13). As 1994 progressed, it is clear that 
emboldened elites believed that they could press Nazarbayev for increased concessions, 
especially as they perceived their power to be growing relative to the executive's (Jones-
Luong 2002).  
 This situation may have come as a surprise to Nazarbayev, especially as signs in 
1993 suggested he may transform a loose pro-presidential bloc of deputies into a full-
fledged party of power. The Union of National Unity of Kazakhstan was registered 
officially as a party in March 1993, but had formed earlier from a group of pro-
Nazarbayev Supreme Soviet deputies under the leadership of Sergei Dyachenko. Urging 
the population of Kazakhstan to support Nazarbayev's agenda, SNEK positioned itself as 
an inclusive, centrist group to counter the efforts of Russian and Kazakh mononational 
groups (Ekspress-K 1993-10-30). Nazarbayev gave the keynote address during a SNEK 
congress in 1993 in which he invited other existing parties to merge with SNEK 
(Nezavisimaya Gazeta 1993-02-09). Unfortunately for SNEK, this did not occur. Though 
the party assisted Nazarbayev in bringing about the self-dissolution of the Supreme 
Soviet at the end of 1993, SNEK won only 30 out 177 seats in the new legislature. In 
1994, the People's Congress of Kazakhstan, led by the leader of a prominent centrist 
movement, defied expectations that it might merge with SNEK and joined the opposition 
Respublika bloc instead (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 1994-11-10). Later, a SNEK official 
claimed that the party only envisioned appealing to 10-15% of Kazakhstan's population 
(Panorama 1995-03-04). Though party members won 11 seats in the new parliament 
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elected at the end of 1995, the party ceased to draw attention as a potential party of 
power.  
 Given Nazarbayev's spokesman's statement about Nazarbayev's resolve to 
continue working with the current Supreme Soviet, it came as a shock when Kazakhstan's 
Constitutional Court invalidated all of the results of the 1994 Supreme Soviet elections 
based on an obscure case regarding district malapportionment. This turn of events 
incensed the parliamentarians whose mandates were curtailed, precipitating large scale 
protests (Interfax 1995-03-14). While Nazarbayev filed an official complaint with the 
Constitutional Court, writing that the dissolution of parliament would "complicate" the 
task of providing legislative support for ongoing reports (Kazakhstan Television 1995-03-
08); the court overruled the president's objection. Soon afterward, in an address to the 
Supreme Soviet, Nazarbayev claimed that the decision came as a surprise to him too, and 
called upon Kazakhstani citizens to accept court's decision as a sign of respect for 
democracy (Kazakhstan Television 1995-03-11), though some believed that this turn of 
events was ordered by Nazarbayev himself (Kadyrzhanov, Rustem. Interview. 2015-03-
17).  
 Nazarbayev scheduled elections for the new bicameral Mazhilis for December 
1995. In the new parliament, non-partisan independents filled 44 of the 67 seats of the 
lower house, while SNEK won only 11. Of the 47 seats in the upper house, 7 were 
directly appointed by Nazarbayev while 28 of the remaining seats were uncontested, 
thereby delivering the president a far more compliant set of parliamentarians (IPU 
Parline, 1995b). Of the 47 seats in the upper house, 40 were nominated by oblast officials 
whom Nazarbayev had appointed, which assured the loyalty of the body. By ruling by 
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decree for most of 1995 and replacing the 13th Supreme Soviet with a compliant 
Mazhilis, Nazarbayev achieved impressive policy victories that had eluded him in his 
dealings with previous parliaments. These changes definitively subordinated the 
legislature to the executive branch, which eliminated the need, at least in the medium 
term, to create a party of power. With the Mazhilis's formal powers securely under 
control of the president and his nominees, the legislature became a toothless appendage to 
the executive branch, and has remained so ever since. 
 For Askar Akayev, the passage of Kyrgyzstan's constitution in May 1993 did not 
resolve his difficulties working with the Supreme Soviet. While he remained popular at 
the time among the general public, he was much less so inside the legislature. Over the 
course of 1994 and 1995, Akayev took a number of steps aimed at strengthening his 
powers. It was during these years that Akayev shifted the balance of institutional power 
in Kyrgyzstan via referendum to secure greater power for the executive branch. Rather 
than creating a party of power to assure a compliant Supreme Soviet, he changed the 
structure of Kyrgyzstan's legislature in order to increase the influence of regional 
administrators who tended to support Akayev at the expense of party-based MPs who 
opposed Akayev. These measures gave the president a way to work around rather than 
with the Supreme Soviet. This pattern persisted in Kyrgyzstan for the following decade 
until opposition protesters drove Akayev from power in the 2005 Tulip Revolution.  
 After the passage of Kyrgyzstan's constitution in May 1993, Supreme Soviet 
sessions became “plenums with showdowns,” which paralyzed the work of the legislature 
(Rossiyskaia Gazeta 1993-07-30). Representatives of eight parties that opposed Akayev 
convened a conference to organize their opposition to the president as if they were 
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waging "their last decisive battle" (ibid). On the agenda of this round table were motions 
to hold an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet to express their lack of confidence 
in the government. Members of these parties called for the expulsion of businessmen and 
regional administrators from the legislature and the convening of a professional Supreme 
Soviet composed entirely of full-time lawmakers from Kyrgyzstan's political parties, 
which jeopardized Akayev's main power base (ibid). 
 Later in 1993, Akayev's opponents targeted Prime Minister Tursunbek 
Chingyshev with charges of corruption in the disappearance of millions of dollars’ worth 
of Kyrgyzstan's gold reserves. Media accounts note the "combative and decisive" mood 
of Supreme Soviet legislators and their determination to hold the Prime Minister and 
National Bank director accountable for the loss (Komsomolskaya Pravda 1993-12-07). 
Chingyshev lost a vote of confidence in December 1993, and was replaced by Apas 
Jumangulov, a Communist hardliner, and an entirely new cabinet (Slovo Kyrgyzstana 
1993-12-18). In response to the turn of events, Akayev spun this defeat as a step to 
"balance out the government" by including representatives of both the reformist wing and 
"those who have experience of organizational work," i.e. the Communists. Analysts at the 
time assessed this turn of events as a victory for "revanchists" in Kyrgyzstan which had 
the potential to stop and even reverse the economic reforms that Akayev had 
implemented to date (Segodyna 1993-12-18). 
 Sensing his support in the Supreme Soviet weakening as the Chingyshev scandal 
dragged on, Akayev scheduled a referendum in which voters were asked whether they 
approved of his policies and whether they wished that he remain in office until the end of 
his term. Akayev began to call for the "self-dissolution" of the legislature, mirroring 
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events occurring at the same time in neighboring Kazakhstan (Interfax 1993-12-11). 
Despite these statements, analysts expected the Communists, who had been the greatest 
thorn in Akayev’s side, to do well in snap elections just as they had in the previous 
elections. At the same time, according to polls at the time, Askar Akayev was the most 
popular individual politician nationwide as well as the top ranked politician in each of 
Kyrgyzstan's six oblasts. He was also the only leading figure whose popularity increased 
in polls over the course of 1993 (Slovo Kyrgyzstana 1993-12-18). This popularity among 
the citizenry coupled with his unpopularity in the legislature may have given Akayev his 
inspiration for his main institutional strategy for the coming years: to change 
Kyrgyzstan's political institutions via referendum rather than through parliamentary 
deliberation.  
 According to Huskey (1997), efforts to win support within the Supreme Soviet led 
Akayev to strike an “informal pact” with Supreme Soviet speaker Medetkan Sherimkulov 
that substituted for establishing a formal parliamentary bloc sometime after the passage 
of Kyrgyzstan’s constitution in 1993 (257). According to this pact, Sherimkulov was to 
use the personal connections he built with incumbent legislators during his long career as 
a high-ranking Communist Party functionary to keep overt conflict in the Supreme Soviet 
to a minimum. In exchange, Sherimkulov himself received various side-payments. This 
set-up exemplifies the kinds of ad-hoc alliances that Akayev forged in the absence of a 
stable group of supporters. Rather than trying to marshal uncooperative legislatures into a 
party of power, he pursued an indirect path for securing legislative support. However, this 
pact came to an end as economic conditions worsened and was not sufficient to maintain 
support for Akayev. 
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 After receiving a clear show of support during the January 1994 referendum, 
Akayev restated his dedication to maintaining interethnic harmony in the republic, and 
that “unity, friendship, and accord between the people of Kyrgyzstan” would be the key 
to overcoming present challenges (ITAR-TASS 1994-02-10). However, as time passed, 
Akayev's “politics of inclusion" in which he made concessions and compromises to "all 
but the most radical" contingents of the Supreme Soviet (Huskey 1997: 256) had the 
unintended consequence of raising the cost of cooperation from legislators in the future. 
Continued steps towards reconciliation with parliamentary opponents cast Akayev as a 
leader who could be squeezed for more concessions. Along with concessions to members 
of parliament, Akayev did little "to halt the 'spontaneous' devolution of power" to 
regional leaders (Jones-Luong 2002: 108), which strengthened the influence of regional 
elites in policymaking. According to observers of Kyrgyzstani politics at the time "it 
[was] not Akayev who [was] determining the pace of reform in Kyrgyzstan but the 
[regional] akims" (Jones-Luong 2002: 109). Thus by 1994, Akayev lacked control over 
the Supreme Soviet as well as regional elites, and so his strongest claim to legitimacy as a 
leader was his popularity among average citizens.67 
 At the end of September 1994, the president scheduled a referendum on 
amendments to the constitution, one of which called for the establishment of a bicameral 
parliament with a total of 105 members, and another which established the possibility of 
amending the constitution via referendum rather than via the parliament (Kyrgyz Radio 
1994-09-23). Both of these were institutional changes that Akayev pursued in order to 
both exert more personal control over the legislative branch while simultaneously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Akayev remained popular among Western donors for his liberal economic reforms and tolerance of 
opposition groups (Anderson 1999). 
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reducing its powers. Though unable to stop the referendum, a majority of deputies, 
refused to attend the rest of the scheduled parliamentary sessions, thereby denying the 
Supreme Soviet a quorum. As a consequence, the legislature entered a period of 
stalemate until the February 1995 parliamentary elections. 
 Whereas Heydar Aliyev and Eduard Shevardnadze created parties that passed 
which secured legislative cooperation of for the executive agenda, Akayev and 
Nazarbayev resorted to measures that allowed them to work around their legislatures 
once they realized that they would not be able to establish parties of power of power. 
Claiming that referenda were becoming “one of the most real and effective forms of 
democracy in the country” (Slovo Kyrgyzstana 1994-09-27), Akayev stated that in the 
future that authorities would seek the input of the population on a range of issues 
including the economy, the use of natural resources in the country and social welfare. 
Similarly, Nazarbayev used referenda and presidential decree for a nine-month period in 
1995 to drastically alter Kazakhstan's laws on his own terms.  
 After 1994, Akayev staged referenda in 1996, 1998, and 2003 that altered the size 
and structure of the Supreme Soviet, took powers away from the judicial branch, and that 
finally confirmed the Kyrgyzstani people's desire for him to serve out his final term until 
its end in 2005. Akayev managed to isolate the Supreme Soviet, though he never expelled 
the opposition from the body. He adopted a laissez-faire, conciliatory attitude towards 
regional political elites whom he stacked in the upper house of parliament, while he gave 
members of the regional administration free rein to siphon off state resources and as long 
as they did not openly organize against Akayev. As long as he could steal elections, 
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Akayev could maintain the status quo in the parliament and stage referenda for public 
displays of support. 
 On the other hand, Nursultan Nazarbayev succeeded in charting a non-party 
strategy of rule that provided him with greater personal control over Kazakhstan's 
parliament. By redesigning the legislature such that he could directly nominate seven 
members of the upper house and indirectly nominate the rest, he retained the formal 
levers needed to control Kazakhstan's legislature, which unlike Kyrgyzstan's ceased to be 
a locus of opposition despite the absence of a party of power. 
 
Revelation of Types in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
 By 1996, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan settled into distinct non-party institutional 
equilibria after their tumultuous first years of independence. While the two countries' 
institutional trajectories shared a number of similarities until 1995, they diverged 
afterwards as leaders revealed their type. In Kazakhstan, a wave of repression of 
opposition figures and brazen manipulation of the constitution by President Nazarbayev 
definitively disempowered the legislative branch and dealt a number of serious blows to 
the Kazakhstani opposition. The original Kazakhstani elites who dominated Kazakhstan's 
Supreme Soviets in the early 1990s were definitively excluded from politics by the mid-
1990s and suffered serious repression, though the opposition was periodically replenished 
by defections from the ruling clique (Junisbai and Junisbai 2005). 
 On the other hand, the dynamics of Kyrgyzstani politics after 1995 largely 
resembled those of the previous years. Efforts on Akayev's part to minimize the 
institutional strength of the legislature via referendum succeeded, but support within the 
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legislature depended on ad-hoc deals with influential regional elites who ultimately 
overthrew him in 2005. Legal harassment of political elites took place intermittently 
during the 1990s and early 2000s, but the original elites who opposed Akayev in the early 
1990s remained in office throughout his presidency and replaced him in 2005 (Radio 
Free Europe / Radio Liberty 2015-06-24). 
 After the 1995 dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, Nazarbayev’s displayed a clear 
willingness to his critics in the opposition. While Nazarbayev transformed his rhetorical 
appeals for maintaining interethnic harmony and domestic stability into a national 
ideology over the 1990s, as time passed, his actions demonstrated the harsh means he 
would use to achieve his goals. According to Olcott (1997), for Nazarbayev, direct 
presidential rule between April and December 1995 followed by “all but direct 
presidential rule” definitively established the presidency as the primary locus of political 
power in Kazakhstan. The subservient Mazhilis that formed in 1996 provided a thin 
veneer of checks and balances in Kazakhstan’s government without threating meaningful 
opposition of Nazarbayev’s initiatives. 
 After this shift, Nazarbayev brazenly repressed his political opponents. While 
between 1993-1995, freedoms of expression and assembly for opponents of the president 
were mostly respected,68 the tendency during the late 1990s and beyond has been towards 
increasing restrictions on public demonstrations, greater persecution of the media, and 
more intense physical repression of the government’s opponents. In late 1996, Petr Svoik, 
a prominent member of Kazakhstan's 12th and 13th Supreme Soviets was summoned to 
the State Committee for Investigations to discuss “alleged wrongdoing” during his tenure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Before 1995, unauthorized protests were mostly tolerated, though each year one or two unauthorized 
protests resulted in the arrests of the protest’s organizers. 
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as head of the State Antimonopoly Committee (US Department of State 1996b). In 
January of the following year, Nazarbayev called for “a year of political accord,” 
effectively a moratorium on public political demonstrations. While state-supported 
organizations complied, independent movements did not. In March 1997, the Prosecutor 
General warned that “all necessary actions” would be taken to stop unsanctioned protests 
after an unauthorized demonstration took place which criticized top government officials. 
Later that year, Petr Svoik was attacked in a hotel room in Bishkek and allegedly 
“received a warning from the government” following his staging of an unsanctioned 
opposition rally in Almaty in November 1997 (US Department of State 1998b). While 
enforcement of the moratorium on protest was unevenly applied, this policy marked a 
clear change of tack from previous years.69  
 After resigning from his position in October 1997, Prime Minister Akezhan 
Kazhegeldin and his close associates came under violent attack, likely on political 
grounds; many of these attacks targeted the campaign staff supporting Kazhegeldin’s 
candidacy in the 1999 presidential elections. Other attacks in 1998 singled out high 
profile Kazakhs as well as foreign embassy officials engaged in reporting on the 
worsening human rights conditions in the country. The following year, soon after 
announcing early presidential elections, five opposition leaders, including Kazhegeldin, 
were arrested and convicted of staging an unauthorized rally, which disqualified them 
from the presidential race (US Department of State 1999b). Intra-elite conflict sent 
groups of former regime insiders into the opposition, yet each wave of regime defectors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Human rights reports published by the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and 
Labor on Kazakhstan list two organizations who experienced administrative difficulties after staging 
unauthorized rallies in 1996. In 1997, unauthorized protests led to the arrest of the events’ organizers on at 
least six occasions. 
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led to an intensification of repression rather than concessions to the new opposition. 
(Sabitov, Zhaksylyk. Interview. 2015-03-11). As long as revenues from hydrocarbon 
sales poured into the country, and as long the flow of foreign capital continued, 
Nazarbayev and his associates had ample resources to repress dissenters and coopt new 
supporters. Though economic growth in Kazakhstan fueled intra-elite conflict, this 
conflict did not result in any significant liberalization of the regime during the 2000s 
(Junisbai and Junisbai 2005).  
 By the end of the 1990s, a number of new pro-presidential blocs of legislators 
formed in what was an already completely compliant Mazhilis. Fatherland (Otan) Party 
won 23 out of 77 seats in the lower house, while the Civic Party in a coalition with the 
Agrarian Party won of 16 seats. The Communists under the leadership of Serikbolsyn 
Abdildin won three out of 77 seats and represented the only opposition force in the 
Mazhilis (IPU Parline 1999). The 2004 Mazhilis's membership represented an even more 
uniformly pro-presidential group of parties and included four seats for Asar, a party 
created by President Nazarbayev's elder daughter Dariga (IPU Parline 2004). Analysts 
have explained rise of this constellation of pro-presidential parties as a response to newly 
formed opposition parties such as DVK, which were created by former regime insiders 
who went into the opposition (Junisbai and Junisbai 2005).  
 A call in 2006 by Dariga Nazarbayeva for all pro-presidential parties to unite so 
catalyzed the establishment of the Nur Otan, Kazakhstan’s first party of power.70 
Constitutional amendments passed in May 2007 increased the size of the Mazhilis from 
77 to 107 deputies, and shifted the balance from 67 SMD seats and 10 party list seats to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 This comment lends support to the notion that parties of power can be created as a defensive move to 
occupy the party sphere, which would stymie the growth of new parties. 
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98 party list seats and 9 appointed members (IPU Parline 2007). Now under the 
leadership of President Nazarbayev, Nur Otan won every seat directly elected seat in 
Kazakhstan's 2007 parliamentary elections (OSCE-ODIHR 2007). Akin to the creation of 
the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan or the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan in 
1991, the establishment of Nur Otan involved little uncertainty, and merely formalized 
pre-existing dynamics between the executive and legislative branches. 
 As stated above, for Akayev, little changed in the Zhogorku Kenesh after the 
1995 elections. The political forces that posed problems for Akayev's legislative agenda 
in the early 1990s continued to do so for entire 15 years of his presidency. The 
Communist Party of Kyrgyztan retained the largest seat share and remained the best 
organized party in the 35-member lower house, though it lost some of its cohesion due to 
targeted cooptation of members by President Akayev (Ishiyama 2008: 158-160). For the 
2000 parliamentary elections, 15 seats in the legislature’s lower house were assigned 
based on party list. Remarkably five out of the eleven parties that competed passed the 
5% threshold in 2000, which awarded seats to the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan (27% 
of the vote), and the Union of Democratic Forces (18% of the vote) as well as three 
smaller parties (IPU Parline 2000b). Though the 1996 and 1998 constitutional 
amendments weakened the formal powers of the legislative branch, parliamentarians in 
Kyrgyzstan continued to show remarkable independence. In 1997, the Zhogorku Kenesh 
overturned 15 presidential vetoes including one on a bill to allow no-confidence votes on 
any government minister.  The following year, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament overturned 28 
vetoes and delayed passage of the 1998 budget in order to extract more concessions from 
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Akayev.71 Such consistent opposition to the presidential agenda was unprecedented in 
Central Asia. 
 During Akayev’s second term, 1995-2000, there were no extrajudicial or 
politically-motivated killings in Kyrgyzstan, and minimal censorship. Rather, Akayev's 
opponents were targeted for legal and administrative harassment rather than 
imprisonment, beatings, and imprisonment. The leader of Kyrygzstan's most influential 
opposition party Erkin Kyrgyzstan, Topchubek Turgunaliyev, was arrested in April 1996 
for allegedly distributing anti-Akayev leaflets. Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Court upheld the 
verdict against him, but then released him in mid-1997 in a general amnesty. 
Turgunaliyev spent the next year in and out of prison for participation in a series of 
illegal demonstrations. As of the end of 1998, Turgunaliyev has remained out of prison 
however he was placed under probation, which disqualified him from running in the 2000 
parliamentary elections.  
 Rather than outright repression, Akayev's government used electoral fraud to 
ensure victory in the country’s competitive elections. The OSCE and other human rights 
monitors consistently assessed elections in Kyrgyzstan negatively. The 1996 referendum 
was regarded as “marred by irregularities,” particularly related to voter turnout, which 
was officially reported at 98% but which was in fact far lower (US Department of State 
1997c). Similarly, the 96% turnout reported by the government in the 1998 referendum 
“was not in accord with participation rates witnessed by local and international 
observers” (US Department of State 1999c).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Eduard Shevardnadze, another conciliatory leader, but one whose party of power maintained a leading 
position in Georgia’s parliament only vetoed one bill during his presidency (Eurasianet 2003-03-19). 
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 Nonetheless, choice remained high in elections under Akayev. An average of 8.9 
candidates registered in single member district races in the 1995 elections, 4.7 candidates 
per district in 2000, and 5.2 in 2005, and on average, there were approximately three 
“effective candidates” in districts across the country in each of the three elections. More 
importantly, the winning candidates won on average only 37.8% of their districts vote in 
1995, 43.6% in 2000, and 47.2% in 2005 (Sjoberg 2011: 152). A second round of 
elections was necessary in 87 of the 90 SMD districts as candidates in these districts 
failed to win an outright majority (IPU Parline 2000b). Though spurious claims against 
the leader of the People’s Party leader, Daniyar Usenov, and Ar-Namys Party leader, 
Omurbek Suvanaliyev put pressure on these candidates during their races, both were 
ultimately permitted to compete in the 2000 parliamentary elections (US Department of 
State 2001b).  
 The Akayev regime met its end in March 2005 after post-election protests 
paralyzed the center of Bishkek and forced the president and his family to flee 
Kyrgyzstan. Though Askar Akayev appeared committed to leaving office at the end of 
his constitutionally-mandated second term in 2005, he raised suspicions by supporting his 
daughter Bermet's efforts to organize a party of power, Alga, Kyrgyzstan!  According to 
Bunce and Wolchik (2011), the final straw for the Akayev regime was not the fact that he 
stole the 2005 elections, but that he stole them in a way that upset the status quo power-
sharing with regional elites. The courts were used to disqualify popular politicians from 
running for parliament on arbitrary grounds72 brought back reminders of the 2000 
parliamentary elections. This compounded tensions from 2003 changes to the constitution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Roza Otunbayeva, a former ambassador and widely respected opposition politician, was disqualified 
from running for office in the Bishkek district where she resided; this happened to be the same district 
where Bermet Akayeva was registered (Eurasianet 2005-03-17). 
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that made it more difficult for opposition members to compete for power (Bunce and 
Wolchik 2011:173-174). The electoral defeat of popular Southern Kyrgyzstani politicians 
set off protests in early March 2005 which soon spread to Bishkek and toppled Akayev's 
government by the end of the month.  
 By the mid-2000s, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan's political trajectories diverged 
remarkably. While Kazakhstan crossed the threshold to a "consolidated authoritarian 
regime" in the mid-1990s and has remained in that category ever since, Kyrgyzstan under 
Akayev remained a "hybrid regime," where civil society organizations and the media 
outlets have continued to operate relatively unhindered, especially when compared to 
Kyrgyzstan's neighbors in the region. Akayev's conciliatory nature meant that persecution 
of his opponents remained low, while repressive measures against certain figures were 
coupled with concessions to others. As a contrast, in Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev's 
repressive rule, whole categories of rivals were excluded from power and prevented from 
returning to power either being exiled or by meeting their untimely deaths. In both 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the leader's type shaped politics far beyond the macro-
institutional choices that the leaders made in the 1990s. While both leaders pursued a 
similar strategy to work around their legislatures rather than coopt their members through 
parties of power, the repressive leader still presides over a consolidated authoritarian 
regime while the conciliatory one lost power following popular protests. 
 
Conclusion 
 This paired comparison of Nursultan Nazarbayev and Askar Akayev's strategies 
of rule in the 1990s demonstrates the conditions under which not creating a party of 
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power dominates creating one, despite the incentives that each leader had to create a 
party. In the Kazakhstani case, the consolidation of parliamentary opposition in 1993-
1994 made clear to Nursultan Nazarbayev that elites would not join a potential party of 
power. Subsequently, he disbanded the Supreme Soviet and amended Kazakhstan's 
constitution to disempower the legislative branch permanently. In Kyrgyzstan, a 
contentious Supreme Soviet obstructed President Akayev's agenda, launched corruption 
investigations against high-placed officials and stymied attempts to dissolve the 
parliament. Realizing that existing elites would not join a party of power, Akayev secured 
the powers of the presidency via referendum and direct appeals to the population rather 
than through parliamentary legislation. Yet his conciliatory rule included significant 
compromises to regional politicians and economic elites, which over time empowered 
elites to the degree that they no longer depended on the president's patronage. 
 By comparing two leaders of neighboring post-Soviet states whose paths to power 
and challenges in office parallel each other allows the analysis to focus on the crucial 
variables of leader type and elite beliefs about their types. During the period when 
Nazarbayev and Akayev were deciding whether to create parties of their own or not, the 
fact that elites in both countries believed both leaders to be conciliatory led both leaders 
not to create parties of their own. However, in the aftermath, Nursultan Nazarbayev, a 
repressive leader, used coercion to exclude and punish uncooperative political elites 
while Askar Akayev, a conciliatory ruler, employed cooptation and consensus-building as 
strategies of rule.  
 In addition to demonstrating how leaders of different types make the same 
institutional choice, this chapter also shows how leader type affects the internal dynamics 
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of a given regime. Neither Nazarbayev nor Akayev established parties of power in order 
to control the legislative branch, and both relied on a combination of referenda and ad-
hoc cooptation to secure their rule. However, in Kazakhstan, visible repression by 
Nazarbayev kept discipline among his allies despite periodic defections of regime 
insiders. In Akayev's case, his continued inclusion of a wide range of regional elites and 
the concessions he granted them put his rule on much weaker footing. The development 
of a consolidated authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan and a less stable version of 
authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan likely has more to do with leaders’ types than their 
institutional choices. 
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Chapter 5: Why Parties of Power? A Reprise 
 
 In this dissertation, I posed the question, "why parties of power" in order to 
understand why some incumbent authoritarian leaders create political parties of their 
own. As I began to dig deeper into the topic, a number of variations of the "why parties" 
question emerged. What purpose do these parties serve? What benefits do they provide? 
Given the uncertainty about the survival of parties of power, can their creation be 
justified by the long-term functions that they perform? What short-term benefits do these 
parties provide? Given the widely recognized incentives that authoritarian rulers have to 
maintain parties of their own, why don't all leaders create them?  
 By delving into the literature on party creation in authoritarian regimes, I found a 
lack of attention to the creation of parties of power and few attempts to explain the 
variation in the distribution of these parties across authoritarian regimes worldwide. 
However, by evaluating the entire set of parties of power in light of existing theories, I 
found that whether a leader creates a party appears not to be a simple function of the 
benefits they expect to receive minus the costs they expect to pay. The decision also 
appears not to depend on specific resource endowments, historical legacies, career 
trajectories of individual leaders, nor any particular institutional configurations. It is 
evident that authoritarian leaders do not create parties where legislatures are shuttered, 
where elections are not held, and where parties themselves are banned. However, these 
patterns offer little positive insight into why some authoritarian leaders create parties. 
 The lack of satisfactory structural, historical, and institutional explanations for the 
variation in authoritarian party creation turned my attention to agent-centered 
   
142 
	  
explanations. After considering decision-theoretic accounts of leaders' choices, it became 
clear that it is impossible to develop an adequate theory considering only rulers. Creating 
a party of power depends both on leaders' incentives as well as the willingness of elites to 
join the party, and so is a strategic and interdependent process. Though both sides stand 
to benefit from creating or joining a party of power under some circumstances, different 
institutional outcomes emerge based on actors' expectations of their opponents' actions in 
the game. By understanding actors' preferences, the order of their play, and their beliefs, 
one can identify the conditions under which leaders create parties and when they do not.  
 In this dissertation, I propose a formal model in which party creation as well as 
the decision not to create a party both emerge as stable institutional equilibria. I model 
authoritarian party creation as a signaling game in which creating a party is a costly and 
meaningful signal of leader type, either conciliatory or repressive. Repressive leaders 
punish and exclude uncooperative elites while conciliatory ones rule through consensus 
and cooptation. Though elites know that both types of leaders exist, they are uncertain 
about their own leader's type, especially for the first few year's of the ruler's tenure. Thus, 
when elites observe that leaders are creating a party of power, elites must base their 
decision about whether to join on their best guess about the leader's type.  
 I make explicit the assumptions that support two pure-strategy pooling equilibria 
(EQ1 and EQ2) and demonstrate their existence empirically with two paired case studies. 
I also identify two other pooling equilibria and one separating equilibrium, which I link 
to existing literature but do not demonstrate in narrative form. Assumptions that support 
the solutions to EQ1 and EQ2 generate the hypotheses that when elites believe leaders to 
be repressive, leaders succeed in creating parties and when elites believe leaders to be 
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conciliatory, leaders do not create parties of power. These hypotheses test the 
interdependent nature of party creation as well as the critical role of elite beliefs in 
shaping the process of authoritarian party creation.  
 I present pairs of historical case studies from four post-Soviet regimes in the 
1990s to demonstrate the existence of EQ1 and EQ2. I based this study in post-Soviet 
Eurasia because the shared institutional pasts, similar political cultures, and comparable 
dynamics of political mobilization across the region serve as controls for competing 
explanations of institutional choices in these regimes. I study the emergence of parties of 
power in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan specifically because these 
cases exemplify the puzzling variation in party creation by incumbent authoritarian 
leaders. While leaders in all four countries had strong incentives to create parties of their 
own, only leaders whom elites considered to be repressive succeeded in establishing 
parties of power. These case studies serve as a test of the plausibility and validity of the 
signaling model of authoritarian party creation, add empirical nuance to the formal 
model, and serve to open the phenomenon up to broader comparative-historical and 
statistical study. 
 
Summary of Main Findings 
 This dissertation has generated a number of novel insights into party creation in 
authoritarian regimes. The first findings engage with the notion that parties lengthen the 
tenure of authoritarian rulers. When the subset of authoritarian regimes that feature pro-
regime parties is compared with those regimes that lack them, it is clear that on average, 
rulers and ruling coalitions that maintain pro-regime parties remain in power longer. 
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However, when parties which rulers presided over before gaining power are removed 
from the set, the added time in power for rulers diminishes significantly. Leaders who 
create parties of power remain in power on average for two years longer than rulers who 
do not create parties at all.  
 This study departs from existing scholarship by justifying party creation by the 
short-term benefits that parties provide to rulers rather than long-term functions that some 
parties perform. This intervention in the literature allows the analysis to focus on the 
immediate concerns that lead rulers to make their institutional choices without having to 
grapple with the many intervening factors that lead a nascent party of power to develop 
into a consolidated one. Focusing on the short-term incentives allows this project to 
address the symbolic significance of creating a party of power, which in its own right is 
sufficient to shift elites' incentives for cooperation with the leader. By creating parties of 
power, I argue that leaders signal their commitment to share some measure of regime 
spoils with a select group of insiders, and at the same time communicate that they will 
exclude others. Thus, creating a party serves as an ultimatum to elites to reveal their 
preferences for cooperation and face the consequences. 
 This dissertation presents historically detailed narratives of the creation of parties 
of power in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Existing scholarship on Georgian and Azerbaijani 
politics of the early 1990s gloss over the creation of the Citizens Union and the New 
Azerbaijan Party and present the process as a fait accompli in which former First 
Secretaries simply corralled their former supporters into a new party. I offer a corrective 
to these accounts. For Eduard Shevardnadze and Heydar Aliyev, creating parties of 
power in the early 1990s involved deft navigation of contentious political environments 
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where failure could have meant losing power and plunging their countries back into civil 
war. Similarities in the initial conditions surrounding party creation in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan allow me to focus on the role that perceptions of leader type play in making 
party creation a dominant strategy for both repressive and conciliatory leaders. The case 
comparison of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan by similar logic focuses on lesser known, but 
fertile cases to demonstrate why two authoritarian leaders chose not to create parties of 
power despite having strong incentives to do so. As the narratives in Chapter 4 
demonstrate, both Nursultan Nazarbayev and Askar Akayev eschewed party creation in 
the 1990s because existing elites considered them both conciliatory leaders.  
 
Extensions of the Project 
  As I develop this project further, I envision a number ways to explore the theory 
of party creation more deeply, extend the case studies, and test the effects of parties of 
power on a number of other institutional and regime outcomes. 
 While so far I have focused on pooling equilibria 1 and 2, in the future I would 
like to explore the theoretical implications of the separating equilibrium (EQ5) generated 
by the model. As stated in Chapter 2, the entire set of party creation by incumbent 
authoritarian rulers is explained by a semi-separating equilibrium in which different types 
of leaders pool under certain conditions and separate under others. I chose to focus on the 
pooling equilibria for the case studies in this dissertation because they give insight into 
the sometimes surprising institutional choices of authoritarian rulers, and offer a twist on 
existing theories. However, in order to understand the full picture of party of power 
creation, I wish to delve deeper into case studies that illustrate a separating equilibrium 
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(EQ5). Vladimir Putin's creation of United Russia could serve as an example of an 
equilibrium in which a repressive leader creates a party, while Ukraine’s Leonid Kuchma 
was a conciliatory leader who did not. Furthermore, a case study of the iconic party of 
power currently in existence in the post-Soviet space would broaden the appeal of this 
project.   
 I envision extending the model to explore other aspects of the informational 
imbalance between elites and leaders. To date, I have modeled information such that 
leaders have information about elite beliefs but elites lack information about leaders' 
types. I justified this choice in Chapter 2 by explaining that leaders can observe elites' 
political preferences in the present while elites can only observe a leader's true type at 
some point in the future. However, as I develop this project further, I will address how 
leaders gain information about elite beliefs so that by the time they initiate the signaling 
game of authoritarian party creation, they already know elites' beliefs. Instances like 
Shevardnadze's 1993 parliamentary showdown and Nursultan Nazarbayev's flirtation 
with SNEK suggest ways in which leaders gather information before deciding whether or 
not to create parties of power. This phenomenon deserves further investigation.  
 So far, I have focused only on party creation by incumbent rulers during the first 
years of their tenure. However, the historical record shows that a number of leaders create 
parties much later. Anecdotally, it appears that these cases take place when leaders 
foresee a major shift from the institutional status quo. For Panama's Omar Torrijos and 
Bangladesh's Hussein Ershad, the resumption of elections after a long hiatus appears to 
have prompted the creation of their parties of power. For other leaders, such as 
Kyrgyzstan's Askar Akayev and Ukraine's Leonid Kuchma, attempts to create parties of 
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power near the end of their constitutionally-mandated terms may have been aimed at 
managing succession. It stands to reason that the stimuli for creating parties at later 
periods of a ruler's tenure are different than ones at earlier rounds. As such, they should 
be theorized differently and modeled separately.  
 As I develop this project, I would like to take up the question of what happens to 
parties of power after they are created. It is evident that a great deal of variation exists 
among parties of power in how they develop over time. Some parties feature robust 
internal competition, actively mobilize citizens, continue to recruit ambitious politicians, 
and carry out any number of other beneficial functions that bolster authoritarian regimes. 
Others ossify and cease to do much other than occupy seats (on paper) in rubber stamp 
parliaments. As I develop this work, I wish to understand what conditions lead parties in 
authoritarian regimes to remain vital to the maintenance of the regime and when they 
evolve into hollow appendages of the executive branch. As Gandhi (2008) argues, it is 
clear that legislatures and parties in some authoritarian regimes are more than window 
dressing. But some parties and legislatures in many are indeed little more than window 
dressing.  
 In this dissertation, I have focused almost entirely on parties of power as a 
dependent variable. Only occasionally has the analysis hinted at the effects that parties of 
power have on the political systems in which they are created, both within a given period 
of authoritarian rule and beyond. I have demonstrated how the creation of a party of 
power immediately changes incentives for elite cooperation with the leader, and have 
touched on instances when legislatures dominated by newly created parties of power 
transfer institutional power from the legislative to the executive branch. In the future, I 
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would like to test this phenomenon more broadly. I hypothesize that ceteris paribus, 
formal executive powers are stronger in regimes where parties of power exist. I expect 
this because leaders who create parties of their own use them to pass legislation and 
constitutional amendments that institutionalize the dominance of the executive branch 
over all others. Using a battery of control variables such as presidential versus 
parliamentary system and the institutional origin of the leader, I would still expect to see 
increased executive powers where rulers have created and maintained parties of power. 
 I would like to test the effects that parties of power have on the structure of party 
systems in which they have been created. Following Magaloni (2006) and Greene (2007), 
I concur that parties of power exert centripetal force in party systems which draws a 
portion of ambitious politicians who otherwise would have remained independent or 
formed their own. Thus, I expect that all else equal, the effective number of parties with 
seats in parliament will be smaller in regimes that feature parties of power. I also 
hypothesize that the percentage of seats held by independents will be larger in regimes 
where parties of power do not exist. I hold that this is the case because ambitious 
politicians who lack deep partisan convictions are likely to join parties of power where 
they exist, but otherwise would pursue political careers as independents. Additionally, I 
hypothesize that legislatures in countries where parties of power exist will be larger than 
countries where there is no party of power. Larger legislatures provide more patronage 
positions to party loyalists, while in the absence of parties, smaller legislatures mean a 
smaller group of legislators that rulers must coopt. 
 Finally, I plan to compare the effects of parties of power on a number of outcomes 
relating to the termination of authoritarian spells and what happens afterwards. 
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Preliminary evidence I have gathered indicates that leaders who create parties of power 
are equally likely to lose power in coups as leaders who do not create parties. This calls 
into question Geddes's (2006) assertion that parties protect authoritarian leaders against 
coups. Though in line with the findings that parties of power do not lengthen the tenure 
of authoritarian leaders when compared to leaders who do not create parties at all, the 
coup-related finding needs to be tested against a variety of control variables to ensure its 
robustness. Whether the existence of parties of power affects the nature of political 
competition in future periods of authoritarian rule under new leaders or under democratic 
rule has not yet been systematically explored. Arguably, formerly authoritarian regimes 
that feature some kind of party activity are better able to support multiparty democracy 
once an authoritarian spell ends, but it is unclear whether there is any difference between 
parties created before rulers gained power and those created afterward.  
 
Final Thoughts 
 When I first proposed this project, my goal was to explain variation in the 
durability of parties of power with the intent of explaining the role that parties of power 
play in either strengthening authoritarian regimes or undermining them. Like much of the 
literature on competitive authoritarianism, I believed that parties of power played an 
integral role in consolidating power for authoritarian rulers, but at the same time 
recognized that many parties of power failed to live up to this ideal. The focus of this 
project shifted over time to the creation of parties of power rather than their long-term 
survival. The research that has emerged as a result of these changes is undoubtedly more 
theoretically rigorous, more broadly testable, and more generative of novel insights about 
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parties in authoritarian regimes. As regards parties of power, my view of their role in 
anchoring or undermining authoritarian regimes has shifted almost 180° to the point that I 
am more comfortable arguing that most parties do not contribute to the long-term 
durability of authoritarian regimes. My appreciation of the importance of other factors, 
including the propensity of leaders to repress or to engage in conciliatory behavior, has 
emerged as a rival explanation for political outcomes to which I will devote greater 
attention in the future.  
 By proposing a novel theory and testing it with historical case studies from an 
understudied region of the world, this dissertation reduces some of the uncertainty about 
why authoritarian rulers create parties and promises to deliver a wide range of benefits to 
researchers of any type. 
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Appendix A: Parties of Power Worldwide 
 
Table 4: Parties of Power Worldwide 
Name of Party Founder Year 
New Azerbaijan Party Aliyev, H 1992 
People's Revolutionary Party of Benin Kerekou 1975 
Congress for Democracy and Progress (Burkina Faso) Campaore 1996 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party Rahman 1977 
Jatiya Party (Bangladesh) Ershad 1986 
ARENA and MBD (Brazil) Branco 1965 
Central African Democratic Party Kolingba 1986 
Comoran Union for Progress Abdallah 1982 
Congolese Workers' Party Ngouabi 1969 
People's Rally for Progress (Djibouti) Aptidon 1981 
Dominican Party (Dominican Republic)  Trujillo 1931 
Popular Movement of the Revolution (Zaire) Mobutu 1967 
People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (DR Congo) Kabila 2006 
United National Workers' Party (Equatorial Guinea) Nguema 1986 
United Fiji Party Qarase 2006 
Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (Gambia) Jammeh 1996 
Citizens' Union of Georgia Shevardnadze 1993 
Institutional Democratic Party (Guatemala) Azurdia 1967 
Party of Unity and Progress (Guinea) Conte 1993 
National Unity Party (Haiti) Duvalier 1958 
Nur Otan (Kazakhstan) Nazarbayev 2006 
Ak Zhol (Kyrgyzstan) Bakiev 2007 
Mauritanian People's Party Daddah 1961 
Democratic and Social Republican Party (Mauritania) Taya 1991 
National Movement for the Society of Development (Niger) Saibou 1989 
United Russia Putin 1991 
Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party Barre 1976 
People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan Rahmonov 1994 
Democratic Party of Turkmenistan Niyazov 1991 
Togolais People's Rally Eyadema 1969 
People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan Karimov 1991 
General People's Congress (Yemen) al-Hashimi 1982 
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Appendix B: Alternate Models of Authoritarian Party Creation 
 
Decision Theoretic Model 
 The simplest possible theoretical model of authoritarian party creation is one 
where the benefits of creating a party (B) exceed the costs of creation (C) for a given 
leader:  B - C > 0. This suggests that rulers who have sufficient resources to pay the costs 
of party creation, or those who expect to benefit the most from a party of their own will 
create one. Considering party creation in authoritarian regimes from this vantage point is 
helpful for underscoring the necessity of executive initiative in creating a pro-regime 
party, but the simple cost-benefit decision of an individual leader is not sufficient to 
explain the empirically observed variation in authoritarian party creation, as many leaders 
who seem to face low costs to party creation or who could benefit significantly from 
creating one do not in fact create parties of their own. 
 
Coordination Game 
 Any sufficient game-theoretic account of authoritarian party creation must 
account for the two empirically observed equilibria: one in which leaders create parties 
that elites join, and one in which leaders do not create parties that elites do not join. If 
modeled as a single-shot game of complete information, this takes the form of a 
coordination73 in which the pure strategy equilibria for leaders and elites would be (party, 
party) and (~party, ~party).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 "Battle of the Sexes," "Chicken," "Stag Hunt" and "Commitment" are all coordination games with 
different payoff structures. Though I offer an example with the simplest possible payoff structure, the same 
intuition about the explanatory power of coordination games holds for other payoff structures. 
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Figure 4: Single-Shot Coordination Game 
 
 
 
Assumption: 
 
a > 0 
 
 Coordination games depend on repeated play or some other external information 
about player's preferences in order to provide a rationale for the emergence of one 
equilibrium over another. This information often takes the form of focal points (Gauthier 
1975, Colman 1997) that identify factors specific to individual leaders or polities that 
would make one equilibrium more likely than the other. For authoritarian leaders, past 
activity in political parties might lead a given leader to create a party of his own while 
leaders who originated in the military might be expected to eschew parties. Alternately, a 
history of single or multiparty government during periods before a given leader's rise to 
power might lead players to converge on party-creation as an institutional focal point, 
whereas little or no party activity in the past may dissuade leaders from creating parties 
of their own. 
 Data gathered on the institutional origins of authoritarian leaders indicate that past 
experience with parties or other forms of rule do not provide focal points for coordination 
of future institutional choices. Of the 22 authoritarian leaders who had professional 
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backgrounds in legislatures, 11 already controlled parties at the time they gained power 
and so they did not face the question of creating a new party of their own. Of the 11 
leaders who did not gain power with a party of their own, four created new ones while 
seven did not. Of 198 authoritarian leaders with military backgrounds, 45 gained power 
with a pro-regime party which they maintained while in power. Of the remaining 145, 
125 did not create parties while 28 did create parties of their own (Svolik 2012b, Author's 
data).74 While rulers with legislative backgrounds were more likely to govern with parties 
once in power and military leaders were more likely to govern without them, sizeable 
proportions of each type of leader coordinated with elites to reach equilibria other than 
what would be expected given the leader's past. 
 Furthermore, neither the existence or absence of a legislature in past periods of 
rule in a given polity nor various partisan compositions of the legislature in the past 
provide focal points for institutional creation. Authoritarian leaders commonly created 
parties of their own after periods when legislatures were unelected or non-functional, 
while other leaders did not create parties after periods when single or multiple parties 
dominated existing legislatures. This suggests that past institutional configurations of 
legislatures do not determine the strategies that authoritarian leaders employ to dominate 
them in the future.75 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Monarchs remain the least likely group to create parties. Of the 39 leaders with royal backgrounds, three 
created parties of their own while two inherited parties from previous rulers. However 13 of these 39 rulers 
presided over appointed and non-partisan legislatures while four ruled without legislatures altogether, 
which provides a compelling rationale for most monarchs not to create a party (Svolik 2012b). 
75 The clearest underlying determinants of authoritarian leaders' decision to create a party or not are 
whether the legislature is operating, whether legislative seats are elected, and whether the legislature is 
partisan or not. In cases where none of the above hold, leaders have no incentive to create a party. 
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Dynamic Games of Complete Information 
 Modeling authoritarian party creation as a dynamic game of complete information 
succeeds in capturing some essential aspects of party creation, namely that the party 
creation process occurs in sequence when players can observe other players' actions in 
the past. However, these games of complete information fail to yield important 
empirically-observed equilibria, namely that many authoritarian leaders choose not to 
create parties despite the clear institutional incentives to do so. 
 
Figure 5: Dynamic Game of Complete Information with Single Type of Leader 
 
 
Assumptions: 
 
For leaders:    a > b> d > c  For elites:        h > g > e > f 
 
 
 In a dynamic model of party creation, authoritarian leaders move first, choosing 
whether or not to create a party of their own. Given the assumptions of leaders' and elites' 
preference as stated above, a leader creates a party when they expect that elites will join 
the party. Elites are always expected to join the party because they prefer to join a party 
once it has been created despite the fact that their top preference is for a party not to be 
created at all.76 I derive the assumption that elites prefer to join a party once it has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Elites' preference to join a party if created is based on a third stage of the game that can be added in 
which the leader punishes elites who do not join the party. Assuming that authoritarian leaders prefer to 
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created based on the view that in authoritarian regimes, "violence is ever-present and the 
ultimate arbiter of political conflicts" (Svolik 2012a: 14), and that when it comes down to 
a question of survival in power, at least a significant subset of authoritarian rulers prefer 
to repress uncooperative elites rather than tolerate their independence.  
 Given the payoff structure in Figure 2, the unique Subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium ( create a party, join ) emerges by backward induction. In the final stage of 
the game, rulers prefer to repress uncooperative elites (b > c), and so when facing the 
decision to join or not to join a pro-regime party, elites prefer the payoff of joining to the 
cost of certain repression for failing to join (e > f). Knowing that elites prefer to join 
parties,77 authoritarian rulers should always create parties given that the payoff of 
establishing a party is greater than the payoff associated with coopting elites through ad-
hoc side-payments (a > d). This model shows that despite the fact that remaining 
independent from an authoritarian leader's party offers elites the greatest possibility to 
extract benefits the ruler, elites will join parties when they expect to be repressed for 
remaining independent. However, this unique equilibrium provides no explanation for the 
many cases when authoritarian leaders do not create parties at all. Given the order of the 
payoffs in this model, leaders will always create parties. If payoffs are ordered 
differently, this same model could be used to predict that no leaders would create parties. 
However, both outcomes are impossible as pure strategy equilibria. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
punish rather than tolerate uncooperative elites, elites are expected to join the party in the game's second 
stage. 
77 The form of this game requires that elites prefer either to join a party, not to join, or to be indifferent 
between the two outcomes. The logic of the model works the same way with either preference for elites. I 
rule out the possibility of indifference between the two in this example because of the infinitesimal 
probability of complete indifference. 
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Dynamic Game of Complete Information with Two Types of Leaders 
 
Figure 6: Dynamic Game of Complete Information with Two Types of Leaders 
 
 
Assumptions: 
For repressive leaders:  a > e > b  For conciliatory leaders:  c > f  > d 
For elites: k  > g > h if repressive leader; l > j > i if conciliatory leader 
 
 The dynamic game of complete information described above does not account for 
the sizeable portion of authoritarian leaders who do not create parties of their own though 
they have clear incentives to do so. However, one way to account for this variation would 
be to include two types of leaders in a dynamic game of complete information. 
Repressive leaders, following the archetypal authoritarian ruler described in the previous 
section, prefer to punish elites who refuse to join parties while conciliatory leaders 
tolerate uncooperative elites. When combined in a dynamic game of complete 
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information, two types of leaders generate two distinct subgame perfect nash equilibria: 
for repressive leaders, ( create a party, join ) remains an equilibrium, while ( ~create a 
party, ~join ) emerges as an equilibrium for conciliatory leaders. In the latter case,78 
under conciliatory leaders, elites prefer not to join parties ( d > c ), and so leaders choose 
not to create a party at all as their payoff from no party at all is greater than the one they 
receive from a failed party of power ( f > d ). 
 Thus, in a dynamic game of complete information, a separating equilibrium 
emerges in which the two types of leaders behave differently according to their type. 
When leaders are repressive, they create parties and where leaders are conciliatory, they 
do not for fear of publicly exposing the fact that they cannot attract elites into a party of 
their own.  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 The third move of the game in which leaders choose to repress or not repress uncooperative elites is 
omitted here. It can easily be added as an extension, however for the purposes of brevity I do not discuss it. 
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Appendix C: Post-Soviet Leaders and Party Creation, 1990-2010 
 
Table 5: Post-Soviet Leaders and Party Creation, 1990-2010 
Leader Country Action Party Name Year 
Levon Ter Petrosian Armenia Inherited Armenian Pan-National Movement  
Robert Kocharyan Armenia No Party   
Serzh Sargsyan Armenia Inherited Republican Party of Armenia  
Ayaz Mutalibov Azerbaijan Inherited Communist Party of Azerbaijan  
Abulfez Elchibey Azerbaijan Inherited National Front Party of Azerbaijan  
Heydar Aliyev Azerbaijan Created New Azerbaijan Party 1992 
Ilham Aliyev Azerbaijan Inherited New Azerbaijan party  
Stanislau Shushkevich Belarus No Party   
Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka 
Belarus No Party   
Zviad Gamsakhurdia Georgia Inherited Round Table  
Eduard Shevardnadze Georgia Created Citizens’ Union of Georgia 1993 
Mikheil Saakashvili Georgia Inherited United National Movement  
Nursultan Nazarbayev Kazakhstan Created Nur Otan 2006 
Askar Akayev Kyrgyzstan No Party   
Kurmanbek Bakiev Kyrgyzstan Created Ak Zhol 2007 
Mircea Snegur Moldova No Party   
Petru Luchinschi Moldova Inherited Democratic Agrarian Party  
Vladimir Voronin Moldova Inherited Communist Party of Moldova  
Boris Yeltsin Russia No Party   
Vladimir Putin Russia Created United Russia 2001 
Dmitrii Medvedev Russia Inherited   
Kahor Mahkamov Tajikistan Inherited Communist Party of Tajikistan  
Rahmon Nabiev Tajikistan Inherited Communist Party of Tajikistan  
Emomali Rahmonov Tajikistan Created People’s Democratic Party  1994 
Saparmurat Niyazov Turkmenistan Created Democratic Party of Turkmenistan 1991 
Gurbanguly 
Berdymuhammedow 
Turkmenistan Inherited Democratic Party of Turkmenistan  
Leonid Kravchuk Ukraine No Party   
Leonid Kuchma Ukraine No Party   
Viktor Yushchenko Ukraine No Party   
Islom Karimov Uzbekistan Created People’s Democratic Party 1991 
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Figure 5: Post-Soviet Party Creation by True Type and Elite Beliefs 
 
 Repressive Leader (True Type) Conciliatory Leader  (True Type) 
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Saparmurat Niyazov, 1985-2006 
Democratic Party of Turkmenistan  
1991-Present 
 
Islam Karimov, 1989-Present 
People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan 
1991-Present 
 
Heydar Aliyev, 1993-2003 
New Azerbaijan Party 
1992-Present 
 
Emomali Rahmonov, 1992-Present 
People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan 
1994-Present 
 
Vladimir Putin 
United Russia 
2001-Present 
 
 
Eduard Shevardnadze, 1992-2003 
Citizens' Union of Georgia 
1993-2003 
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Nursultan Nazarbayev, 1989-Present 
No Party in 1990s 
 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, 1994-Present 
No Party 
 
Boris Yeltsin, 1990-1999 
No Party 
 
 
Askar Akayev, 1990-2005 
No Party in 1990s 
 
Leonid Kravchuk, 1990-1994 
No Party 
 
Leonid Kuchma, 1994-2004 
No Party 
 
Stanislau Shushkevich, 1991-1994 
No Party 
 
Mircea Snegur, 1990-1997 
No Party 
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